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9INTRODUCTION
This volume is the result of the interdisciplinary workshop entitled Histor-
ical Perspectives on Property and Land Law – An interdisciplinary dialogue 
on methods and research approaches that took place at the University of 
Zurich on 11th and 12th April 2019.1 The dialogue between legal historians, his-
torians, and scholars of Roman and comparative law was established around 
central themes: property law, transfer and registration of property. Topics 
that, in every time and place, have played a significant role in the organisation 
of society, in establishing legal relations, but which have also caused discus-
sions and conflicts.
The interdisciplinary approach enriches scientific research, giving several 
impulses to academic disciplines, but it is also relevant in searching for differ-
ent methods and perspectives, which contribute to the examination of legal 
historical implications in current problems. The era of globalisation has cre-
ated global interconnections, global circulation of ideas, models and institu-
tions. New technologies enabled by digitalisation, for example electronic reg-
istries for property, allow historians, legal historians, and scholars of Roman 
and comparative law to formulate or reformulate specific legal questions, in 
order to understand how the past shapes and determines our present.  
This volume aims to investigate how legal property regimes, land law and 
land registration systems are intertwined with economic, social, and political 
spheres; to analyse the social functions and legal and political implications of 
various land registration systems in different contexts and how, for example, 
they operated in a colonial framework; to scrutinise the relations between 
politics and property, as well as the transformation of the property concept, 
in its meaning and function.
In this perspective the concept of property (dominium) and possession 
(possessio) in Roman law served as starting point for the interdisciplinary 
discussion in the workshop. Worth mentioning are the difficulties which oc-
curred in the use of modern language: especially with regard to the transla-
tion of Latin texts, difficulties arose with the ambiguity of certain definitions. 
1  We are very grateful to Prof. José Luis Alonso, Prof. Ruth Arnet and Prof. Gisella 
Bassanelli for their partipation, encouragement and for their fruitful comments during the 
workshop. Special thanks go to Prof. Gisella Bassanelli for having supported us in pursu-
ing this interdisciplinary project from its beginning. 
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This is particularly evident in translating Latin expressions into the English 
language, where literal or respective translation appears to be challenging 
when referring to concepts of Roman law in the legal language of common 
law. Moreover, Roman lawyers did not give any definition of dominium and 
possession, instead, their case-by-case method privileged rather the exam-
ination of concrete problems over theoretical descriptions. This could explain 
the peculiar lack of clarity in using no Latin words to express Roman law 
concepts. 
Basically, dominium diverges from possessio, because the latter is not a 
right, but just a situation. This simple difference is particularly significant 
in the ways of transferring things. In order to hold a thing, the Roman order 
required just the condition of using it, without any damage to someone else’s 
right (bona fides), whereas to acquire a right over a thing, the same order re-
quired the use of prescribed legal ways and the application of specified rules 
(i.e. mancipatio in the case of land situated in Italy and traditio in other cas-
es of land purchase). If one of these conditions was not fulfilled, the right of 
property had not been transferred and one subject had the right, but he did 
not hold the thing, while another did not have the right, but held the thing. 
In late antiquity, ways of transferring things became simpler and preferred 
solutions granting a right but not dominium (i.e. emphyteusis), whereas more 
detailed rules were imposed in the land register system. In the economy of the 
Roman empire, agricultural lands provided the vast bulk of the revenue of the 
State. The management of rents, which formed the endowments of the cities 
and the churches and the incomes of the rentier classes (the senatorial and 
curial orders), implied careful and scrupulous attention to the land registra-
tion system.
The edicts issued by praefecti praetorio Orientis during the 5th – 6th  cen-
tury are detailed laws about transfer of immovable property. The chapter by 
Silvia Schiavo considers five of these edicts and shows how fiscal necessities 
could push the discipline of land transfer towards a strong request for “so-
lemnity”. A combination between ancient and new elements favoured the 
emergence of a precise system of registration of property transfers. Some of 
these elements can be recognised in modern legislations, as, for example, in 
laws enacted in Italy during the 19th century (as the chapter of Alan Sandonà 
shows). 
Paola Bianchi examines fourth-century Egypt, where a land registration 
system was already known in the Ptolemaic age. She points out in particular 
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the effects of illegal behaviours, tax fraud and the abandoning of agricultural 
lands (agri deserti) on the late antiquity economy. Bianchi aims to demon-
strate the imperial response in the face of evasion, inflation and crisis. This 
response encouraged the interaction between the Romans and the Goths. 
Like the Romans, the Goths also dealt with illegal behaviour regarding patro-
cinium in their Edictum Theodorici. 
Through a comparative perspective the contributors show how some 
Roman rules are still present in several modern legislations of the long 19th 
century. Simona Tarozzi aims to point out some similarities between Roman 
laws of the 4th century regarding the long-standing issue of abandoned lands 
(agri deserti) and Chilean laws of 1866 and 1874 relating to the colonisation 
of Mapuche’s territory.
The Chilean case is examined from a different perspective by Agustin 
Parise, who focuses his investigation on the Chilean agrarian reform that was 
enacted during the 20th century. Parise analises the origins of the paradigm of 
social function of property on both sides of the Atlantic starting from the end 
of the 19th century. A decisive moment for Chilean legal history was the pro-
gressive change of the concept of property from a liberal to a social one, and 
its implication on legislation. The conceptualisation of the agrarian reform in 
Chile is examined through its reception in specific law, illustrating how the 
Chilean normative framework reflects changes in the property paradigm. 
Pamela Alejandra Cacciavillani points out that Roman law served as a fun-
damental source for legislating on the acquisition of real rights in Argentina 
during the 19th century. From the distinctive features of the study and teach-
ing of Roman law in the Latin American context, her analysis investigates 
the role of Argentinian Dalmasio Vélez Sarsfield, who was the promoter and 
creator of the Argentinian civil code. Cacciavillani underlines how Roman 
law was not only received but also interpreted, selected and adapted for the 
regulation of land registration, which distanced itself from the consensualist 
system of property transfer.
A comparative perspective on the modern concepts of land in Latin Amer-
ica is offered by Silvia Bagni’s chapter. She explores how the indigenous An-
dean cosmovision of land and its relationship with nature has recently influ-
enced the national legal systems of some Latin American states. Bagni takes 
as case studies the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as important 
judgements of the Constitutional and Supreme Court of Colombia, focusing 
also on the concept of nature as a legal entity.
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Alan Sandonà traces the history of the “trascrizione” system in the King-
dom of Italy from the end of the 19th century to the promulgation of the Italian 
civil code of 1942. His chapter examines how the Italian government, jurists 
and politicians discussed the attempts to reform the land registration system, 
proposing its change. The Italian case proves how the historical events that 
occurred at the end of World War I not only changed the territorial sovereign-
ty of the Italian kingdom, but also had important repercussions and implica-
tions on the discussion concerning the reforms of the Italian land register.
On the colonial context, Mariana Dias Paes focused her attention on judi-
cial processes conserved at the National Archive of Angola, concerning a con-
flict over property rights and possession. After the abolishment of the slave 
trade and the independence of Brasil, Portugal moved its attention to its Af-
rican territories, with the aim of establishing a new form of colonialism. The 
exploitation of land, as well as the establishment of a land registration system, 
were part of the Portuguese colonial discourse. Dias Paes shows how the intro-
duction of a land registration system in a colonial context operated, changing 
the dynamics of certain social relations and impacting land conflicts. 
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina investigates the mechanisms of land law 
and land registration systems in African colonial territories between the 19th 
and 20th centuries, focusing on the relationships between global, interna-
tional and domestic laws in the imperial expansion and colonial periods. Her 
chapter examines legal mechanisms of colonial expansion and outlines the 
discourses between the colonial powers and their implications on the legal 
concepts of land ownership both in the colonial and the European context.
Addressing questions concerning land law necessarily involves aspects  of 
the intertwined relations between property and politics. In this perspective, 
the case study of Charles Bartlett on the Kingdom of Sardinia and its politics 
concerning real property between 1720 and 1848 analyses the political-eco-
nomic aspects of property and land law. The author investigates different 
periods throughout which the kingdom regulated property and its adminis-
tration. On the one hand, the history of corporations offers the possibility 
of depicting a complete image of the politisation of real property regimes, 
specifically during the end of the 18th century; on the other hand, the chapter 
demonstrates that although political forms could be easily changed, this did 
not occur for real property transfer and its administration.
This volume aims to initiate an open dialogue, a sort of platform, through 
which the variety and complexity of specific legal phenomena emerge. Ju-
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
13
rists, institutions, goverments and states are interwined with each other, in 
order to create different legal concepts, rules, legislations, edicts, in different 
times and places, re-defining national, international and colonial contexts. 
This dialogue is interdisciplinary and multicultural. The authors come 
from various countries and their different backgrounds show multifaceted 
approaches to the same subject, thereby enhancing the perspective of the re-
search. In our own times, the roots of our past are regarded as cumbersome 
or are sometimes disregarded, but with this interdisciplinary project different 
research perspectives are presented, through which the past dialogues with 
the present, in order to understand legal mechanisms today and also to plan 
for the future.
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina Simona Tarozzi

TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES, PUBLICITY
AND LAND LAW IN THE AGE OF JUSTINIAN:
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRAETORIAN PREFECT
Silvia Schiavo
1. Five edicts, issued by praefecti praetorio Orientis in V-VI century, pro-
vide stimulating perspectives on transfer of immovable properties, publicity, 
land law. 
The five texts are part of a wider collection of thirty-three edicts (τύποι; in 
latin formae) transmitted through Cod. Bodl. Roe 18 and published by K.E. 
Zachariae in 1843.1 
The edicts are not in an integral version, but in the form of epitomes. How-
ever, they offer an important overview on the normative power of praefecti 
praetorio, with reference to the Eastern prefects.
The praetorian prefect had administrative, fiscal, jurisdictional functions 
and could also create legal rules, through edicts, although with a significant 
limit: edicta could not be in contrast with the content of imperial constitu-
tions.2 Besides, the rules given by the praefecti praetorio had specific territo-
rial boundaries, as they were in force only in the praefectura where they have 
been adopted. 
The edicts issued by the praefecti praetorio did not need to be enforced 
through imperial constitutions. They had a normative value that was inde-
pendent from a validation of the emperors.3 
For the age of Justinian (the period we are interested in, as we will explain 
soon) two well-known imperial constitutions can confirm this circumstance. 
In CJ. 3,1,16 and CJ. 8,40(41),27, issued by Justinian in 531, the emperor 
mentions generales formae/generalia edicta of the Eastern Prefecture. The 
emperor transposes the rules of the edicts and decides that they have to be 
1  Zachariae 1843, p. 227-278. In this article we will discuss some problems already 
addressed in Schiavo 2018, p. 295-347. 
2  See CJ. 1,26,2, a constitution issued in 235 by Maximinus Thrax and later accept-
ed in Codex Iustinianus. On the problems arising from this constitution, among others, 
discussion in Zachariae, 1843, p. 242; Pastori 1950-1951, p. 44; Arcaria 1997, p. 301-341; 
Pietrini 2010, p. 571; Fercia 2012, p. 4; Schiavo 2018, p. 12-18. 




applied in all the provinces of the Empire.4   In Justinian’s laws, it is undoubt-
ed that the edicts had an autonomous normative value also previously, and 
that they were not subjected to confirmation of the emperor.5
The analysis of the collection in Cod. Bodl. Roe 18 allows us to say that 
the prefects intervened integrating imperial legislation but, sometimes, also 
dictating norms about matters not directly regulated by emperors. The topics 
considered in the edicts of this collection were diverse: administrative issues, 
problems connected with the trial, evidence, documents in general etc. 
On occasion, some of the normative solutions adopted by the prefects were 
took on also by the emperors, probably because particularly effective.6 The 
praetorian prefect judged in appeal vice sacra. Several cases arrived at his 
court, therefore he was continuously in contact with significant legal prob-
lems and had a strong interaction with practices and uses applied, at local 
level, within his prefecture.7
The edicts dealing with immovable properties are five: Ed. 2, issued by 
Bassus (548); Ed. 5,3, by Aerobindus (553); Ed. 12, by Eustathius (505-506); 
Ed. 29, by Archelaus (under Justin I) and Ed. 33,1, probably by Basilides (an-
other prefect operating under Justin I).
All of them regulate, as we said, two distinct circumstances: the giving of 
possessio due to a judicial sentence and the act of traditio on the ground of a 
contract or a private transaction in general. 
Scholars have often been divided on the meaning of these texts and diverg-
ing interpretations have been provided also in recent times. 
To briefly summarize the discussion, according to a first explanation, the 
edicts deal with the phenomenon of agri deserti. Consequently, the prefects 
delineate here a mechanism for the assignment of agricultural lands in a state 
of abandonment (so that they can be again cultivated and the related taxes 
paid).8
For other scholars, this interpretation cannot be accepted: for several rea-
sons, linking this directives to the problem of agri deserti is questionable. 
4  On CJ. 3,1,16, where edicta on the problem of recusatio iudicis are quoted, see Goria 
2000, p. 376-379, p. 384; on CJ. 8,40(41),27 pr., recalling edicts dedicated to the problem 
of fideiussio iudicio sistendi causa, Goria 2011, p. 6. 
5  See Goria 2011, p. 6; Schiavo 2018, p. 18-23. 
6  Observations in Schiavo 2018, p. 357-358. 
7  On these profiles see Goria 2011, p. 5. 
8  Rotondi 1914-1915, p. 46; De Dominicis 1971, p. 353; Solidoro Maruotti 1989, p. 
334, note 278; Bonini 1990, p. 23, note 36. 
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The edicts regulate a procedure in execution of a sentence, but also the tradi-
tio of immovable properties, based on a contract: this circumstance has very 
limited connections with the question of agri deserti.9
 Furthermore, in the same collection two more texts10 outline a procedure 
specifically reserved to agri deserti, the so-called adiectio sterilium, which 
consists in a forced allocation of lands to be re-cultivated, so that expected 
tributes can be paid.
On the contrary, the five edicts, characterized by the presence of regis-
tration profiles and the massive involvement of the bureaucratic apparatus, 
seem to respond to the need of protection of the current possessor or domi-
nus of the lands, as well as to fiscal control requirements. 
Therefore, they appear to be connected to the problem of certainty about 
the possessio and ownership of lands, also for fiscal reasons.11 We think it is 
the correct approach to better understand the content of these edicts.12
2. As mentioned above, the edicts of Cod. Bodl. Roe 18 regulating the topic 
of transfer of immovable properties are five.
In this work, however, our attention is drawn specifically towards one of 
them, Ed. 2, issued by Bassus and dating back to Justinian’s times (548). In 
the text, the two situations (the giving of possessio on the basis of a sentence, 
or traditio founded on a private transaction) are particularly clear, and this 
circumstance allows us to make some observations on the problem we are 
dealing with.13
9  See Fercia, 2012, p. 10; according to this scholar, Ed. 5,5 issued by Aerobindus could 
be an exception; probably it could deal also with the question of agri deserti (see discus-
sion in Schiavo 2018, p. 341-342). 
10  Ed. 1, which is an epitome of Nov. 166, an edict issued by the praefectus praetorio 
Demosthenes, and Ed. 24, epitome of Nov. 168, another edict issued by the praefectus 
praetorio Zoticus. 
11  Among others Schupfer 1905, p. 30; Pugliatti 1957, p. 114; Fercia 2012, p. 7; Voci 
1987, p. 61. 
12  See Schiavo 2018, p. 297. 
13  Ed. 12 of Eustathius concerns only the problem of the giving of possessio of im-
movable properties on the ground of a judicial decree; here the prefect introduces the 
possibility of interdictum unde vi against subjects entering an immovable property in the 
situation of vacua possessio absentium without a decree; Ed. 29, of Archelaus, deals with 
the process of issuing a decree of the giving of possessio; Ed. 33,1, of Basilides, again with 
the giving of possessio founded on a judicial decree; Ed. 5,1, issued by Aerobindus, could 
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Moreover, we also have the integral version of the edict, Nov. 167. It is well 
known that Nov. 166, 167 and 168 are not Justinian’s novels, but edicts of 
praefecti praetorio.14
First of all, important information on the question comes out from the 
praefatio:
Nov. 167 praef. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ὅσα διετυπώϑη παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ϑρόνων, καὶ ἐν 
κοινοῖς δηλούμενα γράμμασιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλοις γενικοῖς τύποις τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς ἢ 
περὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἀρχόντων καὶ τάξεων καὶ ὅλως ἀπαιτητῶν διαλεγομένοις, καϑ’ ὃν 
αὐτοὺς δέοι τρόπον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις προσφέρεσϑαι, ἢ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὑπηκόων αὐτῶν ἐν 
τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν ὀρϑότητος καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς  εὐσεβεῖς εἰσφορὰς εὐγνωμοσύνης, 
τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἔχειν ἰσχὺν βουλόμεϑα καὶ  ἐκ τῆς παρούσης ἡμῶν προστάξεως, ἐκεῖνο δὲ 
σαϕέστερον ἔτι προσδιορίσασϑαι δεῖν ἔγνωμεν.15
Concerning the praefatio of the edict, it has to be stressed that Bassus 
recalls previous interventions of the prefecture, related to several legal fields: 
local governors, personnel and tax collectors and their relation with subjects; 
the rectitude of the subjects in the transactions and in the payment of taxes. 
As it has been observed, it is possible that the topic of the giving of possessio 
could be referred to the problem of rectitude of subjects in transactions.16
More in general, this is an important point of the text, because it describes 
some of the fields in which the praetorian prefects used to issue edicts.17
Furthermore, the praefectus praetorio states that the previous rules must 
be kept in force even after the new edict, aimed at better clarifying the already 
existing regulation. Probably, several problems in application of the anteced-
ent statements were known by the prefect, and he decided to intervene again. 
In fact, the discipline dictated in Nov. 167 contains some obscure aspects: it 
concern the question of agri deserti. An overview on these edicta in Fercia 2012, p. 1-16; 
Schiavo 2018, p. 295-347. 
14  Discussion on this question in Zachariae 1843, p. 246-256. 
15  See english translation in Miller, Sarris 2018, p. 1029: “We wish all other regula-
tions of our high offices that are manifested in public documents, or other general direc-
tives of our authority-dealing either with how local governors, personnel and tax collectors 
in general must behave towards the subjects, or with the rectitude of the subjects them-
selves in their transactions, and their compliance over dutiful taxes- to retain their own 
force, by our present ordinance as well; but we have realised that there is one point on 
which we must make an even clearer determination, as follows”. 
16  See Goria 2011, p. 6. 
17  Goria 2011, p. 6. 
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needed to be integrated with preceding rules, lacking, today, for the schol-
ars.18.
 Bassus refers only to edicts of the praefectura Orientis and not to impe-
rial interventions: this circumstance could indicate that the matter we are 
dealing with was principally regulated by the praetorian prefects, and not by 
emperors. 
The prefect then dictates the new rules, clearly distinguishing between the 
two situations: the transfer of possessio of lands in execution of a provision of 
the judge, and the traditio on the basis of a contract.
Let us see what the rules are for the first case:
Nov. 167,1. Εἰ γάρ τις ἀκινήτου τινὸς ἀντιλαβέσϑαι σπουδάζων ἀρχικὰς ψήϕους 
πορίσοιτο, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς εὐδαίμονος ταύτης πόλεως ἀρχέσει τυχὸν ἡ τάξις τὴν σχολὴν 
μαρτυροῦσα τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τούτων νομῆς, εἰ καὶ τῶν γειτόνων ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις λέγει 
μαϑεῖν, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν πραγμάτων τούτων ἐπιλέλπηται: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις 
κειμένων ὑπὸ τοῖς τῶν τόπων ἐκδίκοις ὑπομνήματα ἃ παραπλησίως ταὐτὸ τοῦτο 
πράττονται δεήσει συνίστασϑαι, μαρτυρίας μὲν ἔχοντα τῶν γειτόνων. τηνικαῦτα δὲ 
ἄδειαν παρεχόμεν τοῖς τὰς ψήϕους ᾐτηκόσι τὰ πράγματα κατασχεῖν.19
If the transfer takes place in Constantinople, the competent office (proba-
bly the office of the executors20) must declare, according to evidence given by 
the neighbours, that nobody is currently in the possessio of the land.
 In the provinces, the involvement of the defensor civitatis is necessary: af-
ter obtaining the witness of the neighbours about the vacua possessio he has 
to provide for the confectio gestorum, for the official documentation attesting 
the giving of possessio.21
As in others of the edicts on the same topic, here the role of the neighbours 
(people living close to the land) is highlighted. They are called to give witness 
18  On the obscurity of Nov. 167 see Voci 1987, p. 62. 
19  See english translation in Miller, Sarris 2018, p. 1029-1030. “Should anyone pro-
duce testimonials of an official with the aim of laying claim to an immovable property, in 
this sovereign city it will perhaps be enough for the office to attest that possession of this 
property is vacant, as long as the said office also states that it has been informed by neigh-
bours that no-one has taken possession of these properties. For properties situated in the 
provinces, it will similarly be requisite for records to be drawn up the same effect under 
the defenders of the locality, also with attestation from neighbours; we then give those who 
have requested testimonials licence to take the properties in hand”. 
20  See Schupfer 1905, p. 31. 
21  On the ius actorum conficiendorum of the defensor civitatis see infra. 
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on the fact that the immovable property is not currently in someone’s posses-
sion: it helps to avoid a conflict between the old and the new possessor. 
They have a similar function in Ed. 12, by Eustathius, dating to Anastasius’ 
times: in this edict, neighbours are involved (with inhabitants and coloni) 
to attest that the land, to be given in execution of a judicial decree, is in a 
situation of vacua possessio. Also Ed. 29, issued by the praetorian prefect 
Archelaus under Justin I, contemplates the presence of neighbours attesting 
the property is not in someone’s possessio.22
Consequently, a common thread between these edicta can be identified. 
It is important to stress that the involvement of neighbours in the context of 
transfers of lands was not completely an innovation. 
 In fact, in postclassical age and in particular in Constantine’s legislation 
(then accepted in the Codex Theodosianus) the presence of neighbours was 
requested for the sale of immovable properties -they had to attest that the 
seller was the owner-,23 but also for gift -in this case, vicinitas was called to be 
present at the act of traditio.24
Neighbours had a strategic role in these constitutions, because of their 
concrete knowledge of the factual situation: according to some scholars, they 
were charged with significant functions in order to guarantee publicity and 
stability in the transactions regarding immovable properties. 25
The role of neighbours here strongly connected Costantine’s provisions 
with a far past, dating back to the Twelve Tables.26
After Constantine’s legislation, however, the role of vicinitas in this con-
text suffers a strong resizing. In a Novel of Valentinian III, Nov. Val. 15,3, and 
in a constitution issued by Zeno, CJ. 8,53(54),31, the function of neighbours 
is not so strong as in the past: on the contrary, an important position is given 
22  Analysis of these edicts in Fercia 2012, p. 1-16; Schiavo 2018, p. 299-319. 
23  See CTh. 3,1,2; some differences in the version transmitted through Fr. Vat. 35,6. 
On the relation between the two texts see Sargenti 1982, p. 279-305; Sargenti 1983, p. 
269-278. 
24  Palma 1992, p. 477. 
25  Cerami 1991, p. 637; Palma 1992, p. 477; Palma 2009, p. 931-947. The author 
writes: “I vicini, in quanto consapevoli della realtà di fatto, erano chiamati, dunque, a ga-
rantire l’effettività delle situazioni dominicali: in altri termini, la stabilità delle situazioni 
proprietarie veniva garantita attraverso un rafforzamento della pubblicità”. 
26  See Palma 2009, p. 939. The author thinks that in Constantine’s constitutions 
the presence of neighbours is requested also for religious purposes, as a sign of christian 
solidarity. 
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to the utilization of public documents to ensure publicity of the transfers.27
Considering this framework, it is significant that the praetorian prefects 
recuperate in their edicts a specific role for vicinitas, going against the trend 
developed in the last imperial legislation.28
3. Let us now consider the regulation given by Bassus for the second situ-
ation:
Nov. 167,1 … καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσι δὲ ἐκ συναλλαγμάτων τινῶν πρᾶγμα λαμβάνειν 
καὶ νομὴν τοιαύτην ἢ δεσποτείαν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ποιεῖσϑαι κατοχὴν ἀναγκαίας τὰς 
τῶν ἐκδίκων ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις μαρτυρίας νομίζομεν, ὥστε ὑπομνημάτων συνισταμένων 
ὑπ᾿ἀυτοῖς δηλοῦσϑαι τὴν παράδοσιν, εἴτε ἐπιστάλματα τύχοι γραφέντα φροντισταῖς εἴτε 
ἐπισταλμάτων χωρὶς ἡ παράδοσις μέλλοι γίνεσϑαι, προσόντος ἐνταῦϑα τοῦ καὶ τοὺς 
γεωργοὺς ἢτοι φροντιστὰς χρῆναι συνομολογεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, ὡς τὸν νεώτερον 
εἰδεῖεν νομέα καὶ δεσπότην καὶ τῇ τοῦ παραδόντος ἀκολουϑήσαιεν γνώμῃ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς 
ἐπιτρέψαντος. ἔνϑα δὲ ἂν ἔκδικος μὴ παρῇ, τὸν λαμπρότατον τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἄρχοντα τὰ 
τοιαῦτα συνιστᾶν ὑπομνήματα προστάττομεν ἢ τὸν ὁσιώτατον τῆς πόλεως ἰερέα, ὑφ᾿ἣν 
ἡ κτῆσις ἐστὶν, ὑπὲρ ἧς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττεται, εἰ πολλῷ τυχὸν ὁ τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἡγούμενος 
ἀπολείποιτο τῶν τόπων, ἐν οἷς  ἡ παράδοσις γίνεται ...29
27  On the question, Palma 2009, p. 942.
28  Also in Edictum Theodorici a certain role of neighbours is guaranteed: see Ed. 
Theod. 53. De traditione vero quam semper in locis secundum leges fieri necesse est, si 
Magistratus, Defensor aut Quinquennales forte defuerint, ad conficienda introductio-
num gesta tres sufficiant curiales, dummodo vicinis scientibus impleatur corporalis in-
troductionis effectus. See on this source Palma, 2009, p. 946, Tarozzi, 2018, p. 177, note 
93; p. 295. 
29  English translation in Miller, Sarris 2018, p. 1030: “We also consider attestations 
from the defenders in the provinces to be necessary for those intending to take a prop-
erty as a result of any kind of agreements, and to put such possession or ownership into 
their own hands; thus, when records are drawn up under the defenders, the conveyance 
will be made manifest whether there may perhaps be written instructions, or whether the 
conveyance may be going to take place without instructions; in that case, the agricultural 
workers or overseers must additionally assent, on the records, that they know about the 
new possessor and owner, and have complied with the intention of conveynor, who has 
told them to do this. Where there is not defender present, we direct that such records are to 
be drawn up by the Most Distinguished governor of the province, or else, if it happens that 
the provincial governor is a long way from the area where the conveyance is taking place, 
by the most holy prelate of the city under which lies the holding for which such transaction 
is taking place …”
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The second situation regulated in Nov. 167 is the traditio of the immovable 
properties; as we said, the delivery that takes place on the basis of a contract. 
More precisely, here the prefect refers to someone who wishes to acquire 
possessio (νομή) or ownership (δεσποτεία) of the land.
Probably this distinction is to be connected with the existence of different 
types of sale30 in Justinian’s compilation: a contract of sale that had real ef-
fects and a contract of sale that, on the contrary, produced only duties for the 
seller and for the buyer.31
In the provinces, the presence of the defensor civitatis is required: he 
must attest the successful delivery and proceed with the creation of public 
documentation, through the confectio actorum (as in the first case, assign-
ment of possessio on the ground of a judicial decree). 
After that, the prefect imposes another requirement: the agricultural 
workers (coloni) and the overseers (curatores), people who worked for the 
owner of the land have to declare that they recognize the person receiving the 
land as the new owner and possessor, obeying the intention of the conveyor. 
Perhaps, this is the most important novelty introduced by the prefect with the 
edict.32 The obligation occurs not only if letters (ἐπιστάλματα) are sent to the 
curatores, but also if there are not letters. We think that it is quite an obscure 
point to explain. 
According to an ancient interpretation of Nov. 167, advanced by Cujacius 
and then accepted also by Zachariae, here two different situations are regu-
lated: the case in which the owner of the land does not make the conveyance 
himself, but appoints through letters his curatores to proceed with it, and the 
case in which the owner himself makes the traditio.33
30  In fact, probably the contract that in most cases justified the traditio, the delivery 
of the land, was the emptio venditio. Also the gift could be in the mind of the prefect. See, 
on this question, Fercia 2012, p. 12. The scholar points out that in Justinian’s age gift was 
a consensual contract with the duty, for the donor, to make traditio (Iust. Inst. 2,7,2. On 
this text: Lambertini 2007, p. 2745-2756). 
31  For the sale with real effects: CJ. 4,21,17, emptio venditio cum scriptis. In this case, 
the subsequent traditio has the function of transferring possessio. In the other case, when 
emptio venditio produced only obligations, the subsequent traditio was needed for the 
transfer of ownership. See Fercia 2012, p. 12. 
32  For this approach see Voci 1987, p. 62; probably the need of the declaration com-
ing from coloni and curatores is a point through which the prefect tries to clarify the exist-
ing discipline (see his aim expressed in the praefatio of Nov. 167). 
33  See Zachariae 1843, p. 254, note 54. 
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Anyway, the most important aspect is that Bassus requires the presence of 
the defensor, and, in addition, a specific declaration coming from the over-
seers and the agricultural workers.  
Furthermore, it is established that in case of absence of the defensor civi-
tatis the involvement of the provincial governor is necessary, for the drawning 
of records attesting the traditio.34 If the provincial governor is not available, it 
is possible to ask the bishop for the confectio actorum.35
The issue on which we would like to focus, as it appears significant for this 
research, is the problem of the characteristics of the traditio in the context of 
Nov. 167.
As several scholars noticed, the edict, in the part relating to the traditio, 
dictates several formal requirements that, on the contrary, we do not find in 
Justinian’s compilation.36
On the ground of the principles emerging from Digesta, Codex and Insti-
tutiones, in fact, it seems possible to affirm that the corporalis traditio was 
not imposed in the transfers of immovable properties. Different mechanisms 
were widely accepted. In particular, ample room was made for the constitu-
tum possessorium, which had been deeply opposed in the post-classical age.37 
Moreover, formal requirements as the presence of officials and the confectio 
actorum were not mandatory.38
Bassus has a different approach, imposing various profiles of solemnity. In 
addition to the corporalis traditio, in fact, he asks for the essential presence 
of the defensor civitatis who must draw the documents certifying the delivery 
34  According to Goria 1995, p. 254, this means that the defensor civitatis was not in 
every city. 
35  There are no sources that attribute the ius actorum conficiendorum to bishops and 
ecclesiastical authorities in general. However, Nov. 167, together with CJ. 1,4,31, shows an 
involment of the bishop in the confectio actorum in substitution of the provincial gover-
nor. See also CJ. 1,4,26 pr.-2 (in which an autonomous power of the bishop is attested). On 
the question: Tarozzi 2006, p. 254. 
36  A part from a constitution dealing with transfer of lands in case of suffragium, CJ. 
4,3,1. See Gallo 1988, p. 974; Cerami 1991, p. 653.
37  See Fercia 2012, p. 12
38  On the ‘silence’ of Justinian’s compilation on the mechanisms of traditio relating 
immovable properties see Levy 1951, p. 130; Voci 1987, p. 67. According to Gallo 1988, 
973-974, Justinian is not interested in profiles related with publicity. Different view in 
Cerami 1991, p. 651-656. 
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and the declaration of coloni and overseers.39 From this point of view, it is 
possible to note a tendency, in the prefect’s regulation, to use typical mecha-
nisms of a formal act such as the ancient mancipatio.40 
One could see disharmony between these provisions and what emerges 
from Justinian’s compilation where less solemn principles are indicated. 
How can we explain this discrepancy?
We agree with scholars who believe that the regulation of the edicts inte-
grated Justinian’s system on these particular issues.41
According to this approach, Justinian, who did not state anything on the 
traditio of lands, referred tacitly to the rules given by the praetorian prefects; 
the prefects, among other things, probably took into account local practices 
and customs.42 As we said before, in the praefatio of Nov. 167 Bassus recalled 
previous edicts of the Eastern Prefecture on the topic, that needed to be clar-
ified. This fact can support the idea that several directives on the question 
were already been issued. 
Concluding the analysis of the second case regulated by Bassus,43 another 
question has to be stressed. We saw that the discipline of traditio in Nov. 167 
is quite far from the framework drawn by Justinian’s compilation. Are the 
rules given by the praetorian prefect completely innovative?
Despite the peculiarity of the regulation foreseen by the prefect Bassus, 
not reflected in the contemporary imperial legislation, it is necessary to high-
light some echoes of the previous Constantinian legislation on donatio. In Fr. 
39  According to Zachariae 1843, p. 254, note 54, in the case of traditio regulated in 
this part of Nov. 167 also neighbours (recalled, as we said, for the case of the judicial de-
cree) were involved. We think this is not clear: attestations coming from neighbours are 
not expressly indicated by the prefect in this point of the text. 
40  In this regard, Bonfante wrote that in the edict of Bassus solemnities are required 
that are similar to the ones of the ancient mancipatio. See Bonfante, 1926, p. 255; more 
recently, Fercia 2012, p. 12. On aspects of publicity in mancipatio see Colorni, 1954, p. 19; 
Pugliatti, 1957, p. 106, who believes that mechanisms of publicity in a modern sense are 
present in mancipatio only in a minimal way. 
41  For this approach see Voci, 1987, p. 67.
42  For Voci 1987, p. 67, Justinian “… rinvia tacitamente alle disposizioni prese dai 
prefetti del pretorio, ch’è da supporre tenessero conto delle diversità locali”. 
43  The final part of Nov. 167 is dedicated to the traditio in Constantinople, and it is a 
quite obscure regulation: the prefect says that the attestations concerning traditio and the 
executions already made give security to subjecs who received the lands. On this question 
see Zachariae, 1843, p. 255, note 67. 
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Vat. 249 (see also CTh. 8,12,1) a set of formalities, including the drafting of 
deeds which had to be inserted in the records of the iudex or municipal mag-
istrates were required.44
4. As we said in the first paragraph, scholars expressed different stances on 
the five edicts concerning the giving of possessio in execution of a decree and 
traditio on the basis of a private transaction.
 We think that the correct approach is the one reconnecting the edicts with 
the problem of security and publicity in transfers of immovable properties.45
The analysis of Nov. 167, that covers both the situations recalled, can con-
firm this view. 
As in the past legislation (think about Constantine’s regulation in his in-
terventions on sale and gift46), the various rules examined seem to meet the 
needs to create security on the legal situation of lands and on ownership or 
possessio.47
The mechanisms through which the goal is pursued are essentially the 
presence of officials, the drawning of deeds through the process of confec-
tio actorum, the involvement, although with different roles, of neighbours 
(attesting the situation of vacua possessio), coloni, managers (who have to 
declare to recognize the person receiving the immovable property as owner 
and possessor). 
In particular, the confectio actorum, through which deeds are created and 
recorded in the archives (in the specific case of Nov. 167, the defensor civita-
tis ones48), from which also copies could be extracted, had a clear and strong 
function of publicity, as some scholars pointed out.49
44  On the function of traditio in Constantine’s legislation on donatio see Lambertini 
2007, p. 2753, note 19. 
45  As pointed out by authors like Fercia 2012, p. 10.
46  See observations advanced in paragraphs 2 and 3.
47  On publicity see Colorni 1954, p. 37-38; Pugliatti 1957, p. 116-120. 
48  On confectio actorum and ius actorum conficiendorum in general, Steinwenter 
1915, p. 30; Lévy 1999, p. 311-326; Tarozzi 2006, p.  143-158. On the confectio actorum of 
defensor civitatis see, among others, Tarozzi 2006, 143-159. On the archives of defensor 
civitatis, observations in Schiavo 2018, p. 251-253. 
49  See Schupfer 1905, p. 30-31; and especially Pugliatti 1957, p. 116 and p. 119. The 
author stresses that starting from postclassical age the conservation of documents in the 
acta or gesta of magistrates had a significant role of publicity: “Storicamente il fenomeno, 
considerato nella sua precisa portata e senza prevenzioni, ha una importanza considerevo-
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Besides, the discipline envisaged by the prefect could be explained also 
with reference to fiscal necessities, which pushed towards a strong request for 
solemnity in the transfer of lands. The praetorian prefects had some reasons 
to intervene in this direction. They supervised the imposition and collection 
of taxes, and the registration of the acts relating to the traditio and to transfer 
of possessio facilitated the correctness of those operations.50
In conclusion, by mixing both ancient elements and new ones, the prefect 
Bassus creates a regulation directed to outlining a precise system of regis-
tration of property transfers, system which meets the need for security and, 
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L’EVASIONE FISCALE COME PROBLEMA CIRCOLARE
NELLE ESPERIENZE STORICHE:
ESEMPI DELLA TARDA ANTICHITÀ
Paola Bianchi
1. Premessa
La cd. esperienza giuridica della tarda antichità, dunque il periodo storico 
compreso tra il quarto e il sesto secolo d. C., conobbe differenti problemi. Tra 
i principali vi fu quello fiscale, concretizzatosi in crisi economica, inflazione, 
pressione e conseguente evasione fiscale, che vide protagonisti romani e per-
fino barbari.1 Il sistema di capitatio/iugatio che caratterizzò tale periodo non 
prevedeva la distribuzione del peso fiscale sulla effettiva capacità dei contri-
buenti, dipendendo lo stesso invece dalle necessità statali, che portavano a 
erogare privilegi o a vessare i sudditi laddove le necessità contingenti o più 
generali lo richiedessero. La separazione sociale tra honestiores ed humilio-
res, il fenomeno del patrocinium, il controllo effettuato dalla burocrazia im-
periale, la responsabilità dei decuriones, la vincolatività alle professioni e alla 
terra sono tasselli di un complesso quadro normativo, in cui, tra legge e prassi 
si tenta di mantenere il più possibile saldo e funzionale, anche per far fronte 
a episodi di invasione esterna, l’assetto economico e fiscale. Il tentativo non 
si concretizza in un modus operandi sistematico bensì in un proliferare legi-
slativo, di tipo alluvionale che porta con sé una serie di conseguenze, positive 
e negative.
Come recentemente sottolineato, il diritto finanziario attuale non può es-
sere correttamente compreso senza la conoscenza del suo sviluppo storico.2
Dunque illustrare qualche esempio storico di come la pressione fiscale 
avesse agito sui rapporti personali o addirittura inciso sullo sviluppo giuri-
dico di istituti potrà offrire un quadro della circolarità storica di problemi e 
soluzioni e contribuire ad arricchire il panorama generale del tema scelto in 
questo lavoro collettaneo.
1  Sul rapporto tra romani e barbari sotto il profilo fiscale e specificamente con riguar-
do all’influenza esercitata nel V sec. su di esso dai potentes, mi sia permesso di rinviare a 
Bianchi 2017, pp. 449-490.




Recentemente è stato infatti evidenziato come in caso di abbandono di 
terreni e, quindi, in caso di mal utilizzo della proprietà, in difformità al suo 
uso sociale (vedi art. 42 Cost.), essi possano essere espropriati per il bene so-
ciale3 e proprio a questo riguardo è stato proposto di utilizzare soluzioni che 
l’imperatore tardo antico adottava in caso di agri deserti.4
2. Agri deserti e la lotta all’evasione fiscale nel IV e V sec. d. C.: le risposte 
imperiali5
Il fenomeno degli agri deserti della tarda antichità, e cioè delle terre, pub-
bliche e private, abbandonate, a causa della improduttività dei terreni o a cau-
sa di dissesti finanziari dei proprietari, costituiva uno specchio di problemi 
sociali ed economici e, di conseguenza, anche di finanza imperiale. In realtà 
di tratta di fenomeni sociali ricorrenti: soluzioni pratiche per sfuggire ad one-
ri finanziari non sostenibili, o, come detto da Morelli, “fenomeni sociali che, 
con o senza soluzione di continuità, si ripetono in epoche diverse”;6 e, a questi 
fenomeni, lo Stato “reagisce con le stesse misure, o almeno con misure ana-
loghe: misure che, dettate da una politica economica intesa essenzialmente a 
salvaguardare le entrate del fisco, producono gli stessi effetti negativi”.7
Gli imperatori reagiscono a tale fenomeno attraverso una serie di leggi mi-
ranti a contrastarlo ma non si muovono secondo un piano sistematico: come 
accennato in premessa, l’insieme della legislazione su questo problema ha ca-
rattere alluvionale; con essa si cerca di arginare il fenomeno senza tentare di 
prevenirlo; gli interventi normativi oscillano tra promesse di esenzioni fiscali 
per chi si prenda cura dei fondi abbandonati (ad es. nel 365, con CTh. 5,11,8, si 
prevede, per chi curasse un fondo abbandonato, un’immunità fiscale triennale8) 
3  Maddalena 2014, pp. 105 ss.; v. di Fiorentini 2017, pp. 84 ss.
4  Maddalena cita C.11.59.8 e C. 11.59-11 unendo, arbitrariamente come ben messo 
in luce da Fiorentini 2017, p. 86, due costituzioni: C. 11.59.8 e C. 11.59.7. Di quest’ultima 
non comprende lo scopo del dettato normativo che non è quello di “riattivare la funzione 
sociale della proprietà soffocata dall’inerzia del titolare”, (così Fiorentini 2017, cit., p. 86) 
quanto quella, molto più concreta e contingente e, soprattutto, molto più realistica e lonta-
na da ipotesi dogmatiche moderne di proiezione, di recuperare i tributi come l’imperatore 
stesso afferma esplicitamente.
5  Gli argomenti qui trattati sono ripresi, con modifiche da Bianchi 2018.
6  Morelli 2000, p. 167.
7  Morelli 2000, ibidem.
8  CTh. 5.11.8 [Idem AA. a]a Rufinum P(raefectum) P(raetori)o. Quicumque posside-
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e tentativi, non sempre efficaci, di recuperare quanto perso dal punto di vista fi-
scale (un anno dopo, nel 366, con CTh. 5.15.20, si permetteva una rateizzazione 
dei canoni9); si impone il vincolo alla terra perfino ai barbari (ad es. nell’aprile 
del 409 Teodosio II cercò di migliorare la produttività agricola dei confini vinco-
lando i barbari sconfitti alla terra e al lavoro, CTh. 5.6.310).
Guardando più da vicino qualche esempio concreto vediamo la prima co-
stituzione del titolo 11 del V libro del Codice di Teodosio II, come ricostruito 
da Mommsen, cioè CTh. 5.11.8 di Valentiniano, del 365:
CTh. 5.11.8 [= V,15,8 H.] (365 Aug. 6) Idem AA. ad Rufinum praefectum praetorio. 
Quicumque possidere loca ex desertis voluerint, triennii immunitate potiantur. Qui vero 
re loca ex desertis volue[rin]t, trienni immunitate potiantur. … Dat. VIII Id. Aug. Med(io-
lano) [Val](entini)ano et Valente AA. conss.
9  CTh. 5.15.20 Idem AA. ad Germanium C(omitem) S(acrarum) L(argitionum). Pla-
cuit, ut (enfyteuticorum) fundorum patrimonialiumque possessores, quo voluerint, quo 
potuerint te(m)pore et quantum habuerint pensionis paratum, dummodo non amplius 
quam in tribus per singulos annos vicibus, officio rationalis adsignent ac de suscepto ab 
eode(m) securitatem eodem die pro more percipiant, modo ut intra Ianuariarum iduum 
diem omnis summa ratiociniis publicis inferatur: gravissimae poenae subdendo officio, 
si cuiquam quolibet anni tempore, dummodo nequaquam numerum trinae inlationis 
excedat, solutionem facere gestienti negaverit susceptionis officium vel si moram fecerit 
in chirografo securitatis edendo….. Dat. XIIII K. Iun. Remis Grat(iano) N. P. et Daga-
la[ifo conss].
10  CTh. 5.6.3 Impp. Honorius et Theodosius AA.    A]nthemio    P(raefecto)    P(raeto-
ri)o.    Scyras barbaram nationem maximis [Chu]norum, quibus se coniunxerunt, copiis 
fusis imperio nos[tro] subegimus. Ideoque damus omnibus copiam ex praedicto ge[ner]
e hominum agros proprios frequentandi, ita ut omnes [scia]nt susceptos non alio iure 
quam colonatus apud se futu[ros] nullique licere ex hoc genere colonorum ab eo, cui 
se[mel] adtributi fuerint, vel fraude aliquem abducere vel [fugie]ntem suscipere, poena 
proposita, quae recipientes [alien]is censibus adscribtos vel non proprios colonos in[seq]
uitur. Opera autem eorum terrarum domini libera [utantur] ac nullus sub acta perae-
quatione vel censui ****acent nullique liceat velut donatos eos a iure census [in se]rvi-
tutem trahere urbanisve obsequiis addicere, [lice]t intra biennium suscipientibus liceat 
pro rei frumen[tari]ae angustiis in quibuslibet provinciis transmarinis [tan]tummodo 
eos retinere et postea in sedes perpetuas [conl]ocare, a partibus Thraciae vel Illyrici ha-
bitatione eorum [pen]itus prohibenda et intra quinquennium dumtaxat intra [eius]dem 
provinciae fines eorum traductione, prout libue[rit, co]ncedenda, iuniorum quoque intra 
praedictos viginti an[nos p]raebitione cessante. Ita ut per libellos sedem tuam ade[unti-
bus] his qui voluerint per transmarinas provincias eorum [distri]butio fiat. Dat. Prid. Id. 
April. Const(antin)p(oli) Hon(orio) VIII et Theod(osio) III conss.
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ex desertis nonnihil agrorum sub certa professione perceperunt, si minorem modum pro-
fessi sunt, quam ratio detentae possessionis postulat, usque ad triennium ex die latae le-
gis in ea tantum possessione permaneant, quam ipsi sponte obtulerunt exacto autem hoc 
tempore sciant ad integrae iugationis pensitationem se esse cogendos. Itaque qui hoc sibi 
incommodum iudicarit, e vestigio restituat possessionem, cuius in futurum onera declinat. 
Dat. VIII Id. Aug. Mediolano Valentiniano et Valente AA. conss. 
La legge è indirizzata al prefetto al pretorio Rufino11 e stabilisce un’im-
munità fiscale per un triennio per chi volesse possedere e coltivare agri de-
serti (Quicumque possidere loca ex desertis voluerint, triennii immunitate 
potiantur). L’immunità dalla tassazione ordinaria (pensitatio), avrebbe per-
messo una nuova occupazione produttiva dei terreni. Attraverso la conces-
sione di un’immunità fiscale temporanea, viene imposto un possesso di terre 
assegnate con i relativi oneri fiscali. 
L’immunità fiscale di un triennio, era stata già stabilita da altre leggi, come 
ad es., da Costantino in C. 11.59.1, e prima ancora da Aureliano. La legisla-
zione imperiale mostra dunque, sia pur nella differenza delle soluzioni, una 
certa continuità al fine di ripopolare terre abbandonate.12
Sappiamo poi dalle fonti che un problema connesso a quello degli agri de-
serti riguardava il modo di assegnazione delle terre abbandonate: si offriva, 
ad es., al proprietario delle terre un tempo adeguato per intervenire e curarle; 
trascorso questo tempo la terra veniva affidata a coloro che potessero curarla 
e soprattutto renderla produttiva secondo, ad es., il dettato della legge 12 del 
titolo 11 del Codice Teodosiano emanata nella pars Orientis verso la fine del 
IV sec. d. C.
CTh. 5.11.12 [= V,15,12 H.] Idem AAA (Valentinianus Theodosius et Arcadius Iust.). 
(388-392 ...) Tatiano praefecto praetorio Orientis. Qui agros domino cessante desertos 
vel longe positos vel in finitimis ad privatum pariter publicumque compendium excolere 
festinat, voluntati suae nostrum noverit adesse responsum: ita tamen, ut, si vacanti ac de-
stituto solo novus cultor insederit ac vetus dominus intra biennium eadem ad s.
Di questo testo abbiamo la corrispondente versione giustinianea più com-
pleta, C. 11.59.8:
C. 11.59(58).8 Idem (Valentinianus, Theodosius et Arcadius) AAA. Tatiano p(raefecto) 
p(retori)o Orientis. Qui agros domino cessante desertos vel longe positos vel in finitimis 
11  PLRE I, Rufinus 25, 782 ss. 
12  Cfr. Solidoro Maruotti 2014, p. 283; p. 311. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
33
ad privatum pariter publicumque compendium excolere festinat, voluntati suae nostrum 
noverit adesse responsum: ita tamen, ut, si vacanti ac destituto solo novus cultor insederit 
ac vetus dominus intra biennium eadem ad suum ius voluerit revocare, restitutis primitus 
quae expensa constiterit facultatem loci proprii consequatur. nam si biennii fuerit tempus 
emensum, omni possessionis et dominii carebit iure qui siluit. (a. 388 – 392)
La costituzione è di Teodosio e dell’anno 391/392 secondo Seeck.13
Essa stabilisce che in caso di assenza di proprietari di fondi, i fondi stessi 
dovranno essere attribuiti, a titolo di appartenenza esclusiva, a coloro che 
se ne fossero occupati. I proprietari dei fondi avrebbero avuto due anni di 
tempo per evitare tale assegnazione e dunque revocare i diritti di proprietà 
dei nuovi occupanti attraverso la restituzione delle spese sostenute. Trascorsi 
inutilmente i due anni i vecchi proprietari avrebbero perso ogni diritto, sia di 
possesso, sia di proprietà.
Il tempo di due anni citato nella costituzione è particolarmente sottoline-
ato nella versione giustinianea della legge: ovviamente un termine così breve, 
lontano dai tempi (dieci o venti anni) della praescriptio longi temporis, ha 
suscitato varie interpretazioni inerenti agli effetti giuridici determinati dal 
tempo sulle situazioni di appartenenza come proprietà e possesso.14 Ritenen-
do probabile l’attribuzione del termine di due anni alla cancelleria teodosiana 
e non esclusivamente a quella giustinianea,15 la legge assume la connotazione 
sociale di un intervento volto a dirimere un caso contingente e ottenere al 
contempo una risoluzione del problema fiscale, proprio facilitando la riscos-
sione dei tributi attraverso un tempo breve.16
In una costituzione mutila, del 364 (o 365), di Valentiniano ci si occu-
pa invece di distribuire fondi sterili insieme a quelli produttivi nel territorio 
italico, tentando la cd. adiectio sterilium; fallita l’operazione, i fondi furono 
sottoposti all’asta affinché fossero sorteggiati nuovi proprietari:
CTh. 5.11.9 [= V,15,9 H.] (364/5 ...) Idem AA. ad Mamertinum praefectum praeto-
rio. Per Italiam afanticiae iugerationis onere consistentibus patrimoniis superfuso unum-
13  Seeck 1919, p. 279.
14  Cfr. Rudokvas 2005.
15  Come invece sostiene Tarozzi 2013, p. 19.
16  Fascione 2017 - paper 9 p. 19, nt. 154, colloca la costituzione incompleta del Teo-
dosiano, nell’ambito di una “proprietà diffusa e distribuita” che, in quanto tale, produceva 
“in concreto, un gettito fiscale maggiore, oltre che – se è lecito pensare che la conduzione 




quemque tributarium17 adiectionem alieni debiti baiulare non dubium est; ideoque deserta 
iugatio, quae personis caret, hastis subiciatur, ut licitationis competitione futuros dominos 
sortiatur. ea enim ...
Anche la vendita all’asta, come l’imposizione delle terre sterili, aveva lo 
scopo dell’imposizione tributaria necessaria al buon andamento dello stato. 
In questo caso lo scopo viene attuato attraverso le operazioni della licitatio 
che, però, nel caso di agri deserti, assumeva regole differenti, come si deduce 
da CTh. 5.11.8,18 che, come abbiamo visto,19 prevedeva un’esenzione fiscale 
per un triennio.
Nel 386, con una legge attribuibile a Teodosio I benché priva di inscriptio20 
e mutila nel testo, se i proprietari di fondi abbandonati non fossero tornati 
presso le loro terre entro il mese di maggio successivo all’emanazione della 
costituzione imperiale, gli agri sarebbero stati attribuiti a chiunque avesse 
voluto spontaneamente coltivarle e, chi lo avesse fatto, sarebbe stato conside-
rato proprietario delle terre ed esentato dai canoni precedenti.21
Altre due leggi della seconda metà del IV secolo, collocate nel titolo XV del 
quinto libro del Codice Teodosiano, De omni agro deserto et quando steriles 
fertilibus imponantur, si occupano del recupero dei canoni.
17  L’espressione “tributarius” indicherebbe il contribuente: Pergami 1998, p. 425.
18  Cfr. Tarozzi 2013, § 18; Ead. 2017, pp. 60 ss., la quale precisa come da due costi-
tuzioni, una di Costantino del 321, CTh. 4.13.1 e una di Costanzo, del 360, CTh. 4.13.4, si 
possono trarre informazioni sulle licitationes, “presupponendo che le stesse regole fossero 
applicate anche nelle vendite all’asta dei fondi sterili”.
19  Cfr. supra 2.
20  La costituzione è attribuibile a Teodosio I perché data a Costantinopoli, come ri-
sulta dalla sua subscriptio; in O. Seeck, Regesten, cit., è collocata nell’anno 386, (precisa-
mente in VIII Kal. Nov.) attribuita a Teodosio e diretta, insieme a CTh. 2. 33. 2; 5. 11.11; 
5.14.30; 5.17.2; Iust. XI 51, al prefetto al pretorio Cynegio.
21  CTh. 5.11.11 (V, 15, 11, H.) (386 Sept. 24)
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .
.    .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .
.   .   .   .   .   .   .  ua*****babuntur, diu tracta et iam paene sine debitoribus debi[ta con]
donentur; ea tamen ratione servata, ut prius domin[i longi]oribus temporum metis edi-
ctis celeberrimis evocen[tur,] quo facilius spe inpunitatis ad avitos lares et propr[ia tec]
ta revocentur: ac tum demum, si intra Maium mensem, [quod] spatium dissitis idoneum 
et volentibus longum est, non ad[vene]rint, quicumque se sponte optulerit, non obligan-
dus [de one]re praeterito pro portione hoc modo possessionis [in fu]turum annonarii 
canonis vectigal expendat,  de iur[e do]minii  et perpetuitate  securus. Dat. VIII K. Oct. 
Const(antino)[p(oli)] Hon(orio) N. P. et Enodio conss.
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La prima, CTh. 5.15.14, del 364, mutila,22 è stata ricostruita utilizzando C. 
11.59.3 (ad essere identica è la subscriptio mentre il testo è diverso) e va unita 
a CTh. 12.12.3:23
CTh. 5.15.14 (364 Mai. 26) [= V,13,14 H.] ....fundorum obligatione securitatis publicae 
firmaverunt cautionem, susceptos scilicet semel fundos post emensa inmunitatis spatia 
inconvulsa a se vectigalium pensione retinendos. Dat. VII K. Iun. divo Ioviano et Varro-
niano conss.
C. 11.59.3 Impp. Valentinianus, Valens AA. ad Mamertinum pp. Quicumque deserta 
praedia meruerint sub certa immunitate, ad possessionem impetratorum non prius si-
nantur accedere, quam vel fideiussoribus idoneis periculo curialium datis vel fundis patri-
monii sui maxime utilibus obligatis idonea cautione firmaverunt susceptam a se posses-
sionem nullo detrimento publico relinquendam. D.VII K. Iun. divo Ioviano et Varroniano 
conss. (a. 364)
Valentiniano e Valente stabiliscono che coloro che avessero ottenuto pos-
sessi con esenzione dovevano prestare garanzia (fideiussione) di non abban-
donare i fondi: in tal modo essi decretano la responsabilità fiscale per i fondi 
meno produttivi.24
La seconda costituzione del titolo 15 (dell’anno successivo a CTh. 5.15.14) 
conservata, con testo invariato, nel Codice giustinianeo, CTh. 5.15.20 
(=C.11.65.425) appartiene sempre ai Valentiniani, stabilisce pagamenti in tre 
22  Cfr. Tarozzi 2017, p. 60 nt. 150, che sottolinea l’importanza di questa costituzione 
“se posta in relazione con le altre costituzioni del titolo, trasmesse unicamente dal mano-
scritto Taurinensis a II, 2”. Tutte le costituzioni, otto, pervenute unicamente da tale ms., si 
occupano della “gestione dei fondi enfiteutici e ciò lascia presumere che anche la costitu-
zione in questione affronti lo stesso tema”.
23  Secondo l’edizione P. Krueger. CTh. 12.12.3 (364 Mai. [?] 30) Impp. Valentinianus 
et Valens AA. ad Mamertinum praefectum praetorio. Provinciales desideriorum suorum 
decreta initio aput acta ordinariorum iudicum prosecuti ad sedis tuae eminentiam mit-
tant, ut impudentior petitio refutetur aut iustior petita commoda consequatur. Si qua 
autem eiusmodi fuerint, quae magnificentiam tuam probabili cunctatione destringant, 
super his satis erit consuli scientiam nostram, ita ut cunctas petitiones cum litteris tuis 
legatorum unus advectet. Dat. III kal. Iun. Serdicae divo Ioviano et Varroniano conss.
24  Bravo 1978, pp. 59-70, p. 68; See Jones 1964, pp. 812 ss. 
25  C. 11.65.4 Imperatores Valentinianus, Valens AA. ad Germanianum comitem 
sacrarum largitionum Placuit, ut emphyteuticorum fundorum patrimonialiumque pos-
sessores, quo voluerint tempore et quantum habuerint pensionis paratum ( dummodo 
non amplius quam in tribus per singulos annos vicibus) officio rationalis adsignent ac 
de suscepto ab eodem securitatem eodem die pro more percipiant, modo ut intra ianu-
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rate che i rationales dovevano accettare, e stabilisce che gli enfiteuti possono 
rendere noto il rifiuto dei funzionari di ricevere il pagamento in rate per evi-
tare il cd. commissum e cioè la perdita del proprio diritto:26
CTh. 5.15.20.  (= V, 13, 20 H.) (366 Mai. 19) Idem AA. ad Germanianum c(omitem) 
s(acrarum) l(argitionum). Placuit, ut (enfyteuticorum) fundorum patrimonialiumque pos-
sessores, quo voluerint, quo potuerint te(m)pore et quantum habuerint pensionis paratum, 
dummodo non amplius quam in tribus per singulos annos vicibus, officio rationalis adsig-
nent ac de suscepto ab eode(m) securitatem eodem die pro more percipiant, modo ut intra 
Ianuariarum iduum diem omnis summa ratiociniis publicis inferatur: gravissimae poenae 
subdendo officio, si cuiquam quolibet anni tempore, dummodo nequaquam numerum tri-
nae inlationis excedat, solutionem facere gestienti negaverit susceptionis officium vel si 
moram fecerit in chirografo securitatis edendo. Super quo possessores apud curatores vel 
magistratus aut quicumque in locis fuerit, qui conficiendorum actorum habeat potestatem, 
conveniet contestari, ut (et) de officii insolentia constet, in quod exercenda vindicta es(t, 
et) his possit esse consultum. Dat. XIIII k. Iun. Remis Grat(iano) n.p. et Dagala [ifo conss].
Lo scopo è lo stesso e cioè riscuotere i canoni enfiteutici favorendo i pos-
sessori di fondi enfiteutici o patrimoniali: essi possono pagare nel tempo 
dell’anno che preferiscono e anche in tre rate al massimo; per gli uffici che 
non accettano il pagamento in tre rate da parte di tali possessori è prevista 
una severa pena.
Altre costituzioni, appartenenti al periodo che va dal 364 al 370, trasmes-
se dal Codice Teodosiano ma non conservate dai compilatori giustinianei, 
tentano di individuare forme di riscossione del canone enfiteutico su fondi 
enfiteutici e abbandonati,27 venendosi ad inserire nella politica fiscale di man-
tenimento della produttività di fondi pecuniari. Si tratta di CTh. 5.15.15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 21. 
ariarum iduum diem omnis summa ratiociniis publicis inferatur… D. XIIII k. Iun Remis 
Gratiano np. et Dagalaifo conss. (a. 366). La versione giustinianea è pressoché identica a 
quella teodosiana: è solamente omessa l’espressione “quo potuerint” presente nella prima 
frase della legge.
26  Cfr. Voci 1989, p. 50 che rinvia a CTh. 3.30.5 (=C. 5.37.23) CTh.3.30.5 [=Brev. 
3.19.3] (333 Apr. 18) Idem A. Felici. pp. Africae. Quoniam per negligentiam seu proditio-
nem tutorum et curatorum possessiones iuris emphyteutici, vitio intercedente commissi, 
e minorum fortunis avelluntur, placet, ut tutor curatorve, cuius officio manente possessio 
minoris iuris emphyteutici praerogativam, commissi offensa, perdiderit, tantum de fa-
cultatibus propriis, censura imminente, minoribus restituat, quanto rem valere potuisse 
constabit. Dat. XIV kal. Mai. Constantinopoli, Dalmatio et Zenophilo conss.
27  Cfr. anche Serrano Madroñal 2016, pp. 399 ss.
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Ad es., secondo il disposto della prima costituzione, CTh. 5.15.5,28 praedia 
emphyeutica, assegnati da imperatori precedenti a senatori o ad altri uomini, 
non devono subire alcun danno dalla vendita all’asta (se venduti devono esse-
re restituiti), devono rimanere presso gli antichi possessori senza incremento 
del canone dovuto alla licitatio; infine i possessori (o enfiteuti) occupano i 
terreni in pieno diritto di proprietà (pleno dominio). L’assegnazione ai se-
natori assicurava dunque l’introito del canone29 e tali assegnazioni offrivano 
adeguate garanzie a chi occupava le terre.
Nel Codice Teodosiano oltre le costituzioni inserite nei titoli XI e XV ci 
sono anche molte altre disposizioni inerenti gli agri deserti e il recupero dei 
canoni (ad es., solo per citarne alcune, CTh. 5.14.30 del 386, 11.1.10 e 12 del 
365, o 11.1.31 del 412) così come nel Codice giustinianeo, in particolare nel 
titolo 59 dell’undicesimo libro (titolo che è servito alla ricostruzione del titolo 
11 del libro 5 del Codice Teodosiano); lo scopo imperiale è sempre lo stesso: 
aumentare l’introito fiscale.
Da questo quadro normativo, ovviamente non esaustivo, così ricostruito, 
possiamo dedurre una linea di tendenza della politica imperiale relativa a ter-
re e a fisco, che riassumo.
A partire da Costantino – ma anche già in precedenza - uno degli scopi 
pressanti della legislazione imperiale era quello di assicurare la costanza delle 
entrate fiscali attraverso la vincolatività alle terre,30 pene per chi si allontana-
va da esse, incentivazione alla coltivazione dei fondi sterili tramite esenzio-
ni fiscali, coattiva attribuzione della responsabilità delle imposte per i vicani 
confinanti con fondi abbandonati.31
28  CTh. 5.15.15 [= V,13,15 H.] (364 Iul. 29). Idem AA. ad Mamertinum praefectum 
praetorio. Emphyteutica praedia, quae senatoriae fortunae viris, praeterea variis ita 
sunt per principes veteres elocata, ut certum vectigal annuum ex his aerario pendere-
tur, cessante licitatione, quae recens statuta est, sciat magnifica auctoritas tua a priscis 
possessoribus sine incremento licitandi esse retinenda ita, ut quaecumque in commissi 
fortunam inciderint ac pleno dominio privatis occupationibus retentantur a leontii et 
sallustii consulatu, ius pristinum rursus adgnoscant. Dat. IIII kal. Aug. Sirmio divo Io-
viano et Varroniano conss.
29  Fascione 2017, p. 19.
30  Fenomeno che riguardò anche i barbari in contatto col mondo romano; in rife-
rimento a questo rammento che nel 409 Teodosio II cercò di migliorare la produttività 
agricola dei confini vincolando i barbari alla terra e al lavoro: CTh. 5.6.3 (409 Apr. 12) su 
cui v.di anche supra 2.  Su questa costituzione cfr. Lovato, 2017, 261 ss., 278 s.
31  Cfr. De Francisci 1946, p. 163: “…e poiché anche lo stato aveva interesse, per motivi 
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I provvedimenti imperiali si riferiscono a vari ambiti attinenti alla coltiva-
zione delle terre: agli agri deserti, comprensivi di fondi sterili e fondi abban-
donati e diventati improduttivi,32 ai fondi enfiteutici e patrimoniali, alle terre 
concesse in ius perpetuum.
Inoltre i provvedimenti inseguono i problemi invece di prevenirli (ad es. 
CTh. 11.28.12 si riferisce ad una situazione locale che riguarda alcune pro-
vince dell’Italia suburbicaria come la Campania, il Piceno e la Tuscia); come 
è evidente l’incertezza manifestata dai legislatori nella scelta tra l’esenzione 
fiscale per chi curi i fondi improduttivi e la necessità di recuperare gli arretrati 
fiscali dei fondi abbandonati (ad es. CTh. 5.11.8 del 365 prevedeva un’immu-
nità fiscale triennale per coloro che curassero una terra abbandonata o im-
produttiva, o C. 11.59.3 del 364 imponeva una garanzia di non abbandonare 
il fondo per accedere al suo possesso e alle esenzioni fiscali, oppure ancora 
CTh. 5.15.20, del 366, consentiva una rateizzazione dei canoni, mentre CTh. 
5.14.30, del 386, stabiliva che i fondi patrimoniali ceduti dovessero continua-
re ad essere sottoposti al canone).
L’orientamento costante della politica imperiale relativa alle terre rimane 
tuttavia sempre quello di rendere sicure le entrate finanziarie con diverse mo-
dalità, sia impositive sia attributive di privilegi. 
In tale contesto perfino uno strumento come la cd. praescriptio longissimi 
temporis o meglio il termine di quaranta anni,33 risulta coerente con questa 
linea politica di recupero di denaro, attribuendo, attraverso la prova di appar-
tenenza espressa dal possesso prolungato, un fondo abbandonato o conteso 
tra più soggetti, allo scopo di individuare con certezza i soggetti a cui imputa-
re il pagamento delle imposte.
Guardato sotto l’ottica di imposizione del possesso al fine di ottenere van-
taggi fiscali pubblici, anche lo strumento del termine di quaranta anni, che 
permette di valutare come presupposto certo l’appartenenza di terre, mira 
ad ottenere la trasformazione del gettito fiscale carente e non continuo, in un 
approvvigionamento finanziario sicuro e continuo.
L’incertezza dei rapporti di proprietà nelle province - specie in Egitto - 
dovuta all’abbandono delle terre, abbandono a sua volta causato da malattie, 
fiscali a che i terreni fossero coltivati, così cercò di porre argine all’abbandono sia costrin-
gendo i proprietari alla coltivazione (CTh. 11.1.4=C.11.59(58). 2) sia attaccando i coloni 
alla terra”.
32  Tarozzi 2017, p. 55.
33  Come vedremo meglio infra 6 ss.
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guerre, periodi di anarchia, è stato valutato da un’attenta dottrina come un 
punto nodale della politica severiana tendente a dare certezza ai rapporti di 
proprietà e rinsaldare le casse dello stato: uno dei modi fu proprio quello 
dell’introduzione del rimedio della longi temporis praescriptio che permet-
teva di considerare il perdurare di una situazione di possesso (unita ai requi-
siti della buona fede e della giusta causa) elemento sufficiente per provare la 
proprietà e che, in tal modo, fungeva da misura di emergenza temporalmente 
limitata.34
Ora, il quadro del problema che abbiamo fino a questo punto potuto pre-
sentare, ricavato da fonti legislative contenute nei codici non è stato tut-
tavia semplice da ricostruire, essendo nota la frammentarietà del Codice 
Teodosiano, le cui leggi derivano alcune dal Codice giustinianeo, altre dal 
Breviarium, altre da codici non integri (come, ad. es. il Cod. Reg. Lat. 520) 
e, in tali casi, non offrono il contenuto originario, bensì un testo manipolato 
o ridotto.
La ricostruzione dei titoli del Teodosiano è questione molto complessa 
perché in esso troviamo estratti di costituzioni letteralmente avulsi dai con-
testi originari e i contenuti originari delle stesse mutano all’interno di una 
sistematica come quella propria dei Codici.
Il Codice di Giustiniano, d’altro canto, offre un quadro rimaneggiato e, di 
conseguenza, difficile da ricostruire: un esempio significativo è proprio il titolo 
59 del libro 11 che è composto con leggi presenti nel Codice Teodosiano, quasi 
sempre in altra sede, sovente rimaneggiate nel testo, e con leggi, comprese 
nell’arco temporale 312 – 437, ma note solo nella versione giustinianea.
I dati normativi che le fonti e legislative costituite dai Codici presentano 
allo studioso, necessitano pertanto dell’apporto di ulteriori dati rinvenibili, 
ad esempio, nei documenti della prassi.
Proprio sul problema dell’abbandono delle terre e dei risvolti fiscali posse-
diamo un documento papiraceo egiziano di straordinaria importanza, sia per 
le informazioni concrete che offre, sia per i dati giuridici che attesta.
L’annoso problema della fuga dai campi – fuga realizzata per sottrarsi 
all’imposizione finanziaria - si riscontra infatti in una vicenda processuale che 
vide protagoniste due sorelle, Taesis ed Herais, che, nella prima metà del IV 
secolo d. C. in Egitto, abbandonarono le terre paterne. Occupiamoci dunque 
di questo caso.
34  Nörr 1969, pp. 76 s.
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3. Collassi economici familiari e mantenimento della proprietà
Un caso esemplare della prassi, pervenutoci attraverso una fonte papira-
cea, noto nella letteratura romanistica per l’applicazione dell’istituto della cd. 
praescriptio longissimi temporis, testimonia, per la metà del quarto secolo 
d. C., nel Fayum, un esempio di crisi economica familiare per la quale però 
la famiglia intestataria di beni terrieri tentò in tutti i modi di mantenere la 
titolarità delle proprie terre.35
Di questa famiglia le fonti ci hanno permesso di conoscere due donne, Ta-
esis ed Herais, che ereditarono dal padre una casa e delle terre. Il padre delle 
due sorelle era stato un proprietario terriero ligio alla legge e alla tassazione 
avendo sempre pagato le imposte legate alla sua proprietà. Dopo la sua morte 
le figlie non riuscirono a sostenere il peso fiscale dei beni ereditati e si diede-
ro alla fuga, secondo quel fenomeno che, come abbiamo visto, era consueto 
sia in caso di terreni improduttivi sia in caso di incapacità fiscale personale. 
Proprio l’abbandono di terre per impossibilità di onorare i pesi fiscali, costi-
tuisce, il fulcro di tutta la vicenda processuale, anche se questo aspetto non 
è stato sufficientemente valorizzato dalla dottrina, più attenta al contenuto 
della legge Costantiniana, ricordata nel verbale di questo processo, altrimenti 
non pervenuta, e che ha quasi distratto l’attenzione dal legame tra la suddetta 
legge e la fuga dal fisco.
Il processo si svolge il 17 maggio del 339 di fronte al syndicos dell’Arsinoi-
te. Le parti sono le seguenti: attrici sono le due sorelle, Herais e Taesis contro 
gli eredi di un tale Atisio, rappresentate da Nilo, marito di Herais e difese 
dall’avvocato Teodoro. I convenuti sono gli eredi di Atisio difesi da Alessan-
dro. Altra parte presente nel processo è Germano, che rappresenta i contadini 
di Karanis.
Le sorelle, dopo cinque anni dalla fuga, ritornano nel villaggio per ripren-
dere possesso delle terre, fino ad allora coltivate dai vicani, secondo l’istituto 
dell’adlectio sterilium o epibolè che risolveva i casi delle proprietà vacanti 
(agri deserti). Intentano quindi una causa contro i vicani per riottenere le 
terre ma esse ricevono sia le terre ereditate dal padre, sia altre terre registrate 
a nome di un tale Atisio. Quindi si rivolgono al praepositus pagi perché non 
35  Il caso è riportato in un documento papiraceo che ha avuto una storia complessa 
ed anche una complicata valutazione storiografica. Si tratta di P Col. VII, 175 su cui rinvio a 
Bianchi 2010, pp. 707 ss.; Bianchi 2009, ora in Bianchi 2012; Bianchi 2018, e bibliografia; 
De Simone 2012, pp. 737 ss.; De Simone 2013, pp. 27 ss.
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intendono pagare imposte relative a terre, consegnate loro dai vicani insieme 
ai prodotti ottenuti, che esse non ritengono di loro pertinenza. Il petitum del 
nostro processo è dunque la richiesta di non essere perseguitate per oneri 
finanziari connessi a terre che esse non considerano di loro proprietà (P. Col. 
VII 175, Col. III. 54 “chiedendo di non essere perseguitate per queste terre… 
e che ciascuno abbia le proprie terre e di non essere responsabili per le terre 
altrui”). Questo processo è delegato al defensor civitatis che si occupava di 
cause di questo genere (CTh. 1.29.236).
Tutto il processo si basa su un equivoco, l’equivoco delle terre appartenen-
ti al padre delle due sorelle e di quelle di proprietà invece di un Atisio non co-
nosciuto dalle due donne. Questo equivoco a sua volta si fonda sulla presunta 
omonimia tra il padre e tale Atisio, omonimia piuttosto probabile e che trova 
una conferma in altre fonti papiracee (P. Col. VII, 188).
L’avvocato dei convenuti, dopo aver descritto tutta la vicenda, dall’eredità 
del padre alla fuga delle donne dalle terre a causa degli oneri finanziari, dal 
ritorno al villaggio e dalla rivendica dei campi e dei loro affitti fino all’idea 
dell’inganno della suprema corte (Prefetto di Egitto), dopo aver puntualizzato 
che il praepositus pagi non aveva potuto che assegnare le terre abbandonate 
ai contadini “avendo cura della sicurezza e delle entrate pubbliche”, P. Col. 
VII, 175, 35, cita una legge di Costantino: tale legge avrebbe impedito che i 
possessori fossero allontanati dalle terre possedute per più di quaranta anni 
(essa letteralmente stabilisce che il tempo di quaranta anni non rimuove il 
soggetto dal possesso (II, 28) e dunque avrebbe inchiodato le sorelle alla re-
sponsabilità fiscale imputando loro la titolarità di tutti i beni. In P. Col. 175, 
VII, 72 il giudice dichiara espressamente che le due donne, “in ragione del 
possesso di lungo tempo”, “sono strette a queste terre e paghino per esse le 
sacri imposte”. Recitando la legge dichiara che nel caso di possesso di più di 
quaranta anni non è necessario indagare il titolo, nel caso invece di presenza 
36  CTh. 1.29.2 Impp. Valentinianus et Valens AA. ad Senecae. Si quis de tenuioribus 
ac minusculariis interpellandum te esse crediderit, in minoribus causis acta conficias: 
scilicet ut, si quando quis vel debitum iustum vel servum qui per fugam fuerit elapsus 
vel quod ultra delegationem dederit postulaverit vel quodlibet horum tua disceptatione 
restituas; ceteras vero, quae dignae forensi magnitudine videbuntur, ordinario insinua-
tio rectori. et cetera. Dat. V K. Iul. Tyr Valentiniano et Valente conss. In questo provve-
dimento dei Valentiniani (dunque più tardo rispetto al tempo del processo di Arsione) 
rivolto al defensor Seneca come istruzioni dettagliate sulla sua competenza giurisdizionale 




di giusto titolo deve essere data preferenza alla terra posseduta secondo la 
prescrizione di dieci o venti anni.
La sentenza del defensor si basa su tre elementi: sulla legge costantiniana 
che prevede che trascorsi più di quaranta anni il possessore non può essere 
allontanato dalla terra posseduta senza che si debba indagare il titolo; sulle 
dichiarazioni di Germano di appartenenza delle terre alle donne; sulle dichia-
razioni controverse di Nilo su una casa registrata sotto il nome degli stessi 
campi.
Il defensor conclude il processo sintetizzando in modo solenne il contenu-
to della legge costantiniana (riporto la traduzione latina dei FIRA):
P. Col. VII, 175, IV, 67-68 = FIRA, III 101, III, 49-50:
Cum apud gesta mediocritatis meae deposita sit sacra venerabilisque lex dominorum 
nostrorum perpetuorum regum, quae distincte iubet iustum initium non requiri si quadra-
ginta annorum spatium transierit aliquo bona possidente.
Le sorelle, dopo aver perso la causa, proposero appello ma sfortunatamen-
te questa parte del papiro non è leggibile e si ferma proprio all’espressione di 
proposizione di appello “ἐκκαλοῦμαι” pronunziata dall’avvocato delle sorelle, 
Nilo.
Posta nell’ambito di una esperienza giuridica gravata da problemi fiscali 
ai quali gli imperatori cercano di porre rimedio, il lasso di tempo di quaranta 
anni costantiniano si mostra come un rimedio processuale simile alla prae-
scriptio formulare perché determina il contenuto dell’eccezione o della do-
manda processuale in essa inclusa (nel processo di Arsinoe una domanda ri-
convenzionale autonoma rispetto alla richiesta della parte attrice) indicando 
al giudice di riconoscere che, nel caso in esame, essendo trascorso un periodo 
di tempo superiore ai quaranta anni, per il quale non  è nemmeno necessario 
indagare il titolo, la proprietà delle terre spetta alla parte attrice costituita 
dalle sorelle che avevano abbandonato precedentemente le terre paterne.37 
La vicenda trova conferma, nei suoi aspetti principali, in una legge di Anasta-
sio (C. 7.39.638) e mette in evidenza come la legislazione fiscale abbia inciso 
37  Secondo Nörr 1969, pp. 94 ss., il termine praescriptio possiede un valore proces-
suale, già dal tempo di Settimio Severo, come testimonierebbe Marciano in D. 48.17.3, e 
poi un valore sostanziale riferito alla proprietà dei beni: i due significati si mescolerebbero 
nel tempo e, tra il primo e il secondo, l’elemento comune sarebbe rappresentato dal valore 
attribuito al tempo.
38  C. 7.39.6 Imperator Anastasius A. Leontio pp. Comperit nostra serenitas quo-
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sulla prassi fino a modificare la struttura dei diritti reali in modo “occulto” 
perché conseguenza indiretta di leggi. Il caso processuale di Arsinoe appare 
alla dottrina maggioritaria un caso anomalo perché il tempo di quaranta anni 
è infatti impiegato non come eccezione a difesa del convenuto ma dallo stesso 
convenuto contro la parte attrice. In realtà, a mio parere, tale processo non ri-
vela un caso di applicazione anomala dell’istituto del tempo di quaranta anni 
perché il suo impiego ad opera di Alessandro, avvocato degli eredi di Atisio, 
convenuti, contro le due sorelle parte attrice, assomiglia ad una domanda ri-
convenzionale più che ad una eccezione e tale domanda ha come contenuto 
l’indicazione del lungo trascorrere del tempo del possesso facente capo alle 
due sorelle; appare così un’autonoma domanda di accertamento della pro-
prietà, posta dal convenuto contro la parte attrice, conforme agli interessi 
pubblici rappresentati dalla legislazione fiscale generale, attraverso la quale 
in sostanza essi attribuiscono alla parte attrice la proprietà delle terre.39 L’an-
damento del processo di Arsinoe svela la tendenza pubblicistica dello stesso: 
sia le donne sia i convenuti mirano a rendere noto il soggetto che deve assu-
mersi l’onere fiscale. Non c’è tanto un dibattito sulla titolarità e appartenenza 
dei beni sotto un profilo privatistico, quanto una discussione mirata preci-
puamente ad individuare il soggetto a cui imputare il pagamento delle tasse. 
Gli interessi del fisco sono al centro della causa.
sdam sacratissimam nostrae pietatis constitutionem, quae de annorum quadraginta lo-
quitur praescriptione, ad praeiudicium etiam publicarum functionum solutionis trahere 
conari et, si quid per tanti vel amplioris temporis lapsum minime vel minus quam opor-
tuerat tributorum nomine solutum est, non posse requiri seu profligari contendere, cum 
huiusmodo conamen manifestissime sensui propositoque nostrae legis obviare noscatur. 
1. Ideoque iubemus eos, qui rem aliquam per continuum annorum quadraginta cur-
riculum sine quadam legitima interpellatione possederunt, de possessione quidem rei seu 
dominio nequaquam removeri, functiones autem seu civilem canonem vel aliam quan-
dam publicam collationem impositam ei dependere compelli nec huic parti cuiuscumque 
temporis praescriptionem oppositam admitti. 
39  Nörr 1969, p. 92 e nt. 9, sosteneva che il processo di Arsinoe fosse il primo caso 
noto in cui fosse l’attore a richiamarsi alla praescriptio: i convenuti avrebbero attribuito 
attraverso di essa la proprietà delle terre in oggetto alla parte attrice. La praescriptio sve-
lerebbe, in questo caso, a suo avviso, un’efficacia sostanziale. Egli cita anche un caso in cui 
l’attore usò la prescrizione contro sé stesso: il retore Eliodoro come avvocato degli attori 
aveva proposto una paragraphé davanti a Caracalla in cui era indicato che il suo colle-
ga era assente e che pertanto egli stesso era impreparato (Philostr. Vita soph. 2.32.626). 
L’Autore valuta il processo di Arsinoe come un caso che dimostra che la praescriptio pote-
va essere fatta valere contro il possessore e non solo a suo favore.
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La legislazione fiscale produce un cambiamento e un adeguamento forse 
non pensato dal legislatore ma inevitabile. Costantino, nell’ambito del feno-
meno dell’abbandono dei campi, impone il possesso laddove si cerchi di di-
sfarsene per evitare gli oneri economici, al fine di realizzare l’adempimento 
dei pagamenti dovuti dai proprietari dei fondi, e attua, in tal modo, una tra-
sformazione del possesso e della proprietà.
Costantino, attento a risolvere i problemi delle terre improduttive, impone 
il possesso su terre possedute per più di quaranta anni. Il lunghissimo pos-
sesso, di cui non si può conservare memoria del titolo (non necessario), è una 
condizione tale da impedire l’allontanamento del soggetto dalle terre, di cui 
deve continuare a occuparsi assolvendo i debiti connessi. Quindi nell’appli-
cazione del possesso continuato quarantennale nel processo contro gli eredi 
di Atisio, si può comprendere il valore dell’istituto costantiniano: il possesso 
vale come titolo e dunque consolida una situazione di fatto già pubblica per-
ché nota ai più.
4. Tassazioni onerose e “sistemi” per aggirarla40
Un altro esempio significativo ed esemplificativo di modalità a cavallo tra 
illegalità e sistemi legali per aggirare le norme, sempre in tema di pressione 
fiscale e terre, si può trovare in una fonte più tarda del Codice Teodosiano che 
illustra l’unione tra romani e barbari nell’affrontare il medesimo problema.
Mi riferisco ad un capitolo dell’Edictum Theodorici, 43, che accomuna, 
sotto il profilo dell’istituto del patrocinium, prassi peculiare del tardo impero 
anche se già risalente all’età del Principato,41 genti barbare a romani.
ET. 43. Nullum debere ad potentem romanum aut barbarum suas actiones transferre.
Nullus ad potentem Romanum aut Barbarum proprias quolibet titulo transferat ac-
tiones. Quod si fecerit, iacturam litis iurgator incurrat, et is qui susceperit, medietatem 
pretii rei aestimatae fisco cogatur inferre. Qua poena teneri praecipimus etiam eos, qui 
rem in lite positam in huiusmodi crediderint transferendam esse personam; quoniam 
volumus, ut remota persona potentioris, aequa iurgantes sorte confligant. Litigantibus 
40  L’esempio qui riportato è stato già oggetto di studio: Bianchi, 2017. 
41  Sul patrocinium, processo secondo il quale i contadini diventavano clienti di ricchi 
proprietari per evitare di pagare le tasse e i cd. patroni diventavano garanti per le tasse 
non pagate, fonte principale è l’intera rubrica del Codice Teodosiano, 11, 24, De patroci-
niis vicorum; se ne occupa anche il codice di Giustiniano, 11, 54; poi abbiamo varie fonti 
retoriche, come Libanio e Salviano.
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vero post caussae terminum, largiendi quod vicerint, cui voluerint personae, concedimus 
potestatem.
In questo capitolo viene stabilito il divieto di trasmissione delle azioni a 
potentes, siano essi romani o barbari. Chi contravviene alla norma subisce 
la perdita della lite (iactura litis) e il potente deve versare al fisco metà del 
valore della res oggetto della lite. Inoltre dispone il divieto di trasferimento 
della res litigiosa.
La norma, secondo la communis opinio, trae origine da una legge conte-
nuta nel Codice Teodosiano, CTh. 2.13.1:
CTh. 2.13.1 [= Brev.2.13.1] Impp. Honorius et Theodosius AA. Ioanni pf. p. Post alia: 
si cuiuscumque modi cautiones ad potentum fuerint delatae personas, debiti creditores 
iactura mulctentur. Aperta enim credentium videtur esse voracitas, qui alios actionum 
suarum redimunt exactores etc. Dat. V Id. Iul. Ravenna, dd. nn. Honorio XIII. et Theodo-
sius X. AA. coss.
Interpretatio. Qui cautiones exigendas potentibus dederint, omne debitum perdant: 
quia, ubi potest esse repetitio, potestas ad exigendum non debet a creditoribus invitari.
Il precetto dell’Editto, rispetto alla legge del Codice, si pone sotto il profilo 
processuale e non sostanziale, occupandosi della fase tra iurgator e potens, 
mentre Onorio e Teodosio si rivolgono ad un rapporto di credito; inoltre ap-
pare più severa della legge imperiale, disponendo la pena del versamento al 
fisco della metà del valore della res litigiosa,42 pena non prevista nella costi-
tuzione originaria: il problema fiscale aveva evidentemente raggiunto un peso 
consistente.
Nel capitolo 43, tra gli intenti di Teodorico, predomina quella di arginare i 
42  Quest’ultimo divieto trova la sua fonte in D. 4.7.1. Gaius l. IV ad ed. prov. pr. Om-
nibus modis proconsul id agit, ne cuius deterior causa fiat ex alieno facto, et cum intel-
legeret iudiciorum exitum interdum duriorem nobis constitui opposito nobis alio adver-
sario, in eam quoque rem prospexit, ut si quis alienando rem alium nobis adversarium 
suo loco substituerit idque data opera in fraudem nostram fecerit, tanti nobis in factum 
actione teneatur, quanti nostra intersit alium adversarium nos non habuisse. 1 Itaque si 
alterius provinciae hominem aut potentiorem nobis opposuerit adversarium, tenebitur; 
ma è anche rintracciabile anche in CTh. 4.5.1 del 331, norma che però non si riferisce 
specificamente ai potentes. CTh. 4.5.1pr. [=Brev.4.5.1pr.] Imp. Constantinus A. ad pro-
vinciales. Post alia: lite pendente illud, quod in controversiam devocatur, in coniunctam 
personam vel extraneam donationibus vel emptionibus vel quibuslibet aliis contractibus 
minime transferri oportet, tanquam nihil factum sit lite nihilominus peragenda.
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potentes e le loro sopraffazioni ristabilendo la giustizia, l’onestà e la legalità.43 
Tentando di arginare un fenomeno dilagante e di prevenirne gli abusi, Teo-
dorico prova a stabilire certezza dei rapporti giuridici nel rispetto delle leggi 
e degli oneri fiscali ed un ritorno alla quiete. In tal senso Cassiodoro lodava il 
prefetto al pretorio Liberio che, nel primo periodo di governo di Teodorico, 
avrebbe condotto i barbari ad quietem (Cass., Variae, II, 15, 3)
Cass. Variae II, 15, 3 Venantio V. I. Theodoricus Rex 
Praefecturam enim, sollicitudinum omnium nobilissimum pondus, quod vel solum 
fuisset expedire laudabile, iuncta exercitus nostri cura disposuit, ut nec provinciis ordina-
tio deesset nec exercitui se provida sollicitudo subtraheret. superavit cuncta infatigabilis et 
expedita prudentia: traxit mores barbaros ad quietem: in votum nostrum cuncta modera-
tus est, ut sic accipientibus satisfaceret, ne dantes locum querimoniis invenirent. verum ut 
de plurimis pauca sufficiant, probavit de se tanta, ut eligeretur eius inexplorata posteritas.
Si veda anche Variae I, 18.2 in cui si stabilisce che se un barbarus prea-
sumptor abbia occupato un terreno di un romano senza atto di assegnazione 
(il che fa dedurre che vi fosse pratica di assegnazione di terre ai barbari), 
lo debba restituire al romano. Se lo avesse tuttavia posseduto per un tempo 
maggiore di trenta anni allora l’azione del querelante romano sarebbe stata 
inficiata dalla eccezione di tempo: 
Variae, I, 18.2: Si Romani praedium, ex quo deo propitio Sonti fluenta transmisimus, 
ubi primum Italiae nos suscepit imperium, sine delegatoris cuiusquam pittacio praesump-
tor barbarus, occupavit, eum priori domino summota dilatione restituat. quod si ante de-
signatum tempus rem videtur ingressus, quoniam praescriptio probatur obviare tricennii, 
petitionem iubemus quiescere pulsatoris.
Qui Cassiodoro si riferisce alla costituzione di Teodosio del 424 sulla pra-
escriptio trentennale (CTh. 4.14.144) – tempo descritto come “longi temporis 
obscuritas”45 - che implica interazioni tra barbari e romani anche sul piano 
43  Vismara 1967, p. 114 ss.
44  CTh. 4.14.1 Imp. Theod(osius) A. Asclepiodoto P(rafecto) P(raetori)o. Sicut in re 
speciali est, ita ad universitatem ac personales actiones ultra triginta annorum spatium 
minime protendantur. Sed si qua res vel ius aliquod postuletur vel persona qualicumque 
actione vel persecutione pulsetur, nihilo minus erit agenti triginta annorum praescriptio 
metuenda: eodem etiam in eius valente persona, qui pignus vel hypothecam non a suo 
debitore, sed ab alio possidente nititur vindicare. …. Dat. XVIII Kal. Decemb. Constant(i-
no)P(oli) Victore V.C. cons.
45  Variae, I, 18.3 Illa enim reduci in medium volumus, quae, nostris temporibus 
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dell’efficacia del tempo sul diritto, e che in questo contesto di interesse mo-
stra il nesso tra sistema dei possedimenti terrieri e sistema di tassazione.
Dunque è abbastanza evidente notare come i problemi della terra, delle 
espropriazioni e/o delle assegnazioni a favore dei barbari si collochino tra 
princìpi di hospitalitas, i buoni rapporti tra senato e Teodorico, e il sistema 
finanziario romano che si estende anche ai barbari; per i problemi delle terre, 
tale integrazione, consentiva all’élite romane e barbare di coalizzarsi in vista 
di scopi comuni.
Il capitolo 43 dell’Edictum mostra in definitiva un fenomeno di evasione 
fiscale attuata dagli stessi Goti di Teodorico che sembra nascere come naturale 
conseguenza del rapporto instauratosi sul piano della distribuzione delle terre 
e dei relativi oneri, e, soprattutto, dall’assimilazione della pratica del patroci-
nium che aveva già imperversato, non venendo mai meno, nelle corti romane.
5. Considerazioni conclusive
Gli esempi qui esposti, se pur brevemente, ci mostrano un quadro varie-
gato in cui, tuttavia, al centro degli interessi statali e dei conflitti sociali, ap-
pare un filo conduttore, il recupero delle entrate finanziarie, comune ad ogni 
società, antica e moderna. Senza dubbio le modalità e i metodi di recupero 
messi in atto dagli imperatori romani rispondono a esigenze coeve e rispec-
chiano la società del tempo, come dimostra il caso delle due sorelle egiziane 
che, per non pagare i tributi dovuti per le loro proprietà, si diedero alla fuga 
e poi, tornate presso i propri possedimenti, tentarono di non adempiere gli 
oneri finanziari connessi, ma, al contempo, possono rappresentare quasi dei 
modelli di riferimento laddove l’interesse primario diventa il contemplamen-
to di tutti gli interessi in gioco, in vista di un equilibrio tra le parti e di un 
buon vivere civile. Le risposte imperiali all’evasione, all’inflazione, alla crisi 
evidenziano perfino un’interazione tra i romani e “gli altri”, come abbiamo 
visto a proposito dei Goti, nelle fonti dell’Edictum Theodorici, in cui i barbari 
si uniscono ai romani nel comportamento illegale del patrocinium, e, oggi, 
lo Stato si trova ad affrontare problemi di evasione, crisi economica, cattiva 
distribuzione delle ricchezze, disuguaglianze e conflitti sociali in un momento 
di profonda interazione, purtroppo legata ad evidenti e pericolosi atteggia-
menti di neo-razzismo, tra immigrati e cittadini.




La storia tardo antica può insegnare molto, pur nel suo approccio spes-
so non sistematico, al problema qui evidenziato. Un patrimonio storico può 
inoltre coadiuvare il lavoro, lo studio, le scelte di un giurista positivo che non 
può non tener conto delle proprie radici.
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LAND GRANT IN LATE ANTIQUITY:
A PATTERN FOR MODERN COLONIAL REGULATIONS?
Simona Tarozzi 
1. Introduction 
Although modern colonialism is actually a contingent phenomenon whose 
causes are determined by different factors and there is no doubt that the cir-
cumstances which arose the new colonialism in the 19th were not the same 
of the roman colonate, it is undoubted that the modern colonialism reflects 
some roman concepts and in part resumes the meaning of the terms ‘colo-
nus’ as a tenant farmer and sharecropper, who paid back landowners with a 
portion of their crops, in exchange for use of their farmlands. In the litera-
ture of the ending of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the ‘colonus’ 
was contracted to work for a fixed time and sometimes on imperial lands. He 
could have never obtained the ownership of the cultivated lot. According to 
Savigny,1 the colonate could have three origins: a man could become a colo-
nus by birth, by contract or by spending a long number of years as a tenant on 
the same land. He also added punishment as another possibility. One three 
sources of colonate appearance seen by Fustel de Coulange2 was that free col-
onists (coloni) who contracted to work for five years were reduced by debt 
and overdue rent to serfs bound to the land and its owner. Saumagne,3 in his 
study dated 1937, considered that two types of coloni existed at the time of 
the Principate: coloni and inquilini. This idea was primarily based on the in-
scription from Henchir Metich in North Africa, that shows that both, a) coloni 
who had villae dominicae and who were in fundo and b) those who were ul-
tra fundo, inquilini in Saumagne’s opinion worked on lands belonging to the 
emperor. Both terms were retained in the later Roman empire: the colonus 
of the earlier period became the adscripticius or tributarius after Diocletian.4 
1  Savigny 1850, p. 1 ff.
2  Fustel de Coulanges 1885, p. 35 ff.
3  Saumagne, 1937, p. 487 ff.
4  The problem of the late Roman colonate has been debated since the seventeenth 
century, but this topic does not interest my paper’s object. In a few words, the question is 
when, how and why the colonus of the Principate, a voluntary tenant of land, free to move 




Saumagne designated the first as colonus, while the former inquilinus took on 
the meaning originally held by the colonus and is also given the designation 
colonus.
The use of symbols and terms which refer to the Roman empire and other 
ancient societies is typical for modern empires. For its territorial expansion 
and its approximately twelve centuries of existence, the Roman empire was a 
great model from whom it was possible to draw inspiration.
The Chilean experience is especially interesting because Andres Bello, 
mainly responsible for the Chilean Civil Code, promulgated in 1855, was sent 
to London in 1810 (with Simón Bolívar) on a political mission for the Vene-
zuelan revolutionary junta and he elected to stay there for 19 years, acting as 
secretary to the legations of Chile and Colombia and spending his free time in 
study, teaching, and journalism.
The Chilean Civil Code is of clear neoclassic inspiration and had the same 
influence throughout South America as that of Code Napoléon had in Europe. 
Each institution is introduced through an axiom and articles or sections cite 
examples or consequences of the axiom with a didactic purpose. The indis-
putable main source of the Civil Code is the Siete Partidas of King Alfonso 
X, perhaps the pinnacle of Spanish ius commune and regarding the law of 
obligations and the law of things, another main source of inspiration for the 
Chilean Code has been the Napoleonic Code. But, for example, in relating the 
acquisition of property, the code makes a clear distinction between the title 
hereditary bond. The position of a colonus in the early third century is clearly defined by 
the lawyers cited in the Digest. He held a lease, normally for five years, which by the tacit 
consent of both parties became on expiry an annual tenancy. A colonus might, if he were, 
as he often was, in arrears with his rent, find practical difficulty in leaving; for in such 
circumstances his landlord would have no hesitation in distraining on his stock. The first 
clear evidence that coloni - or at any rate some coloni - were tied to their farms and to their 
landlords is a law of Constantine (CTh. 5.17.1, 332 A.D.) in which any person with whom a 
colonus belonging to some other person is found shall not only restore him to his place of 
origin but be liable for his poll tax for the period. It will furthermore be proper that coloni 
themselves who plan flight should be put in irons like slave, so that they may be compelled 
by a servile penalty to perform the duties appropriate to them as free men. The first explicit 
reference to the hereditary character of the bond is in a Emperor Valens’law of 365 A.D. 
(CTh. 5.19.1, which orders that slaves and coloni and their son and grandsons who had 
deserted imperial estates to join the army or the civil service should be recalled. Worth 
mentioning works on colonate of A.J.B Sirks, most recent are: Sirks 2008, p. 120-143; 
Sirks 2012, p. 133 – 143; Sirks 2017 p. 235-243.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
53
and the actual acquisition of property, similarly to the Roman Law and the 
German BGB (a strong by Roman Law influenced modern code) and we can 
presume, for his studies in London and his knowledge of Latin, he could have 
direct known these sources, not just through the Siete Partidas or Code Na-
poléon. He wrote furthermore a Manual de derecho romano.
After the independence from the Spanish Empire, the newborn Republic 
of Chile should have faced up the question of southern land, regarded by the 
Government as never been tilled, even if they are populated by native people, 
the Mapuche This consideration brought the Government to take possession 
of Mapuche’s lands and to give them to European and North American set-
tlers for improving soil’s conditions and the country’s growth. In the Roman 
Empire, we have a similar situation in the phenomenon of agri deserti, aban-
doned lands by owners a cause of their infertility or tax pressure.
The means used to solve the problems by Roman emperors are the same 
used by the Chilean Government: my research would have the aim of com-
paring the land grant system of both experiences and in the following pages it 
will be given a brief description of the results.
2. A lexical approach
Most of roman constitutions on (public) land grant were promulgated be-
tween III and IV century A.D., some of them were adopted by Theodosius II 
in his code and after by Justinian.
Unfortunately, the manuscript tradition (MS Codex Taurinensis II a 2) of 
the book of Theodosian Code, the fifth, particularly focused on these topics, 
shows so many lacunae that let us impossible to know how the matter was 
exactly regulated.
This is particularly clear in the words used by imperial chancellery to de-
fine the different typologies of land grant: what according to Levy5 ius em-
phiteuticum would be the long term lease on estates of the emperors privy 
pursue (res patrimoniales);6 ius perpetuum would be the permanent lease 
on possessions of the crown as such (res privatae)7 and ius privatum would 
comprehend dominium if the grantee, as a rule, owed the canon and he might 
5  Levy 1951, p.43 ff.
6  Patrimonial estates of the Emperor that were held under the regular terms of rental 
for such estates.
7  Personal estates of the Emperor.
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also be subjected to a compulsory “imposition” of unproductive land (epi-
bolé) for which he had to contribute a proportional amount of the tax due 
from it (perequatio). As an alternative an ius privatum the sources show the 
expression ius privatum salvo canone.8 On the contrary, Jones9 believes they 
are no differences and these terms are interchangeable and concerning the 
same reality, especially after Constantine’s reform which brought together 
res patrimoniales and res privatae and created a new position to manage 
them, the comes rerum privatarum.
It is a fact that these lexical differences do not always correspond to sub-
stantial variations, sometimes these iura were mixed up each other or were 
joint together. As, for example, in a constitution of Emperor Theodosius I 
promulgated on 393 (CTh. 5.14.33),10 which assign emphyteutic land estates 
in perpetuity to possessors, nullifying differences between ius emphiteuticum 
and ius perpetuum, but in this case, it was an exceptional situation because 
the law regards unfertile lands, abandoned by their possessors (agri deserti). 
In the above-mentioned constitution, Theodosius I obliges, or rather tries to 
oblige, grantees of fertile lands to accept unfertile ones too, with tax charges, 
ordering to praetorian prefect, Rufinus, to establish for the judges, their offer 
staffs and the defenders a penalty if they do not “come to the aid of the aban-
doned and inferior lands by combining them with profitable lands”.
8  The conveyance of the land in private ownership though subject to a permanent 
canon payable to the emperor. In exceptionable cases, we have a ius privatum dempto 
canone, a conveyance even without such qualification, but ever without ownership (never 
implied ownership).
9  Jones 1964, p. 812 ff.
10  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 5.14.33 [Translation by Pharr 1952): The same Augustuses (Valentinian, Theodo-
sius, and Arcadius) to Rufinus, Pretorian Prefect. The emphyteutic right, by which landed 
estates belonging to Our patrimonial domain or the privy purse are assigned to possessors 
in perpetuity, is maintained, not only by Our orders but also by those of Our predecessors, 
as so indefeasible that once an estate has been delivered, it can never be occupied by Us or 
by anyone else while the others are in possession. 1. But since it has come about through 
the arrogance of wicked men that all the best lands are serving their greed for gain and 
profits and such inferior fields in the province are left as none of the aforesaid men deign to 
hold, Your Sublime Magnificence shall establish for the judges, their office staffs, and the 
defenders the following penalty, namely, that unless they come to the aid of the abandoned 
and inferior lands by combining them with profitable lands, they shall know that they must 
sustain the fine and penalty which has been promulgated. (30 July 393)]
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As regards Chilean Law, according to art. 589, third paragraph,11 of Chil-
ean Civil Code12 are public goods (bienes fiscales o del Estado) those goods 
that do not belong to anyone, but State. The art. 59013 decrees that estates, 
which are placed within the country’s border and do not belong to anyone, 
belong to State. 
In Chilean laws of 19th-century ancestral territories of different native peo-
ple are not considered in the same way, depending on the different grades 
of resistance and consequently on different means used to get control over 
these lands. Arauncanía (south of Bío Bío and north of Valdivia province) was 
distinguished from the rest of southern territories, which arrive in the austral 
region (South Pole); the latter was considered abandoned and consequently 
belonged to State. The question of Araucania was more intricate: the Spanish 
did not conquer this region, they did not go over today’s metropolitan region, 
Santiago de Chile and its surroundings. Strong resistance of the Mapuche 
people and lack of real interest in southern Chile, a territory without noble 
metals, were causes of this decision. 
For resolving the question with the Mapuche people, the Chilean Govern-
ment tried to acquire their lands in Araucania, by sale or by proof that these 
lands did not belong to anyone. The Mapuche people should have proved to 
be owners, by showing property deeds, which should be recorded in Land 
Office (Conservador de Bienes Raíces). The lands, which belonged to native 
people, are called tierras indigenas, the others, belonged to State, are called 
tierras fiscales.
11  Código Civil de la Republica de Chile 1856:
art. 589, 3: Los bienes nacionales cuyo uso no pertenece generalmente a los habi-
tantes, se llaman bienes del Estado bienes fiscales
12  The Código Civil de la Republica de Chile is the work of Venezuelan-born Chilean 
Andrès Bello. In 1829 he accepted a post in the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, settled 
in Santiago, and took a prominent part in the intellectual and political life of the city. He 
was named senator of his adopted country—he eventually became a Chilean citizen—and 
founded the University of Chile (1843), of which he was rector until his death. The Chilean 
Civil Code was promulgated in 1855 and had much the same influence throughout South 
America as the Code Napoléon in Europe. Among its sources of inspiration have been 
considered Roman Law and BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the German Civil Code, which 
has been strongly influenced by Roman Law too).
13  Código Civil de la Republica de Chile 1856: 
art. 590: Son bienes del Estado todas las tierras que, estando situadas dentro de los 
limites territoriales, carecen de otro dueño.
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For both types of land, the Chilean Government, taking different mea-
sures, carried out a policy aimed whether at integrating native people in Chil-
ean society or at providing incentives for cultivation.
For the tierras indigenas, two years after the establishment of first govern-
ment assembly, Government and Senate passed regulations14 for helping the 
Mapuche people to go out their indigence conditions and for promoting their 
integration with Spanish origin people. Native people could live in towns, 
which were specially built for them, where a house with a plot of land was 
assigned to them. Tierras indigenas, those native people left to live in town, 
became tierras fiscales and were assigned through a sale by auction (remate); 
they were mortgaged to guarantee funds for native people’s civilization (this 
civilization was operated especially by Church). In 1819 native people, called 
by the Spanish, Naturales, obtained Chilean citizenship.
3. Land Grant system in Rome and Chile:15comparing methods.
The figure of modern colon, who was contracted in order to stay with his 
family in a lot for a fixed time and to cultivate it, goes back to Roman expe-
rience, but it is not so evident that the sale by auction recalls the Roman law 
too, especially about the question of ‘agri deserti’.16
It is generally agreed that there was a decline in agriculture in the later 
Roman empire and on its causes debate has been inconclusive, whether it was 
due to the general exhaustion of the soil, to a shortage of agricultural man-
power, or partly to German invasion and depredation, but predominantly to 
over-taxation.
“That the area of land under cultivation shrank considerably cannot be 
doubted. Unfertile and abandoned lands (agri deserti) are a constant theme 
of imperial legislation from before Diocletian’s time to that of Justinian. The 
problem first appears in the late second century, when the emperor Pertinax 
issued an edict, inviting all and sundry to cultivate deserted land, whether 
private or imperial property, in Italy and the provinces, promising them ten 
years ‘immunity’ from taxes and full ownership. In the late third century, Au-
14  Boletín 1813, p. 253-258.
15  Essential bibliography: Encina 1949; Ibañez Santa Maria 2013. About the land re-
form of the 20th century in Chile see the contribution of AugustÍn Parise in this volume.
16  Bianchi 2018, pp. 17-67. See also the contribution of Paola Bianchi and Silvia Schi-
avo in this volume
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relian decreed that the councils of the cities were to be responsible for the 
taxes of deserted lands in their territories. Constantine renewed this law, but 
added that, where the councils were not equal to the burden, the tax obliga-
tions of abandoned land should be distributed to lands and territories, im-
munity for three years being granted.”17 Furthermore, lands are abandoned 
because depopulated by smallpox, Black Death and famine and during the 
Principate, Marcus Aurelius tried to repopulate the territory with a lot assign-
ment to various German tribes. The pressure at the boundaries of Empire of 
these people and the persistent problem of agri deserti brought next Emper-
ors to assign in emphyteusis these abandoned lands to Germans under cer-
tain conditions. The chief tribes should have guaranteed to give back military 
support and cultivate the land without tax payment.
Unfortunately, the land assignment system to German people, entirely de-
manded to local governors and army, was not ever so efficient and the assign-
ment did not go out as supposed.
Therefore, as above said, deserted lands could be allocated by authority, 
but not ever this procedure was practicable and when it was not possible to 
force the assignment of these unfertile lands, they were sold by auction.
Principal rules for a sale by auction (licitatio) provided for assignment 
of land to whom offered the best bid and best guarantees of solvency in the 
rent18 payment for almost three years (CTh. 4.13.119 by Constantine and CTh. 
17  Jones 1964, p. 812.
18  Jones 1964, p. 820: “The rent depended obviously on the quality of the land and 
its agricultural use, as olive groves, vineyards, arable or pasture. In Syria, there was an 
elaborate system of classification into olives, ‘old’ and ‘mountain’, vineyard, three qualities 
of arable and pasture. The fiscal unity, the iugum, was made up of varying areas of each. 
Syria seems, however, to have been exceptional. In Africa, for example, the system was 
even rougher and ready, the land being assessed by the centuria of 200 iugera, apparently 
without regard to use or quality. In Syria, therefore, the tax would, in so far as the land was 
correctly classified, vary with the rental value, while in Africa all land would pay the same 
tax whether it produced a high or low rent. This may partly explain why the proportion of 
deserted land was so much higher in Africa than in Syria.”
19  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 4.13.1 [Translation by Pharr 1952: Emperor Constantine Augustus to Junius Ru-
fus, Governor of Aemilia.  The right to collect imposts shall remain in the possession of 
the person who was the highest bidder. Thus the contract of letting shall be concluded at 
the end of a period of not less than three years, and in no way shall the time granted for 
the collection of imposts be interrupted. When that time has passed, the rights of bidding 
and of obtaining the contract shall be renewed, and similarly, the concession must be let 
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4.13.420 by Constance). By a law of Valentinian immunity for three years was 
granted to who started voluntary tilling deserted land (CTh. 5.11.821). To fa-
vorize and support people who would have voluntarily cultivated abandoned 
parcels, by law they could immediately get a property right on these because 
here the grantees were found of trying to fertilize them. In this case, these 
lands belonged to a private citizen, but it is not so significative if abandoned 
lands were private and no public, because it there was, however, a public in-
terest that this area was finally cultivated for increasing and improving land 
productivity and then to obtain fixed income to imperial finances. According 
to laws, the new farmer obtained on this land ius privatum (that means, ac-
cording to Levy, that he had title of private ownership, but subject to a perma-
nent canon payable to the emperor), after the landlord did not have done any-
thing for a reasonable period of time of two years and past time the landlord 
could take legal steps within two months (six in the Code of Justinian) against 
this assignment: he could pursue his title through an action in rem. Accord-
ing to CTh. 13.11.1622, part of a law of Honorius, the landlord should have 
to others. If it should appear that any collector of imposts has exacted anything more from 
the provincials than the amount established by statute, he shall be subjected to capital 
punishment. … (July 1, 321)] 
20  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 4.13.4 [Translation by Pharr 1952: Emperor Constantius Augustus to Proclianus, 
Proconsul of Africa. The payment of the impost contains the utmost utility and it must be 
guarded with such great diligence that it may be increased by frequent bidding. 1. There-
fore Your Gravity shall order that the increases over the old payments of the accounts of 
the imposts shall be preserved for the resources of the fisc … (Constantinople, January 
19(18), 360)]
21  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 5.11.8 [Translation by Pharr 1952: The same Augustuses (Valentinian and Valens) 
to Rufinus, Praetorian Prefect. If any persons should choose to take possession of parcels 
of deserted land, they shall receive an exemption for three years. 1. But if persons who 
have obtained some of the deserted fields under a definite tax declaration should declare 
a smaller amount than the reckoning of such detained, up to three years from the day of 
issuance of this law, in that kind of possession only which they have voluntarily offered to 
assume. But after this time has elapsed, they shall know that they will be compelled to pay 
the entire land tax. 2. Therefore, if any person should judge this to be to his disadvantage, 
he shall immediately return the landholding, the future burdens of which he declines to 
assume … (Milan, August 6, 365)]
22  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 13.11.16 [Translation by Phar 1952r: The same Augustuses (Honorius and Theo-
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supplied to comes primis ordinis the necessary documents which proved his 
title and, if his application was accepted, expenses for improvements should 
be refunded to a new farmer. This favour shows its maximum effects in a 
constitution by Theodose I of 24 September 386 (CTh. 5.11.1123) according 
to that if owners should have not come back on owns lands within May after 
the issue of the edict, the free new farmer would have obtained on these lands 
ius dominii et perpetuitate with remission of not paid canons immediately, 
which means that landowners did not have possibilities to claim against new 
farmers.
dosius) to Sebastius, Count of the First Order. The surreptitious filing of partitions shall be 
barred, and a landholding shall remain firm in the possession of that man to whom it has 
been established once for all that it was delivered by tax equalizer. We do not allow the fisc 
to demand from the new master delinquent taxes for time that has already passed, so that 
one man may not begin to undergo an expense due to the fault of another. If any private cit-
izen, indeed, should affirm either that a landholding is obligated to him which has remained 
thus far abandoned, or should prove that it is rightfully due him under any title, he must 
present his allegations before Your Respectability without delay, either through himself or 
through some other person ordained by law. Thus, if reasons of equity should persuade and 
the landholding should be transferred to the petitioner, the person who received it from the 
tax equalizer shall be relieved by the recovery of the expenses that were incurred in improv-
ing the estate. But in order that ownership once established shall not be disturbed by spe-
cious litigations, We decree that a space of two month must be observed, within which time, 
if any man should suppose that the property belongs to him by provable reason, he shall 
institute due action. But if the prescribed time should pass and should remain silent, it is 
Our will that no suit at all shall be begun for recovery. If any person at the time at which the 
tax equalizer assigns a landed estate to someone else should not suppose that suit should 
be brought about his own right, either by himself or by his men, he must, after the statutory 
period of two months has elapsed, forever hold his peace. … (Ravenna, March 14, 417)]
23  Codex Theodosianus 1904:
CTh. 5.11.11 [Translation by Pharr 1952. …  which have been extended for a long time 
and are now almost without debtors, the debts shall be remitted. However, the following 
regulation shall be observed, namely, that first the owners shall be summoned by longer 
periods of time and very frequent edicts, in order that because of the hope of impunity 
they may be recalled more easily to their ancestral lares and their own dwellings. Then, 
finally, if they should not return before the month of May, which is sufficient time for those 
persons who are at a distance and too long a time for those who wish to return, any person 
who voluntarily offers himself shall not be obligated for the past burden, but, for the future 
he shall pay the ground rent of the fixed taxes in kind, according to his portion of such 
landholding; and he shall be secure in the right of ownership in perpetuity. …(Constanti-
nople, September 24, 386)]
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In the next centuries, methods of achieving this aim remained the same. 
The deserted lands might be granted or sold or leased on favourable terms,24 
including a firm title and temporary immunity. They might be compulsorily 
allocated to individual landlords, who made what they could out of them but 
were responsible for the full tax.25
To guarantee stability in southern territories Chilean Government granted 
tierras fiscales to Chileans, at first through permissions of occupation and 
exploitation (permisos de ocupación omde explotación); in a few cases, the 
generals gave plots of land to whom had helped the soldier, otherwise, the 
Government gave lands to whom will occupy borderlands. 
The decree of 10th June 182326 was the first regulation to order the sale by 
auction of tierras fiscales and was carried out by decree of 28th June 1830. 
According to this, before the auction, the province intendant, together with 
the land surveyor, had the task of finding out if native people lived still here, 
then to surveying and to taxing lands left by native people (consequently be-
longed to State). Each lot could not exceed ten hectares and the sale by auc-
tion should be promoted everywhere, in provinces, towns, and villas (small 
country towns). The lands remained in native people’s perpetual ownership 
if they were legitimate owners. These sales by auction were not successful 
because of the native people’s assaults (they were not dominated) and land-
scarce size, which aroused any commercial interest. 
Afterwards was issued the Law of 4th December 186627 “Fundación de po-
blaciones en el territorio de los indígenas” (Foundation new villages in the 
territory of native people). It stated that the Chilean Government could buy 
24  In the fourth century the government used private lands deserted by their own-
ers to provide allotments for veterans, and in a.d. 368 Valentinian gave a general license 
to veterans to cultivate wastelands, forbidding the owners to appear at harvest time and 
claim agraticum.
25  They issued laws that required the landlord to pay anyway tax on deserted lands 
[CJ. 11.59(58).2 (= CTh. 11.1.4 De annona et tributis), a.d. 337; CJ. 11.59(58).12 (= CTh. 
11.1.3), a.d.  412 for African landlords]; or compelled landlords to manage fertile lands 
together with those unfruitful [CJ. 11.59(58).9 (= CTh. 5.14.34), a.d. 394]. Sometimes it 
was given a fiscal immunity [CJ. 11.59(58)10 (= CTh. 13.11.9) a.d. 398] or the loss of fertile 
lands was inflicted [CJ. 11.59(58).5 sine data, CJ. 11.59(58).6 (= CTh. 10.3.4) a.d. 383)].
26  In 1813 the same regulations, which decreed the foundation of towns for the Ma-
puche people, established a sale by auction for lands abandoned, but they did not take 
place because of Reconquista Española.
27  Boletin 1866, p. 426 - 430.
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lands by native people or by private citizens to whom the Mapuche people 
had sold them before. Or it took ancestral lands when native people did not 
show property deeds and in this case, the State helped them, with economic 
support, to go to live in town. Lands, purchased by the Government or left by 
native people, were lot sold by auction. The best offer price could be extended 
in fifty years at 2% annual interest. One part of these lots should be set aside 
for the Chilean or foreign colonies settlement. Eight years after, this law was 
confirmed by the Law “Enajenacion de terrenos situados en territorio arau-
cano” (4th August 187428) (Transfer of public lands located in the Araucanía 
region), which furthermore regulated transfers of native lands, acquired by 
private citizens. It was strictly forbidden purchased lands which belonged to 
the Mapuche people’s territory and these lots were confiscated and put out 
for sale by auction. In the presence of deeds legally recorded, owners could 
be refunded for expenses and could obtain the equivalent of the bid value. 
Through sale by auction, Chilean Government allowed private citizens or for-
eigner to establish a settlement. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Government of Chile made laws to 
sponsor Chilean and foreign settlements, but first attempts were unsuccess-
ful.29 In 1845 was issued the Law of 18th November “Colonias de naturales 
I estranjeros” (Settlement of Chilean and Foreigners) which established as-
signments of lots to Chilean or foreign families. Detailed rules on settlement 
were regulated afterwards by the laws as mentioned above of 1866 and 1874.
According to art. 11 of the law of 4th August 1874, the Government drew up 
contracts with individuals or companies, charging them with the selection of 
families from Europe and North America for their transfer to Chile. The pri-
vate citizens, who founded a new settlement, and each family, who came from 
Europe or the United States of America, obtained a lot; it could be extended 
until 150 hectares in plain and the double in mountain, and, decreed by the 
President of Chile Republic, to each son or family member older as ten years 
was assigned more a half of lot and to each one younger as four a quarter of lot.
For the High Decree of 10th October 1882 an Immigration Office (Agencia 
General de Inmigración) was set up in Paris (till 1888 Francisco de Borja 
28  Boletin 1874, pp. 82-87
29  Earlier attempts were unsuccessful. On 10th April 1824, because of O’Higgins ab-
dication, was issued a law which gave guarantees and exemptions either to colons who 




Echeverría was at the head of the office). According to the next Immigration 
Regulation of 24 June 1905, two agencies were set up in Genoa and in Ham-
burg, the most important harbours for boarding to (South) America.
The Agencia was competent to draw contracts with individuals; whereas 
the companies obtained the land granting and the authorization to conclude 
an agreement with private citizens by decree of Government of Chile.
Who wanted to go to Chile, should have presented an application (solici-
tud) to Immigration Office with the following certificates: certificate of birth 
of him and his family members; health certificate; certificate of good morali-
ty, good life and conduct and a statement of the skills evaluation.
After the Immigration Office had accepted the request, the contract was 
drawn. The future colon bound himself to go to Chile with his family, to set-
tle in the designated lot and to stay there at least six years, afterwards he 
would have obtained the title. The Immigration Office paid travel tickets 
(either through agreements with shipping companies or tickets purchase). 
The Government bound itself to give colon and his family, at arrival in Chile, 
hospitality and a daily allowance of thirty cents of pesos for each adult and 
fifteen cents for each kid older than ten years, until they would have taken 
possession of the lot, selected by law or by company in agreement with the 
Inspección General de Tierras. The colons knew which lot they would have 
obtained, before going on the trip. After the colons had taken possession of 
the lot, they received necessary footage for buying a house, pack animals and 
tools for soiling (in case of woodland, a deforestation machine for twenty fam-
ilies). Furthermore, a pension of twenty pesos for one year and health care 
and medicines for two years. The government only anticipated all these costs, 
which the colons would have given back in ten annual instalments. After they 
had paid one-third of their debt, stayed at the farm for six years (reduced 
to three with the decree of 12th October 1908) and built a house, the colons 
obtained the title, which was as mortgaged as if the lot had been sold by auc-
tion. After the total payment, title without a mortgage was obtained through a 
decree (and then through a deed) recorded in Conservador de Bienes Raíces.
Foreign settlements were only in part successful, especially German set-
tlements, which, how it is still possible to observe, helped strongly to the de-
velopment of South Chile territory. And, though to a lesser extent, Italian set-
tlement in Capitan Pastene and in the neighboring area, near to Temuco, in 
the Araucanía, the Mapuche people land (Región de la Araucanía today).30
30  In 1904 and 1905 Sociedad Nueva Italia, assignee of Fratelli Ricci & Co.’s rights, 
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But some experiences failed and reasons could be as follows: a) breach of 
contract on company’s side: the company did not carry families or did not 
give tools for settlement or did not give whole assigned lot or defrauded the 
Government of Chile, because the company obtained more lots compared to 
the number of families.; b) breach of contract on State’s side: as result of bad 
knowledge of the land map, the Government promised more land what he 
had or he promised lots which were already granted or sold; c) Exaggerated 
generosity by State in drawing land granting contracts without knowing the 
real situation of the country.31
4. Conclusion
Some means adopted by the Chilean government in the attempt to taking 
control over the southern territories and improving soil conditions do not 
represent new strategies. It is known that the term ‘colonus’ was already used 
in the laws of the Roman empire and since Principate, emperors had to face 
up with the question of agri deserti who shows strong similarity with the 
Chilean question of native people’s land. 
But it is interesting - and I think it would deserve more attention than 
what it has received - to mark how two experiences so distant in the time and 
space had very similar problems and faced up with the same solutions.
who was assignee of Sebastián Nicosia’s rights, settled down for Decree No. 553 of 30th 
May 1908 one hundred Italian families from small towns of the Apennines of Emilia-Ro-
magna North-East Italy. They were in a very good relationship with the Mapuche people, 
improved soil conditions and attended to keep Italian food tradition. Recently, the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave to ham of Capitan Pastene PDO (Protected Designation 
of Origin) certificate for ham production.
31  There was a spontaneous migration to Chile too. For High Decree of 10th September 
1899, these migrants were recognized as foreign colons, if they made a request. Whoever 
was interested, put in an application to Ministerio de Colonización (Office for Settlement) 
with enclosed certificates as mentioned above. Their skills requested were farm jobs. After 
the competent office had accepted the request, the migrant (colon) received a lot with vari-
able size (up to forty hectares for each householder (padre de familia), more up to twenty 
for each almost twelve years old son. The colon bound himself to stay there with his family 
and to soil land in person for five years; furthermore, he had to mark the boundary and 
to get better his lot, which he could not transfer or sell. He could obtain the ownership 
such as the foreigner who arrived in Chile by contract. For the High Decree of 13th July of 
1903, the possibility to make a request a plot of land was restricted to foreigners who were 
arrived in Chile within a year.
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It is possible to see an analogy between Chilean and Roman experience. 
Both, Chile and the Roman empire, had problems with the exploitation of 
some lands in their territory. For different causes: Chilean Government had 
to face up the question of the Mapuche people lands, whereas the Roman em-
perors should resolve the question of agri deserti, lands which were infertile 
and abandoned by landlords who could no more pay the taxes (or they did not 
want to do it). The effects were the same: bad exploited lands and fewer tax 
revenues for the State.
According to Jones:32 “The problem of imperial lands was administratively 
simpler. The government would offer emphyteutic or perpetual leases, with a 
few years’ initial immunities, insisting that grantees must hold good land of 
their own to guarantee the rent: in a.d. 337 it was enacted that anyone who 
bought the good private land of an emphyteutic lessee of bad imperial land 
became responsible for the emphyteutic lease. The emperors also frequently 
ruled that in any lease, for term o years or in perpetuity, badlands must be 
mixed with good and that lessees must never be allowed to take productive 
land only”
The question of ancestral land rights in Chile is still struggling. On Decem-
ber 2013 appeared in “The Independent” an article titled “Chile: The nation 
that’s still waging war on Native Americans”.33 It told the history of a native 
family who lives in a wooden shack on a plot of land outside the rural town’s 
limits, Ercilla, a seven-hour bus journey south of the Chilean capital, Santi-
ago. This land, one of those lots which Chilean Government sold to foreign 
settlers, belongs to its rightful owner, but the native family has been occupy-
ing it as part of an ancestral land rights claim. This is only an example of the 
relationship between native people and landowners, which has continued to 
intensify over the last decade with hunger strikes and violence, until when 
a married couple burnt to death after their farmhouse was set on fire by a 
Mapuche leader. The country’s refusal to recognize ancestral land claims has 
sparked a deadly conflict with the Mapuche people.
The dispute has its roots at the end of the 19th century in the so-called 
“pacification” of the Araucania region, when the territory was incorporated 
into Chilean State. From the time it became independent, the Chilean Gov-
ernment faced up the problem of these lands. Native people were not inte-
32  Jones 1964, p. 813.
33 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/chile-the-nation-that-s-still-wa-
ging-war-on-native-americans-8996336.html
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grated, and they had a connection with Nature so different that their lands 
were considered bad exploited or abandoned. Chilean State tried then to re-
solve the question through organized colonization of these lands; especially 
inviting foreigners from Europe and the United States of America to settle 
down in Chile, where they would have received a plot of land to cultivate. 
Chile, adopting the solution found by Roman laws, acquired the native 
people’s lands (in the Roman empire, abandoned lands belonged to the em-
peror or landlords) and sold them by auction to whom was good to till the soil 
and to improve it. The Chilean Government went further and decided to give 
these sold lots for founding foreign settlements. From Europe and the United 
States of America came many families to settle down in Chile and to help the 
growth and development of the country. 
They did it and for that, the solution taken by the Government can be con-
sidered as the best, but unluckily instead of working out the question of the 
Mapuche people, settlements of their ancestral lands have made it worse.
In both experiences, Roman farmers and foreign settlers in Chile became 
owners of these lands, after a fixed period, but was this title legitimate? Could 
Roman emperors or the Chilean Government transfer these lands? We can 
affirmatively answer for the Roman empire: the emperors made and were the 
Law, so they could decide what they wanted and apart from this, these were 
land abandoned by their owners, who could anyway claim them within a fixed 
term. Of course, we could say the same for the Chilean Government and the 
transferred title was legitimate, but here the question is that these lands be-
longed to other people who had a different mother tongue, different culture, 
different laws and who probably did not understand what it was happening to 
their lands, and, although in many cases the Mapuche people left their lands or 
sold them without conflicts, their descendants assert that the whole question 
of foreign settlement in Chile was not legitimate, but that is another question.
My paper does not talk about ancestral land rights and their political 
implications,34 but just shows Chilean colonialism’s historical roots and its 
strong connections with the later Roman empire’s experience, when Roman 
emperors used the same means to resolve similar land problems in some ter-
ritories of the empire. 
34  The Chile Government set up a body to resolve the Mapuche land dispute: the 
Conadi (Corporacíon Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena - National Corporation for Indig-
enous Development). The organization is allotted a yearly budget to buy properties from 





Boletin 1813 = Boletín de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno, Santiago de Chile, 
Imprenta Nacional, Calle de la Moneda, I, 1813
Boletin 1866 = Boletín de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno, Santiago de Chile, 
Imprenta Nacional, Calle de la Moneda, XXXIV, 1866.
Boletin 1874 = Boletín de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno, Santiago de Chile, 
Imprenta Nacional, Calle de la Moneda, XLII, 1874.
Codex Theodosianus 1904 = Codex Theodosianus. I. Theodosiani libri XVI cum 
constitutionibus Sirmondianis, ed. Th. Mommsen, I.2, Berlin, 1904
Código Civil de la Republica de Chile 1856 = Código Civil de la Republica de 
Chile Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Nacional, calle de Morandé, núm. 36. Mayo 
31 de 1856
Pharr 1952 = C. Pharr, The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmondian 
Constitutions: A Translation with Commentary, Glossary, and Bibliogra-
phy, Princeton, 1952
Secondary Sources
Bianchi 2018 = P. Bianchi, Gli effetti del passaggio del tempo nelle leggi impe-
riali e nella prassi da Costantino a Giustiniano. Evasione fiscale e possesso, 
inerzia dei creditori, Rome, 2018
Encina 1949 = F.A. Encina, Historia de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1949 (3ª ed.).
Fustel de Coulanges 1885 = Fustel de Coulanges, Le colonat romain. Recherches 
sur quelques problemes d’histoire, Paris, 1885.
Ibañez Santa Maria 2013 = A. Ibañez Santa Maria, Historia de Chile (1860 – 
1973), Santiago de Chile, 2013.
Jones 1964 = A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire. 284 – 602, voll. 2, Ox-
ford, 1964.
Levy 1951 = E. Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law. The Law of Property, Philadel-
phia, 1951.
Saumagne 1937 = Ch. Saumagne, Du rôle de l’origo et du census dans la forma-
tion du colonat romain, in Byzantion, 12, 1937, p. 487 – 581.
Savigny 1850 = F.C. von Savigny, Über dem römischen Kolonat, Vermischte 
Schriften, Vol. II, Berlin, 1850.
Sirks 2008 = A J B Sirks, The Colonate in Justinian’s Reign, in Journal of Roman 
Studies, 98, 2008, p. 120-143.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
67
Sirks 2012 = A.J.B Sirks, Did poverty lie at the origin of the Colonate?, in Koino-
nia, 36, 2012, p. 133 – 143.
Sirks 2017 = A.J.B Sirks, L’aspetto fiscal del colonato dopo il 438, in (ed. G. Bas-
sanelli Sommariva, S. Tarozzi, P, Biavaschi) Ravenna Capitale. Dopo il Te-
odosiano. Il diritto pubblico in Occidente nei secoli V – VIII, Santarcange-




LA REFORMA AGRARIA CHILENA (SIGLO XX)*
Agustín Parise
1. Introducción
El presente estudio apunta a contextualizar la reforma agraria que se llevó 
a cabo en la República de Chile durante el siglo XX. La experiencia de reforma 
chilena amerita especial atención ya que, cuando se la compara con experien-
cias en otras jurisdicciones de las Américas, refleja el mayor grado de impacto 
en la modernización de la agricultura.1 Es dable notar que la propiedad es 
principalmente una cuestión de mentalidad,2 y la cabal comprensión de la 
mentalidad en un momento y lugar determinados ayuda a entender el alcan-
ce de un derecho. Las fronteras que delimitan los intereses de los diferentes 
actores (v.gr., Estado, propietarios) son problemáticas3 y las instituciones 
del derecho de propiedad proporcionan un terreno fértil para los problemas 
cuando estos límites se solapan.4 Esos conflictos atraen la atención de los aca-
démicos más allá del derecho, y ese interés ha resultado en estudios por, inter 
alia, economistas, sociólogos, politólogos y teólogos.5 Por lo tanto, la proble-
matización de la propiedad a menudo dispara preguntas relacionadas con el 
papel de los diferentes actores. Nuevas condiciones sociales afectan así a las 
culturas locales y esos impactos provocan cambios en las instituciones del 
derecho de propiedad.6 Un enfoque desde el estudio de la historia del derecho 
ayuda a identificar las transformaciones en las instituciones del derecho de 
propiedad, ayudando así a demostrar que las interpretaciones actuales no son 
* El presente estudio ofrece una traducción de secciones tomadas de Agustín Parise; 
Ownership Paradigms in American Civil Law Jurisdictions: Manifestations of the Shifts 
in the Legislation of Louisiana, Chile, and Argentina (16th-20th Centuries). Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2017.
1  Sampaio 1993, p. 20.
2  La expresión fue compartida por Abelardo Levaggi en un curso sobre historia del 
derecho de propiedad en la Universidad de Buenos Aires en agosto de 2001.
3  Reich 1964, p. 733.
4  Castán Tobeñas 1963, p. 7.
5  Castán Tobeñas 1963, p. 7.




dogmas sagrados e incuestionables.7
El presente estudio explora la experiencia chilena de reforma agraria y se 
divide en tres partes. En primer lugar, se presenta el afloramiento del para-
digma de la función social. Se abordan entonces brevemente sus orígenes en 
múltiples foros y los esfuerzos de Léon Duguit, quien obró como principal 
paladín. En segundo lugar, se conceptualiza la reforma agraria y se elabora 
sobre sus orígenes y expansión en América Latina. En tercer lugar, se ofrece 
información sobre el desarrollo normativo en Chile, abriendo surcos para la 
reforma mediante legislación especial. Se verá de ese modo la evolución y 
la implementación de la reforma en esa parte de las Américas. El presente 
estudio ofrece así herramientas para entender cómo la República de Chile 
experimentó cambios en su paradigma de propiedad.
2. Afloramiento de una función social8
El derecho privado experimentó un proceso de socialización en el período 
comprendido entre 1890 y 1930,9 ya que el paradigma liberal había ofrecido 
pocas limitaciones al derecho de propiedad. Cambios graduales comenzaron 
a ocurrir en la sociedad en relación con el alcance de este derecho y el para-
digma de la función social comenzó a desarrollarse en el hemisferio occiden-
tal. Ese enfoque implicaba una comprensión menos egoísta de la propiedad.10 
Se habían producido cambios en las estructuras sociales y económicas de las 
diferentes jurisdicciones, con migraciones masivas a las ciudades y los efectos 
de la Revolución Industrial.11 En consecuencia, el crudo paradigma individua-
lista comenzó a ser desafiado como una reacción a los problemas sociales que 
se estaban desarrollando en el hemisferio occidental.12 
El cambio se percibió con los sucesos revolucionarios de 1848 en Europa13 y 
con los escritos de, inter alia, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon,14 Karl Heinrich Marx15 
7  Azcárate (de) 1879, p. xviii; Azcárate (de) 1883, p. 352.
8  Aspectos de esta sección 2 fueron publicados previamente en Parise 2019. 
9  Halpérin 1996, p. 186.
10  Areán 1994, p. 188.
11  Cordero Quinzacara 2008, p. 503.
12  Azcárate (de) 1883, p. 357-453.
13  Azcárate (de) 1883, p. 359. 
14  Peset 1999, p. 443 y 449.
15  Adrogué 1991, p. 32.
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y Auguste Comte.16 La idea de una función social no se limitó al derecho de 
propiedad, ya que estuvo presente en diferentes áreas del derecho,17 inter alia, 
el derecho de familia, sucesiones18 y procedimiento civil.19 Quienes abogaran 
por la adopción de un paradigma amplio de la función social podían apuntar a 
encontrar en la legislación un reflejo de la realidad social,20 donde el derecho 
debía ser un producto de esta última.21 Por lo tanto, la función social podía es-
tar sujeta a alteraciones, según las mutaciones en las circunstancias sociales de 
diferentes sociedades en diferentes momentos.22
Los defensores de un cambio de paradigma pronto surgieron en Europa 
continental,23 más allá de los juristas socialistas y sus escritos.24 La necesidad 
de cambio también estuvo presente en las obras de autores provenientes de ju-
risdicciones de habla inglesa,25 aunque no necesariamente en la misma línea o 
en la misma medida que en Europa continental.26 El nuevo paradigma también 
estuvo presente en los escritos de la Iglesia Católica,27 los cuales no negaron 
la existencia de un carácter tanto social como individual para la propiedad.28 
Se desarrolló una Doctrina Social de la Iglesia, cuyo objetivo era humanizar la 
propiedad, siendo un derecho natural, gravado con una hipoteca social.29 
El jurista francés Duguit fue el paladín del paradigma de la función social,30 
16  Ankersent & Ruppert 2006, p. 95; Bergel 1994, p. 18; Adrogué 1991, p. 34.
17  Véase, por ejemplo, Lloredo Alix 2012, p. 214.
18  Caroni 2012, p. 340-341; Caroni 2013, p. 89-99. El segundo trabajo abordó la fun-
ción social en el derecho de sucesiones en Suiza.
19  Verkerk 2010, p. 257-277.
20  Hernández Gil 1969, p. 74.
21  Keiser 2005, p. 162.
22  Ruíz B. 1964, p. 39.
23  Véanse, por ejemplo, trabajos de Heinrich Ahrens, Gumersindo de Azcárate, Otto 
von Gierke, Henri Hayem, Anton Menger y José María de Semprún y Gurrea.
24  Castán Tobeñas 1963, p. 63; Bolgár 1960, p. 288.
25  Véanse, por ejemplo, trabajos de James Barr Ames, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 
Richard Theodore Ely, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. y Frederic Pollock.
26  Simpson 1998, p. 27.
27  Véanse, por ejemplo, las encíclicas Rerum novarum (1891) de León XIII, Quadra-
gesimo anno (1931) de Pío XI, Mater et magistra (1961) de San Juan XXIII y Populorum 
progressio (1967) de Pablo VI. 
28  Quadragesimo anno 1931, § 45. Véase también Adrogué 1991, p. 34.
29  Expresión acuñada por el Papa San Juan Pablo II. Véase Adrogué 1991, p. 34.
30  Sobre la vida y obra de Léon Duguit, véase en general el volumen conmemorativo 
en Melleray 2011 y Calvo González & Monereo Pérez 2005.
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afirmando desde el principio que el paradigma liberal estaba en extinción.31 
El publicista francés popularizó el término función social (fonction sociale) 
en 1905,32 y unos años más tarde, en agosto y septiembre de 1911, pronunció 
una serie de seis conferencias33 en la Universidad de Buenos Aires,34 donde 
defendió la función social en el derecho privado.35 En la sexta conferencia, 
que trata principalmente sobre la función social de la propiedad, indicó que 
la propiedad estaba sujeta a la socialización, lo que implicaba dos cosas: “que 
la propiedad individual [ya] no es un derecho individual, y se transforma en 
una función social; y segundo, que hubo un aumento en el número de ca-
sos de riqueza asignados a colectividades, que deben estar sujetos a protec-
ción jurídica”.36 Duguit también declaró que los propietarios podían usar las 
cosas siempre y cuando cumplieran una función social. Tenían que asumir 
tres tareas:37 (i) disfrutar de las cosas al satisfacer necesidades individuales 
o colectivas;38 (ii) no dejar las cosas sin uso o explotación;39 y (iii) permitir el 
uso de las cosas cuando se pretende cumplir con los intereses sociales.40 El 
autor francés bordó la existencia de derechos subjetivos y defendió que “la 
propiedad ya no es el derecho subjetivo del propietario; es la función social 
del poseedor de riqueza”.41 Las ideas y escritos de Duguit generaron debate 
y motivaron otros estudios.42 Sus postulados también fueron bienvenidos en 
América Latina, especialmente luego de sus Conferencias de Buenos Aires.43 
El paradigma de la función social se extendió por América Latina y motivó 
cambios en la redacción de constituciones y códigos civiles, mientras que, a 
31  Duguit 1912, p. 155.
32  Halpérin 1996, p. 197.
33  Sobre el contenido de las seis conferencias, véase también Mirow 2010, p. 203-209. 
34  Duguit 1912, p. I; Mirow 2010, p. 198. 
35  Para un estudio sobre el impacto de los postulados de Léon Duguit en el derecho 
privado, véase en general Morin 1932.
36  Duguit 1912, p. 148-149.
37  Duguit 1912, p. 165-166, citado también por Alessandri Rodríguez et al. 2010, p. 
41-42. Véase también Salvat 1962, p. 17.
38  Duguit 1912, p. 165-166.
39  Duguit 1912, p. 166-167.
40  Duguit 1912, p. 168-169.
41  Duguit 1912, p. 158. Véase también Mirow 2010, p. 207.  
42  Sobre los diferentes grados de aceptación y rechazo de las ideas de Léon Duguit, 
véase el estudio detallado en Hakim 2011. 
43  Keiser 2012, p. 269.
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su vez, incluyó cambios en la interpretación de los tribunales y en el desarro-
llo de legislación especial que abogaba por el nuevo enfoque de la propiedad. 
Esa recepción tuvo lugar principalmente durante las primeras décadas del 
siglo XX, si bien algunos textos más recientes aún incorporan la idea de una 
función social.44 La recepción se percibió en diversos ámbitos y el presente 
estudio se focaliza en la acogida brindada mediante la legislación especial de 
reforma agraria. 
3. Postulados de la reforma agraria 
Las jurisdicciones latinoamericanas incorporaron el paradigma de la fun-
ción social también dentro de legislación especial y de los nuevos códigos 
satélite. Esas disposiciones se desarrollaron fuera de los códigos civiles y te-
nían como objetivo incluir al nuevo paradigma. La legislación especial ayudó 
a avanzar con un cambio de paradigma de propiedad, despegándose de los 
principios liberales de los códigos civiles decimonónicos que, quizá debido a 
la veneración de la que eran objeto, fueron difíciles de dejar atrás. Un ejem-
plo clave de legislación especial se encuentra en las leyes de reforma agraria 
que se extendieron a través del continente. La legislación especial contribu-
yó a crear un nuevo statu quo o dimensión social,45 introduciendo reformas 
profundas en el derecho de propiedad, transformando la propiedad en un 
derecho limitado por el bienestar común.46 La descodificación también allanó 
el camino para la incorporación del nuevo paradigma. En consecuencia, el 
cambio de paradigma también se incluyó en los códigos satélite que no for-
maron parte de los códigos civiles, pero que afectaron su contenido. La des-
codificación hizo posible la promulgación de códigos satélite que hicieron que 
los códigos civiles dependieran necesariamente de ellos. Ejemplos de desco-
dificación son los códigos rurales, laborales y de familia que se introdujeron 
durante el siglo XX en diversas jurisdicciones americanas. 
La promulgación de leyes de reforma agraria abrió camino para la re-
cepción del nuevo paradigma en las Américas. La reforma agraria ha sido 
así descrita de diferentes maneras,47 y además no tiene un significado úni-
44  Por ejemplo, el artículo 56, párrafo 1 de la Constitución Política de Bolivia de 2009 
hizo referencia a la función social de la propiedad. Véase Constitución de Bolivia 2009. 
45  Cordero Quinzacara 2008, p. 504.
46  Delgado de Miguel 2002, p. 62.
47  Ankersent & Ruppert 2006, p. 71.
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co.48 Estas reformas pueden verse como procesos históricos que se desa-
rrollaron a partir de impulsos políticos apenas previsibles, tanto internos 
como externos.49 Los procesos se pueden definir de forma resumida como 
medios para proporcionar tierra a los habitantes que carecen de ella,50 
seguido de una redistribución de la tierra, que tiende a beneficiar a los 
pequeños agricultores y trabajadores agrícolas.51 La redistribución de la 
tierra se mueve desde la élite terrateniente hacia quienes tienen un ac-
ceso limitado o nulo a la tierra.52 Sin embargo, la reforma agraria tam-
bién puede considerarse un elemento para el cambio social que apunta 
a eliminar estructuras sociales rígidas, donde los actores dentro de esos 
contextos provocan cambios.53 En la década de 1960, este tipo de reformas 
fue descrito como un “proceso muy complejo que implica transformacio-
nes sustanciales no sólo en los modos de vida de las zonas rurales, en la 
estructura de la economía, sino además, en la estructura del poder y de la 
organización social”.54 
La reforma agraria varió según la perspectiva adoptada y, en consecuen-
cia, los diferentes actores (v.gr. latifundistas, políticos, pequeños agriculto-
res) ofrecieron diferentes definiciones y modos de entender el proceso.55 Una 
serie de condiciones fueron fundamentales para desencadenar estas refor-
mas. La estructura de tierras debía ser inadecuada, caracterizada por latifun-
distas y por trabajadores con acceso a la tierra muy limitado (o nulo).56 Debía 
existir incluso una pobreza notable en las áreas rurales, donde los pequeños 
agricultores no podían acceder a los beneficios de los desarrollos agrícolas 
e industriales.57 Finalmente, la inestabilidad política debía acompañar este 
escenario.58 Sin embargo, la reforma agraria fue muchas veces rechazada por 
48  Mirow 2004, p. 219.
49  Sampaio 1993, p. 45.
50  Tai, p. 11.
51  Barraclough 1973, p. 33; Warriner 1969, p. xiv, citado también por Karst & Rosenn 
1975, p. 241.
52  Dekker 2003, p. 78.
53  Barraclough 1973, p. 34-35.
54  Chonchot 1965, p. 104.
55  Barraclough 1965, p. 127.
56  Barraclough 1965, p. 145.
57  Barraclough 1965, p. 145.
58  Barraclough 1965, p. 145.
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los latifundistas, quienes controlaban grandes extensiones de tierra.59 En el 
presente estudio, la legislación sobre reforma agraria abarca aquellas emana-
das de las legislaturas con el objetivo de modificar la distribución existente 
de la tierra dentro de una jurisdicción. Al mismo tiempo, esa legislación hace 
que la propiedad de la tierra existente esté disponible para aquellos miem-
bros de la sociedad a quienes tradicionalmente se les había negado su capa-
cidad o derecho de propiedad. Como corolario, esa nueva legislación ayuda a 
generar un cambio de paradigma dirigido hacia la función social.
Los esfuerzos para lograr una reforma agraria se extendieron por todo el 
mundo, experimentando un desarrollo significativo durante la segunda mitad 
del siglo XX.60 Los primeros precedentes en las Américas siguieron a la Revo-
lución Mexicana, mientras que en Europa varias jurisdicciones implementa-
ron reformas agrarias luego de la Primera Guerra Mundial61 (v. gr., España, 
década de 1930).62 La legislación dirigida a la reforma agraria estuvo presente 
en América Latina y se desarrolló con diferentes grados de éxito en Europa, 
África, Asia63 y más tarde en Australia,64 alcanzando, entre otros, Filipinas, 
India, Irán, Pakistán y Taiwán.65 Varios países en desarrollo y otros en proce-
so de reconstrucción (v.gr., Japón, década de 1940)66 emprendieron reformas 
ambiciosas, principalmente durante la segunda parte del siglo, con el objetivo 
de lograr cambios profundos en la división y el régimen de las tierras rura-
les.67 Esa tendencia mundial hacia la reforma agraria resultó finalmente en la 
primera Conferencia Mundial de las Naciones Unidas sobre Reforma Agraria 
y Desarrollo Rural, que se celebró en Roma en 1979.68
La función social ofreció un contexto para la mayoría de los esfuerzos de 
reforma agraria en las Américas.69 La función social, en el contexto de esas 
jurisdicciones, fue un término amplio que promovió el uso de la tierra como 
59  Lapp 2004, p. 2.
60  Sin embargo, el propósito de la redistribución de la tierra se remonta a la Antigua 
Grecia. Ankersent & Ruppert 2006, p. 72.
61  Durán Bernales 1966, p. 172-174.
62  Robledo - Espinoza 1999, p. 406.
63  Dekker 2003, p. 78 y 88-102; Halpérin 2008, p. 312-319.
64  Véase Villiers (de) 2003, p. 89-129. 
65  Véase en general Tai 1974; Conesa 2012, p. 5.
66  Barraclough 1973, p. 33.
67  Halpérin 2008, p. 312-313.
68  Parra Silva 2006, p. 239-240.
69  Ankersent - Ruppert 2006, p. 71.
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un medio para lograr el progreso social y económico.70 En última instancia, 
la reforma agraria se convirtió en un componente importante del derecho de 
propiedad en las jurisdicciones de América,71 una región que era considerada 
líder en la distribución desigual de la tierra,72 donde el 90 % de la tierra era 
propiedad del 10 % de la población durante la década de 1960.73 Esa relación 
tradicional de la tenencia de tierra dio forma al sistema social,74 donde los 
campesinos solían carecer de educación formal, atención médica adecuada 
y vivienda digna.75 Los reformistas intentaron terminar con los latifundios y 
erradicar las zonas desocupadas,76 mientras que el nuevo paradigma pareció 
justificar la intervención para eliminar la distribución desigual de la tierra.77 
La reforma agraria tuvo lugar en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones latinoa-
mericanas. La primera experiencia se remonta a México, a partir de 1915, poco 
después de la Revolución.78 México adoptó una serie de decretos, códigos y 
leyes para lograr la reforma.79 La Constitución Mexicana de 1917 incorporó 
elementos de la reforma agraria, principalmente en el artículo 27.80 En 1934 
se dieron nuevos pasos hacia la reforma a través de la descodificación, cuando 
se promulgó el Código Agrario en México.81 Ese código estimuló el estableci-
miento de ejidos,82 donde la tierra podría cultivarse colectivamente o distri-
buirse.83 Varias jurisdicciones siguieron a México en el camino hacia la refor-
ma agraria durante el próximo medio siglo, aunque algunas jurisdicciones 
parecen no haber exigido una reforma (v.gr., Argentina, Uruguay).84 En la 
70  Hendrix 1993, p. 3.
71  Mirow 2004, p. 227.
72  Ankersent - Ruppert 2006, p. 70; Karst & Rosenn 1975, p. 242.
73  Lapp 2004, p. 2.
74  Barraclough 1973, p. 40. Para un análisis sociológico de la reforma agraria en Amé-
rica Latina, véanse los trabajos de Antonio García (v.gr., García 1973).
75  Alexander 1974, p. 101.
76  Ankersent - Ruppert 2006, p. 100.
77  Ankersent - Ruppert 2006, p. 119.
78  Halpérin 2008, p. 313-314; Assies & Duhau 2009, p. 359-360. Véase en general 
Mirow 2004, p. 219-222. 
79  Hernández Gaona 1991, p. 93.
80  Mirow 2004, p. 206; Halpérin 2008, p. 313-314; Alexander 1974, p. 25.
81  Hernández Gaona 1991, p. 88; Meyer 1998, p. 187.
82  El ejido existió antes de este período, debe notarse. Sobre el ejido más allá de la 
primera mitad del siglo XX, véase Duhau 2009.
83  Alexander 1974, p. 26.
84  Alexander 1974, p. 26; Lapp 2004, p. 14.
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región se produjo un contagio85 de legislación de reforma agraria. Ejemplos 
de los primeros pasos legislativos de reforma agraria86 se encuentran en Co-
lombia (1936), Venezuela (1940), Puerto Rico (1941), Guatemala (1952), Bo-
livia (1953), Cuba (1959), República Dominicana (1961), Chile (1962), Costa 
Rica (1962), Honduras (1962), Panamá (1962), Paraguay (1963), Perú (1963), 
Brasil (1964), Ecuador (1964), Nicaragua (1979) y El Salvador (1980).87 La re-
forma agraria experimentó un auge en la década de 196088 y se desaceleró en 
la década de 1980.89 Incluso se ha afirmado que los cambios en las estructuras 
agrarias de esas jurisdicciones fueron mayores durante el período entre 1930 
y 1980 que durante los 400 años anteriores.90 
Las reformas variaron significativamente en la medida en que reestructu-
raron la tenencia y la producción de la tierra.91 Las medidas requerían, entre 
otras cosas, el establecimiento de limitaciones a la propiedad privada y la ex-
propiación de grandes extensiones de tierra.92 Los programas variaron en al-
cance: algunos concedieron prácticamente todas las tierras individualmente 
para ser cultivadas como granjas familiares; otros optaron por sistemas mix-
tos, dando la bienvenida a la agricultura cooperativa y a la propiedad privada 
de la tierra; mientras que otros optaron por la socialización de la tierra, como 
fue el caso en Cuba.93 La experiencia de la reforma agraria cubana de 1959 
fue radical94 y se llevó a cabo como parte de la revolución comunista.95 Ese 
movimiento despertó preocupación en los EE.UU, impulsando reformas en 
las jurisdicciones a través del programa denominado Alianza para el Progreso 
85  Este término se toma prestado, mutatis mutandis, de Colley 2014, p. 237.
86  Algunas jurisdicciones promulgaron múltiples leyes de reforma agraria. Por 
ejemplo, Colombia promulgó leyes de reforma agraria en 1936, 1961 y 1980. Sampaio 
1993, p. 10.
87  Sampaio 1993, p. 10; Zoomers & Haar (van der) 2000, p. 19; Chonchot 1965, p. 
100; Halpérin 2008, p. 314-315; Alexander 1974, p. 40; Janvry (de) et al. 2001, p. 279; 
Lapp 2004, p. 13; Rosenn 1963, p. 335; Wilkie 1974, p. 1.
88  Tai 1974, p. 15.
89  García 1985, p. 120.
90  Long - Roberts 1994, p. 325.
91  Long - Roberts 1994, p. 362.
92  Zoomers & Haar (van der) 2000, p. 19.
93  Alexander 1974, p. 58.
94  Sampaio 1993, p. 11.
95  Alexander 1974, p. 37.
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del presidente John Fitzgerald Kennedy.96 Ese programa abogó por reformas 
progresivas que ayudaran a evitar más revoluciones a lo largo del continente97 
y transformó la idea de reforma agraria, de algo que se consideraba subversi-
vo, a una especie de compromiso general de las jurisdicciones que apuntaba 
hacia un objetivo respetable.98 Sin embargo, la promulgación de leyes de re-
forma no significó necesariamente que la reforma agraria se llevara a cabo.99 
A pesar de que se puede afirmar que las disposiciones de reforma agraria 
en última instancia no alteraron sustancialmente la estructura agraria de la 
región,100 o que en algunas jurisdicciones no fueron más que un gesto,101 ayu-
daron a acoger la recepción del nuevo paradigma. Esas normas se sumaron a 
los esfuerzos plasmados en diversas constituciones y códigos civiles. La pro-
mulgación de leyes especiales y la introducción de la función social llevaron a 
la eliminación de la comprensión unitaria de la propiedad.102 
4. Desarrollo normativo
Chile acogió el paradigma de la función social en su legislación especial.103 
96  Una carta estableció la Alianza y se firmó en Punta del Este (Uruguay) en 1961. 
Véase Karst - Rosenn 1975, p. 275; Sampaio 1993, p. 11.
97  Chonchot 1965, p. 102; Long & Roberts 1994, p. 361; Carroll 1970, p. 126; Sampaio 
1993, p. 33; Lapp 2004, p. 28-29. 
98  Alexander 1974, p. 23, 42.
99  Karst - Rosenn 1975, p. 274.
100  Sampaio 1993, p. 15.
101  Alexander 1974, p. 40.
102  Cordero Quinzacara 2008, p. 513.
103  Nótese que Chile también dio la bienvenida a la función social, inter alia, en su 
texto constitucional. La actual Constitución de Chile fue adoptada en 1980, y sus predece-
soras fueron adoptadas en 1833 y 1925. Diversas reformas fueron incorporadas a esos tres 
textos, sin embargo. Dos de esas reformas, implementadas en 1963 y 1967, incorporaron 
elementos de reforma agraria. Por su parte, el término función social fue introducido en 
el parágrafo 10 del artículo 10 del texto constitucional: “El derecho de propiedad en sus 
diversas especies. La ley establecerá el modo de adquirir la propiedad, de usar, gozar y 
disponer de ella y las limitaciones y obligaciones que permitan asegurar su función social 
y hacerla accesible a todos. La función social de la propiedad comprende cuanto exijan los 
intereses generales del Estado, la utilidad y salubridad públicas, el mejor aprovechamiento 
de las fuentes y energías productivas en el servicio de la colectividad y la elevación de las 
condiciones de vida del común de los habitantes. […]” Ley 16615 (1967).
Véase también Muñoz León 2005, p. 263-269; Carrasco Delgado 2006, p. 322.
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Tal como se sostuvo anteriormente en el presente estudio, la promulgación 
de leyes de reforma agraria en Chile tuvo, en comparación con otras jurisdic-
ciones, el mayor grado de impacto en la modernización de la agricultura. 104
A. Evolución
Las primeras décadas del siglo XX aún reflejaban que los terratenientes 
se oponían enérgicamente a una reforma agraria significativa en Chile.105 De 
manera similar a otras jurisdicciones americanas, la estructura de la tenen-
cia de la tierra en Chile había sido heredada del período español y continuó 
durante las primeras décadas de los períodos republicanos.106 Los cambios en 
Chile se iniciaron durante la presidencia de Arturo Fortunato Alessandri Pal-
ma en 1920, cuando el poder político de los terratenientes comenzó a erosio-
narse.107 Durante ese siglo, la industrialización y los ideales del capitalismo se 
filtraron en el sector rural, provocando un efecto que debilitó a la élite terra-
teniente.108 Las principales reformas se llevaron a cabo en la década de 1960 y 
se consolidaron en la década de 1970,109 durante las presidencias de Eduardo 
Nicanor Frei Montalva, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (n.b., hijo de Alessandri 
Palma) y Salvador Guillermo Allende Gossens. Las áreas rurales de Chile, an-
tes de esas reformas significativas, se caracterizaban por contar con propie-
tarios de extensas tierras, que mantenían una relación cuasi feudal con los 
inquilinos,110 donde el 80% de las tierras agrícolas se dividía entre el 3% de las 
familias rurales.111 Había una clara dicotomía entre los grandes terratenientes 
en las haciendas (latifundios) y los pequeños agricultores que poseían tierras 
que apenas bastaban para subsistir (minifundios).112 Incluso cuando las ha-
ciendas parecían ser propiedades multifamiliares, seguían siendo unidades 
económicas singulares113 y el latifundio era la unidad económica y social do-
104  Sampaio 1993, p. 20.
105  The Chilean Land Reform 1963, p. 312-313.
106  Thome 1971, p. 491.
107  Thome 1971, p. 494.
108  Lapp 2004, p. 54.
109  Brahm García 2012, p. 254.
110  Barraclough 1999, p. 20.
111  Barraclough 1999, p. 21.
112  Dekker 2003, p. 7; Barraclough 1973, p. 133-134.
113  Becket 1965, p. 561.
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minante.114 En Chile, durante el período revolucionario (1960-1980), algunos 
grupos intentaron apartarse del capitalismo y adoptar el socialismo.115
Diversas disposiciones limitaron el derecho de propiedad más allá de leyes 
de reforma agraria en Chile desde principios del siglo XX. Por ejemplo, la 
propiedad familiar también se introdujo en Chile. Su recepción se remonta 
a la Constitución de 1925 y a otras leyes especiales (v.gr., Ley 1838 de 1906, 
Ley 5950 de 1936 y Ley 7600 de 1943).116 Se impusieron aún más limitacio-
nes al derecho de propiedad, inter alia, mediante legislación que trató sobre 
servidumbres públicas (v.gr., Ley 4851 de 1930), sobre limitaciones de carác-
ter municipal o urbanístico (v.gr., Decreto 1472 de 1941), sobre salubridad 
pública (v.gr., Código del Trabajo) y sobre utilidad social (v.gr., Decreto-Ley 
261 de 1925 y Ley 6844 de 1941).117
B. Implementación
Un primer conjunto de reformas dio la bienvenida al paradigma de la fun-
ción social y se emprendió a partir de la década de 1920. La estructura laboral 
y de tenencia de la tierra en Chile motivó la intervención del Estado.118 En 
Chile se había desarrollado un sistema de hacienda, donde existía una estruc-
tura social de producción agrícola, junto con el poder político ejercido por los 
terratenientes sobre los campesinos.119 Esa estructura hizo que los trabajado-
res, los inquilinos y los pequeños terratenientes dependieran de la hacienda, 
convirtiéndola en un sistema social y no solo en una unidad de producción.120 
Se pueden establecer–vale notar–paralelos entre el sistema de haciendas y el 
feudalismo en Europa.121 En 1928, durante la presidencia de Carlos Ibañez del 
Campo, se estableció la Caja de Colonización Agrícola,122 la cual apuntaría lue-
go a dividir las grandes extensiones de tierra, transformándolas en unidades 
pequeñas o medianas, para así poder aumentar el número de propietarios.123 
114  Petras - Zeitlin 1970, p. 507.
115  Bellisario 2006, p. 169.
116  Peñailillo Arévalo 2006, p. 69.
117  Lira Urquieta 1944, p. 176-182.
118  Véase la descripción de la estructura en Barraclough 1973, p. 139-140.
119  Bellisario 2006, p. 172.
120  Barraclough 1973, p. 147-148.
121  Bellisario 2006, p. 172.
122  Brahm García 2012, p. 250; Claro Solar 1979, p. 406-408.
123  Durán Bernales 1966, p. 329.
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Ese tímido esfuerzo logró solamente distribuir 10 000 unidades de tierra, y 
no alcanzó a los 600 000 campesinos que podrían haber sido beneficiados.124 
Las actividades de la Caja de Colonización Agrícola allanaron el camino para 
las reformas que siguieron en los años sesenta y setenta del mismo siglo, debe 
notarse sin embargo.125
Un segundo conjunto de reformas se llevó a cabo en la década de 1960,126 
cuando la estructura de la tierra siguió exigiendo cambios en Chile. El Tercer 
Censo Agropecuario de 1955 declaró que 345 000 familias vivían en las áreas 
rurales de Chile, mientras que el 47% de esas familias no poseían tierras.127 
Asimismo, en ese momento, el 55% del área cultivada estaba dividida entre 
latifundios de más de 5000 hectáreas.128 La Ley 15020 de 1962129 ofreció la 
primera experiencia chilena de reforma agraria, siendo bien recibida,130 aun 
cuando se la consideró demasiado extensa y detallada, por lo que presentaba 
desafíos para su implementación.131 Ese esfuerzo inicial se realizó durante la 
administración de Alessandri Rodríguez, en el contexto de las actividades de 
la Alianza para el Progreso132 y de la Comisión Económica para América Lati-
na (CEPAL),133 y fue una extensión de las políticas que ya existían en Chile.134 
La Ley 15020 fue la primera legislación de reforma agraria en América Lati-
na luego del establecimiento de la Alianza para el Progreso,135 al tiempo que 
124  Hurtado-Edwards & Smith 1964, p. 93; Barraclough 1999, p. 23. 
La Caja concluyó sus actividades en 1962, luego de afectar solamente a 4206 familias. 
Véase Thome 1971, p. 495. 
Se han indicado paralelos entre las actividades de la Caja y las reformas sobre la tierra 
implementadas en Italia a partir de la década de 1940. Véase Durán Bernales 1966, p. 331.
125  Barraclough 1999, p. 23.
126  Véase la información sobre las reformas de la década de 1960 en Mirow 2011, p. 
1209-1211.
127  Silva 1987, p. 57. Véase también González Terán 2010, p. 89.
128  Lapp 2004, p. 54.
129  Ley 15020 (1962). 
130  Lapp 2004, p. 66.
131  La ley incluyó 104 artículos y ocho artículos transitorios para facilitar su imple-
mentación. Véase Ley 15020 (1962) y Thome 1971, p. 497.
132  Sampaio 1993, p. 70.
133  Mirow 2011, p. 1209. 
CEPAL, por ejemplo, organizó una reunión en Santiago de Chile en mayo de 1961 para 
abordar temas de reforma agraria. Véase Brahm García 1994, p. 171.
134  Becket 1965, p. 579; Brahm García 1994, p. 168.
135  The Chilean Land Reform 1963, p. 311.
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Chile se encontraba en 1963 entre los principales beneficiarios de los fondos 
de la Alianza.136 La nueva ley pretendía incluso eliminar el ineficiente sistema 
de hacienda137 y, en palabras de Alessandri Rodríguez, pretendía ser “un ins-
trumento eficaz para que nuestro país pueda satisfacer la aspiración humana 
y justa de quienes trabajan la tierra en orden a tener un más fácil acceso a 
la propiedad de ella [...]”.138 La Iglesia Católica también dio la bienvenida a 
la reforma agraria en Chile,139 abogando por un cambio con el gobierno de 
Alessandri Rodríguez.140 Asimismo, la Iglesia Católica había implementado 
la redistribución de la tierra en partes de sus posesiones rurales en 1963.141
La Ley 15020 dio la bienvenida a la función social de la propiedad142 y 
permitió la expropiación por parte del Estado de tierras improductivas, re-
conociendo la responsabilidad social de los propietarios.143 El artículo 1 de la 
ley indicó que la propiedad se limitaba de acuerdo con los requisitos de man-
tenimiento y progreso exigidos por el orden social.144 El artículo 3 agregó que 
era primordial, entre los objetivos de la reforma, dar acceso a la propiedad a 
quienes trabajan en la tierra.145 Se requirió la creación de instituciones para 
136  The Chilean Land Reform 1963, p. 331.
137  Gallardo Fernández 2002, p. 61.
138  The Chilean Land Reform 1963, p. 5-6.
139  Tai 1974, p. 14-15; Mirow 2011, p. 1210.
140  Brahm García 1994, p. 173.
141  Thome 1971, p. 498; Barraclough 1999, p. 24.
142  Brahm García 1994, p. 163.
143  Lapp 2004, p. 66.
144  El artículo 1 de la Ley 15020 sostuvo: “El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad sobre 
un predio rústico está sometido a las limitaciones que exijan el mantenimiento y progreso 
del orden social. Estará sujeto, especialmente, a las limitaciones que exija el desarrollo 
económico nacional y a las obligaciones y prohibiciones que establece la presente ley y a 
las que contemplen las normas que se dicten en conformidad a ella.
Todo propietario agrícola está obligado a cultivar la tierra, aumentar su productividad 
y fertilidad, a conservar los demás recursos naturales y a efectuar las inversiones necesa-
rias para mejorar su explotación o aprovechamiento y las condiciones de vida de los que en 
ella trabajen, de acuerdo con los avances de la técnica”. Ley 15020 (1962).
145  El artículo 3 de la Ley 15020 sostuvo: “Con el propósito de llevar a cabo una re-
forma agraria que permita dar acceso a la propiedad de la tierra a quienes la trabajan, me-
jorar los niveles de vida de la población campesina, aumentar la producción agropecuaria 
y la productividad del suelo, se dictan los preceptos que a continuación se expresan”. Ley 
15020 (1962). 
Véase también Lapp 2004, p. 66.
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implementar la reforma agraria. En consecuencia, la ley estableció la creación 
de, inter alia, la Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA) y el Instituto de 
Desarrollo Agropecuario (INDAP).146 El artículo 11 de la ley estableció que la 
Caja de Colonización Agrícola se transformara en la CORA,147 con el objetivo 
de administrar la adquisición y la redistribución de la tierra. El artículo 12 
indicó que el INDAP debía, entre otras funciones, otorgar apoyo financiero 
para los pequeños agricultores.148 La Ley 15020 ha sido considerada como 
el paso más trascendental hacia la recepción del aspecto social de la propie-
dad en Chile.149 Si bien en última instancia afectó solamente a 980 familias y 
abarcó más del 1.5% de la superficie total de Chile,150 su efecto principal fue 
introducir eficazmente en la agenda política la reforma agraria y destacó las 
deficiencias del sector agrícola chileno.151 La Ley 15020 fue, de hecho, un im-
portante escalón para las subsiguientes leyes de reforma agraria.152
Una nueva etapa de reforma se inició mediante la Ley 16640 de 1967.153 
146  Thome 1971, p. 495; Alexander 1974, p. 83.
147  El artículo 11 de la Ley 15020 sostuvo, en parte: “Transfórmase la Caja de Colo-
nización Agrícola en Corporación de la Reforma Agraria. Dicha Corporación tendrá el ca-
rácter de persona jurídica de derecho público, empresa autónoma del Estado de duración 
indefinida, con patrimonio propio, con plena capacidad para adquirir, ejercer derechos y 
contraer obligaciones.
La Corporación de la Reforma Agraria será la sucesora de la Caja de Colonización Agrí-
cola, en todos sus bienes, derechos y obligaciones”. Ley 15020 (1962). 
148  El artículo 12 de la Ley 15020 sostuvo, en parte: “Transfórmase el Consejo de 
Fomento e Investigaciónes Agrícolas en Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario. [...] Sus fun-
ciones serán las que siguen:
a) Otorgar asistencia técnica gratuita y ayuda crediticia a los pequeños y medianos agri-
cultores, incluyendo a los que exploten minifundios y a los indígenas, y a las respectivas 
cooperativas; como también fomentar las actividades de artesanía y pequeña industria en 
zonas rurales, especialmente las relacionadas con las complementarias de la agricultura;
b) Otorgar asistencia crediticia a dueños de minifundios de propiedades familiares 
agrícolas o de pequeños predios no divisibles a fin de facilitar la adjudicación de la tierra 
en beneficio de quien la trabaje, en casos de liquidación de herencia o comunidades; o para 
transformar el minifundio en unidad económica o para pagar el todo o parte del saldo de 
precio de un inmueble comprado con el mismo objetivo [...]”. Ley 15020 (1962). 
Véase también Lapp 2004, p. 66.
149  Brahm García 1994, p. 163.
150  Sampaio 1993, p. 70.
151  Sampaio 1993, p. 70.
152  Thome 1971, p. 497; Barraclough 1999, p. 23-24.
153  Ley 16640 (1967). 
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Esa ley fue el resultado de un proceso de elaboración interdisciplinario, con 
la participación de juristas, sociólogos, agrónomos, agricultores y economis-
tas.154 En ese entonces aún había preocupación por el rendimiento de la pro-
ducción agrícola, y las reformas de Alessandri Rodríguez parecían haberse 
estancado.155 Asimismo, un movimiento de trabajadores rurales se había ges-
tado en Chile y había encontrado apoyo en el gobierno del presidente Frei 
Montalva,156 quien abogó por una reforma agraria efectiva que pusiera fin a 
la estructura existente de tenencia.157 El movimiento obrero rural tuvo lugar 
casi simultáneamente con las actividades de reforma agraria y algunos de sus 
participantes tomaron un papel activo en el proceso de reforma.158
La ley 16640 tenía como objetivo modernizar el campo chileno y establecer 
la democracia.159 El artículo 2 de la ley claramente dio la bienvenida al nuevo 
paradigma, al mencionar expresamente que la expropiación era autorizada 
para que “la propiedad agraria cumpla su función social”.160 La nueva ley, que 
encuentra paralelos en los postulados de Duguit, indicó en el artículo 4 que la 
propiedad podía limitarse para los predios que “se encuentren abandonados 
y los que estén mal explotados”.161 Los Consejos Comunales Campesinos juga-
ron un papel fundamental en esa etapa de la reforma agraria, principalmente 
en la toma de control de los latifundios y su reemplazo por nuevas unidades 
154  Thome 1971, p. 497.
155  Lapp 2004, p. 70.
156  Alexander 1974, p. 95-96. La ley fue aprobada por el 93% de los miembros del 
Congreso Nacional. Véase Sampaio 1993, p. 71.
157  Thome 1971, p. 489.
158  Alexander 1974, p. 95-96.
159  Sampaio 1993, p. 70.
160  El artículo 2 de la Ley 16640 sostuvo: “Con el objeto de que la propiedad agraria 
cumpla su función social, declárase de utilidad pública y autorízase la expropiación total 
o parcial de los predios rústicos que se encuentren en cualquiera de las situaciones que se 
expresan en los artículos 3° y 4° a 13° inclusive de la presente ley”. Ley 16640 (1967). 
161  El artículo 4 de la Ley 16640 sostuvo: “Son expropiables los predios rústicos que 
se encuentren abandonados y los que estén mal explotados.
No obstante la causal de expropiación por mala explotación, sólo se aplicará después 
de tres años contados desde la fecha de publicación de la presente ley, respecto de aquellos 
predios rústicos que, desde una fecha anterior al 4 de noviembre de 1964, tengan una su-
perficie que no exceda de 80 hectáreas de riego básicas”. Ley 16640 (1967).
Véase también Alexander 1974, p. 38.
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productivas.162 La Ley 16640 finalmente benefició a 20 976 familias163 que re-
cibieron 2.6 millones de hectáreas de tierra,164 mientras que la producción 
agrícola creció a una tasa anual del 2.9%.165 Chile experimentaría nuevos es-
fuerzos de reforma agraria, debe notarse.
Un tercer y más radical conjunto de reformas se llevó a cabo en el período 
1970-1973,166 durante la presidencia de Allende Gossens, y fue interrumpido 
por el coup d’État de Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte.167 Sin promulgar 
una nueva ley, la administración de Allende Gossens se propuso acelerar y 
desarrollar aún más la reforma agraria e involucrar al Estado en las activi-
dades del sector agrícola.168 Allende Gossens dejó en claro su intención de 
terminar el dominio del latifundio.169 En consecuencia, parte de los latifun-
dios expropiados continuaron transformándose en asentamientos, si bien 
con algunas modificaciones y denominados Centros de Reforma Agraria,170 y 
resultaron en la implementación de cambios en la estructura de la tenencia 
de la tierra.171 El objetivo era socializar los medios de producción,172 al tiempo 
que se sustituía la dicotomía latifundio-minifundio con una nueva estructura 
construida sobre modalidades estatales, comunales, cooperativas y familiares 
de tenencia.173 El Congreso chileno no hubiera respaldado una nueva ley de 
reforma agraria originada por Allende Gossens, por lo que éste último optó 
por utilizar las leyes existentes en su máximo potencial, expropiando durante 
su primer año en el gobierno una cantidad similar de hectáreas a la que Frei 
162  García 1973, p. 32-33.
163  Sampaio 1993, p. 71.
164  Lapp 2004, p. 72.
165  Sampaio 1993, p. 71.
166  Véase la información sobre las reformas en ese período en Mirow 2011, p. 1211-
1212.
167  Sampaio 1993, p. 71. 
Luego del coup d’État, el 55% de la tierra que había sido afectada por las reformar fue 
otorgada a beneficiarios individuales que en definitiva controlaron el 22% del total de la 
tierra útil para agricultura. Véase Sampaio 1993, p. 20, 72. 
Matthew Mirow indicó, sin embargo, que Augusto Pinochet comulgó con algunos pos-
tulados de la función social de la propiedad. Véase Mirow 2011, p. 1212-1214.
168  Sampaio 1993, p. 71. 
169  Lapp 2004, p. 78.
170  Barraclough 1999, p. 26.
171  Cantor & Kraus 1990, p. 520.
172  Sampaio 1993, p. 71.
173  García 1973, p. 179.
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Montalva había alcanzado durante toda su presidencia.174 La expropiación 
creció exponencialmente en Chile, como se percibió en las 6 297 000 hectá-
reas que se vieron afectadas y que finalmente beneficiaron a 37 277 familias.175
Chile representa uno de los mejores ejemplos de adopción de legislación 
de reforma agraria, donde se experimentó un verdadero cambio durante el 
proceso de reforma.176 Esto se refleja en el cambio en el número total de pro-
pietarios, que aumentó de 140 000 en 1924 a 317 955 en 1976.177 La recepción 
del nuevo paradigma dentro de la legislación especial también fue el resultado 
de los esfuerzos de intelectuales locales y extranjeros. Estos actores participa-
ron en las actividades de reforma agraria en Chile resaltando las deficiencias 
del sistema de haciendas y proporcionando enfoques comparativos que ana-
lizaron las experiencias de la reforma agraria en otras jurisdicciones.178 Todo 
el sistema de haciendas se vio afectado indiscutiblemente por la expropiación 
y redistribución de tierras en Chile, y los latifundios ya no fueron dominan-
tes en Chile.179 En consecuencia, Chile acogió herramientas para restringir el 
derecho de propiedad, comenzando así a alejarse del paradigma que había 
prevalecido durante el siglo XIX y parte del siglo XX.180
5. Recapitulación y acotaciones
El presente estudio se centró en la recepción del nuevo paradigma de pro-
piedad en la República de Chile en el marco de la legislación especial sobre 
reforma agraria. Esa experiencia sirvió para ilustrar el cambio de paradigma 
de propiedad durante el siglo XX. En primer lugar, se elaboró sobre los oríge-
nes del nuevo paradigma. Se advirtió sobre la atención que recibió la temática 
en la literatura continental europea, del common law y de la Iglesia Católica. 
También se mencionó que Léon Duguit fue uno de sus principales represen-
tantes a ambos lados del Atlántico. En segundo lugar, se abordó la reforma 
agraria y su presencia en América Latina. Las jurisdicciones en América ex-
perimentaron un contagio de reformas agrarias durante la segunda mitad del 
siglo XX, con distintos grados de éxito. En tercer lugar, se trató sobre las tres 
174  Lapp 2004, p. 79; Barraclough 1999, p. 25.
175  Sampaio 1993, p. 72.
176  Mirow 2004, p. 223.
177  Gallardo Fernández 2002, p. 67.
178  Barraclough 1999, p. 27.
179  Gallardo Fernández 2002, p. 61-62.
180  Matus Valencia 1958, p. 81.
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etapas en que se desarrolló la reforma agraria en Chile durante el mentado 
siglo. Se resaltó que la promulgación de leyes de reforma agraria en Chile 
tuvo, en comparación con otras jurisdicciones, el mayor grado de impacto en 
la modernización de la agricultura. El presente estudio ofreció entonces in-
formación para mejor contextualizar los eventos que ocurrieron en Chile ante 
el cambio de paradigma de propiedad.
Los paradigmas de propiedad experimentaron un cambio en Chile y en 
otras jurisdicciones latinoamericanas. El presente estudio señaló que el para-
digma liberal fue reemplazado por uno que dio la bienvenida a limitaciones 
sociales al derecho de propiedad. La función social implicó una comprensión 
menos egoísta de la propiedad, adaptando ese pilar fundamental a las nece-
sidades de los actores sociales. El paradigma de la función social se configuró 
cuando la sociedad alcanzó un lugar de preminencia. Las jurisdicciones lati-
noamericanas en efecto abandonaron el paradigma liberal e incorporaron los 
principios del paradigma de la función social. La recepción del nuevo para-
digma difirió conforme las diferentes jurisdicciones, siendo algunas más con-
servadoras que otras. Un grupo de jurisdicciones debilitó el carácter absoluto 
de la propiedad al adoptar doctrinas y principios que tuvieron un impacto 
indirecto en ese pilar fundamental del derecho; mientras que otro grupo de 
jurisdicciones–incluyendo Chile–acogió con satisfacción el nuevo paradigma 
expresamente en su legislación especial, incluso refiriéndose expresamente al 
término función social. 
Bibliografía 
Fuentes primarias
Constitución de Bolivia 2009 = Bolivia - Constitución Política del Estado 2009, 
https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Constitucion_Bolivia.pdf (última consulta, 26 
de marzo de 2019).
Duguit 1912 = Léon Duguit, Les transformations générales du droit privé depuis 
le Code Napoléon, Paris, 1912.
Ley 15020 (1962) = Reforma Agraria, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chi-
le. http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=28016&tipoVersion=0 (última 
consulta, 26 de marzo de 2019).
Ley 16615 (1967) = Modifica la Constitución Política del Estado, Biblioteca 
del Congreso Nacional de Chile. http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNor-
ma=130884&tipoVersion=0 (última consulta, 26 de marzo de 2019).
AGUSTÍN PARISE
88
Ley 16640 (1967) = Reforma Agraria, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chi-
le. http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=28596&tipoVersion=0 (última 
consulta, 26 de marzo de 2019).
Quadragesimo anno 1931 = Encíclica Quadragesimo anno 1931 (español), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/es/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_
enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html (última consulta, 26 de marzo de 
2019).
Fuentes secundarias 
Adrogué 1991 = M. I. Adrogué, El Derecho de Propiedad en la Actualidad. Intro-
ducción a sus Nuevas Expresiones, Buenos Aires, 1991.
Alessandri Rodríguez et al. 2010 = A. Alessandri Rodríguez et al., Tratado de los 
Derecho Reales, 6 ed., Vol. I, Santiago, 2010.
Alexander 1974 = R. J. Alexander, Agrarian Reform in Latin America, New York, 
1974.
Ankersent & Ruppert 2006 = T. T. Ankersent y T. Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: 
The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, en Tulane 
Environmental Law Journal, 19, 2006, p. 69-120.
Areán 1994 = B. Areán, Curso de Derechos Reales: Privilegios y Derecho de Re-
tención, 3 ed., Buenos Aires, 1994.
Assies & Duhau 2009 = W. Assies & E. Duhau, Land Tenure and tenure regimes 
in Mexico: An overview, en J. M. Ubink et al. (eds.), Legalising Land Rights: 
Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Security in Africa, Asia and La-
tin America, Leiden, 2009, p. 355-385.
Azcárate (de) 1879 = G. de Azcárate, Ensayo sobre la historia del derecho de pro-
piedad y su estado actual en Europa, vol. I, Madrid, 1879.
Azcárate (de) 1883 = G. de Azcárate, Ensayo sobre la historia del derecho de 
propiedad y su estado actual en Europa, vol. III, Madrid, 1883.
Barraclough 1965 = S. L. Barraclough, ¿Qué es una reforma agraria?, en Ó. Delga-
do (ed.), Reformas Agrarias en la America Latina: Procesos y Perspectivas, 
Mexico y Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 127-145.
Barraclough 1973 = S. L. Barraclough (ed.), Agrarian Structure in Latin Ameri-
ca; A Resume of the CIDA Land Tenure Studies of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Lexington, 1973.
Barraclough 1999 = S. L. Barraclough. Land reform in developing countries: the 
role of state and other actors. Geneva: UNRISD Discussion paper No. 101.
Beaglehole 1935 = E. Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American 
Indian Tribe, en Iowa Law Review, 20, 1935, p. 304-316.
Becket 1965 = J. Becket, Problemas de la reforma agraria, en Ó. Delgado (ed.), 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
89
Reformas Agrarias en la America Latina: Procesos y Perspectivas, Mexico y 
Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 559-592.
Bellisario 2006 = A. Bellisario, The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: The 
Pre-Agrarian Reform Period (1955–1965), en Journal of Agrarian Change, 
6:2, 2006, p. 167-204.
Bergel 1994 = J.-L. Bergel, La Propriété, Paris, 1994.
Bolgár 1960 = V. Bolgár, The Magic of Property and Public Welfare, en In-
ter-American Law Review, 2, 1960, p. 283-298.
Brahm García 1994 = E. Brahm García, El concepto de propiedad en la Ley Nº 
15.020 sobre reforma agraria, en Revista Chilena de Derecho, 21:1, 1994, p. 
159-187.
Brahm García 2012 = E. Brahm García, Algunos aspectos del proceso de socia-
lización del derecho de propiedad en Chile durante el gobierno del general 
Carlos Ibañez del Campo (1927–1931), en Rechtsgeschichte, 20, 2012, p. 234-
256.
Calvo González & Monereo Pérez 2005 = J. Calvo González y J. L. Monereo Pérez, 
Léon Duguit (1859-1928): jurista de una sociedad en transformación, en Re-
vista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, 4, 2005, p. 483-547.
Cantor & Kraus 1990 = P. Cantor & J. Kraus, Changing Patterns of Ownership 
Rights in the People’s Republic of China: A Legal and Economic Analysis in 
the Context of Economic Reforms and Social Conditions, en Vanderbilt Jour-
nal of Transnational Law, 23, 1990, p. 479-538.
Caroni 2012 = P. Caroni, Escritos sobre la Codificiación, A. Mora Cañada & M. 
Martínez Neira trad., Madrid, 2012.
Caroni 2013 = P. Caroni, Lecciones de Historia de la Codificación, Madrid, 2013.
Carrasco Delgado 2006 = S. Carrasco Delgado, La evolución político-constituc-
ional de Chile, en Estudios Constitucionales, 6:2, 2006, p. 301-324.
Carroll 1970 = T. F. Carroll, Land Reform as an Explosive Force in Latin Ameri-
ca, en R. Stavenhagen (ed.), Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in 
Latin America, Garden City, 1970, p. 101-137.
Castán Tobeñas 1963 = J. Castán Tobeñas, La propiedad y sus problemas actua-
les, 2 ed., Madrid, 1963.
Chonchot 1965 = J. Chonchot, Razones económicas, sociales y políticas de la 
reforma agraria, en Ó. Delgado (ed.), Reformas Agrarias en la America La-
tina: Procesos y Perspectivas, Mexico y Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 100-126.
Claro Solar 1979 = L. Claro Solar, Explicaciones de Derecho Civil Chileno y Com-
parado, Vol. III:VI:I, Santiago, 1979.
Colley 2014 = L. Colley, Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 
1776–1848, en Law and History Review, 32:2, 2014, p. 237-266.
Conesa 2012 = E. Conesa, El impuesto a la tierra libre de mejoras, recursos naturales, 
AGUSTÍN PARISE
90
hidrocarburos y el federalismo en la Argentina, 2012, http://portalacademico.
derecho.uba.ar/catedras/archivos/catedras/19/el_impuesto_tierra_libre_de_
mejoras_y_a_los_recursos_naturales_en_general_en_el_regimen_federal_
argentino_copia.pdf (última consulta, 26 de marzo de 2019).
Cordero Quinzacara 2008 = E. Cordero Quinzacara, De la propiedad a las pro-
piedades. La evolución de la concepción liberal de la propiedad, en Revista 
de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 31, 2008, p. 
493-525.
Dekker 2003 = H. A. L. Dekker, The Invisible Line: Land Reform, Land Tenure 
Security, and Land Registration, Aldershot y Burlington, 2003.
Delgado de Miguel 2002 = J. F. Delgado de Miguel (coord.), Instituciones de 
Derecho Privado: Reales, Vol. II, Madrid, 2002.
Duhau 2009 = E. Duhau, A case study on the implementation and outcomes of 
the 1992 reforms on the Mexican agrarian property institutions: An ejido in 
the frontier of the urbanisation process, en J. M. Ubink et al. (eds.), Legali-
sing Land Rights: Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Security in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, Leiden, 2009, p. 388-407.
Durán Bernales 1966 = F. Durán Bernales, Población, Alimentos y Reforma 
Agraria, Santiago, 1966.
Gallardo Fernández 2002 = G. L. Gallardo Fernández, Communal Land Owners-
hip in Chile: The agricultural communities in the commune of Canela, Norte 
Chico (1600-1998), Aldershot, 2002.
García 1973 = A. García, Sociología de la reforma agraria en América latina, 
Buenos Aires, 1973.
García 1985 = A. García, Modelos operacionales de reforma agraria y desarrollo 
rural en América Latina, San José, 1985.
González Terán 2010 = D. L. González Terán, El Derecho de Propiedad Privada 
en el Liberalismo Individualista, tesina inédita, Universidad de Chile, Santia-
go, 2010.
Hakim 2011 = N. Hakim, Duguit et les privatistes, en F. Melleray (dir.), Autour de 
Léon Duguit: Colloque commémoratif du 150e anniversaire de la naissance 
du doyen Léon Duguit. Bordeaux, 29-30 mai 2009, Brussels, 2011, p. 81-114.
Halpérin 1996 = J.-L. Halpérin, Histoire du droit privé français depuis 1804, 
Paris, 1996.
Halpérin 2008 = J.-L. Halpérin, Histoire du droit des biens, Paris, 2008.
Hendrix 1993 = S. E. Hendrix, Property Law Innovation in Latin America with 
Recommendations, LTC Paper 149, Madison, 1993.
Hernández Gaona 1991 = P. Hernández Gaona, Evolución y proyección de la le-
gislación agraria mexicana, en Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho, 
III-1991, 1991, p. 81-94.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
91
Hernández Gil 1969 = A. Hernández Gil, La función social de la posesión (Ensa-
yo de teorización sociológico-jurídica), Madrid, 1969.
Hurtado-Edwards & Smith 1964 = J. L. Hurtado-Edwards & R. Gene Smith, The 
Chilean Agrarian Reform, en Inter-American Law Review, 6, 1964, p. 93-
137.
Janvry (de) et al. 2001 = A. de Janvry et al., The Changing Role of the State in 
Latin American Land Reforms, en A. de Janvry et al. (eds.), Access to Land, 
Rural Poverty and Public Action, Oxford, 2001, p. 279-303.
Karst - Rosenn 1975 = K. L. Karst y K. S. Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin 
America: A Case Book, Berkeley, 1975.
Keiser 2005 = T. Keiser, Eigentumsrecht in Nationalsozialismus und Fascismo, 
Tübingen, 2005.
Keiser 2012 = T. Keiser, Social conceptions of Property and Labour – Private 
Law in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution and European Legal Sci-
ence, en Rechtsgeschichte, 20, 2012, p. 258-273.
Lapp 2004 = N. D. Lapp, Landing Votes: Representation and Land Reform in 
Latin America, New York, 2004.
Lira Urquieta 1944 = P. Lira Urquieta, El Código Civil y el Nuevo Derecho, San-
tiago, 1944.
Lloredo Alix 2012 = L. M. Lloredo Alix, Rafael Altamira y Adolfo Posada: Dos 
aportaciones a la socialización del derecho y su proyección en Latinoamérica, 
en Rechtsgeschichte, 20, 2012, p. 209-233.
Long - Roberts 1994 = N. Long & B. Roberts, The agrarian structures of La-
tin America, 1930-1990, en L. Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, Vol. VI, Cambridge y New York, 1994, p. 325-390.
Matus Valencia 1958 = J. G. Matus Valencia, The Centenary of the Chilean Civil 
Code, en The American Journal of Comparative Law, 7, 1958, p. 71-83.
Melleray 2011 = F. Melleray (dir.), Autour de Léon Duguit: Colloque commémo-
ratif du 150e anniversaire de la naissance du doyen Léon Duguit. Bordeaux, 
29-30 mai 2009, Bruselas, 2011.
Meyer 1998 = J. Meyer, Mexico: revolution and reconstruction in the 1920s, en 
L. Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America, reimpresión, Vol. 
V, Cambridge y New York, 1998, p. 155-194.
Mirow 2004 = M. C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and 
Institutions in Spanish America, Austin, 2004.
Mirow 2010 = M. C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, 
Hayem, and Others, en Florida Journal of International Law, 22, 2010, p. 
191-226.
Mirow 2011 = M. C. Mirow, Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile, 
en Fordham Law Review, 80, 2011, p. 1183-1217.
AGUSTÍN PARISE
92
Morin 1932 = G. Morin, L’œuvre de Duguit et le droit privé, en Archives de Phi-
losophie du droit et de Sociologie juridique, 1-2, 1932, p. 153-162.
Muñoz León 2005 = F. Muñoz León, Notas sobre la Historia constitucional de 
Chile: génesis y evolución entre 1810 y 1970, en J. Woischnik (ed.), Anuario 
de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano 2005, Vol. I, Montevideo, 2005, 
p. 245-271.
Parise 2019 = A. Parise, La función social de la propiedad y la humanización 
de un pilar del derecho (siglo XX), en R. D. Rabinovich-Berkman (ed.), Los 
derechos humanos desde la historia. Inmersiones libres, Santiago, 2019, p. 
271-286.
Parra Silva 2006 = R. Parra Silva, Conferencia internacional sobre reforma 
agraria y desarrollo rural, en Estudios Agrarios, 31, 2006, p. 239-253.
Peñailillo Arévalo 2006 = D. Peñailillo Arévalo, Los Bienes: la Propiedad y otros 
Derechos Reales, 4 ed., Santiago, 2006.
Peset 1999 = M. Peset, Fundamento ideológico de la propiedad, en S. de Dios 
et al. (coord.), Historia de la Propiedad en España siglos XV-XX. Encuentro 
Interdisciplinar. Salamanca, 3-6 de junio de 1998, Madrid, 1999, p. 441-470.
Petras & Zeitlin 1970 = J. Petras & M. Zeitlin, Agrarian Radicalism in Chile, en 
R. Stavenhagen (ed.), Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin 
America, Garden City, 1970, p. 503-531.
Reich 1964 = C. A. Reich, The New Property, en Yale Law Journal, 73, 1964, p. 
733-787.
Robledo - Espinoza 1999 = R. Robledo & L. E. Espinoza, La Reforma Agraria en 
la II República: El Proceso de Asentamiento de Comunidades de Campesinos 
en la Provincia de Salamanca, en S. de Dios et al. (coord.), Historia de la 
Propiedad en España siglos XV-XX. Encuentro Interdisciplinar. Salamanca, 
3-6 de junio de 1998, Madrid, 1999, p. 403-439.
Rosenn 1963 = K. S. Rosenn, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an In-
structive Experiment, en Yale Law Journal 73, 1963, p. 334-356.
Ruíz B. 1964 = G. A. Ruíz B., La función social de la propiedad agrícola en la ley 
de reforma agraria venezolana de 1960, Caracas, 1964.
The Chilean Land Reform 1963 = The Chilean Land Reform: A Laboratory for 
Alliance-for-Progress Techniques, en Yale Law Journal, 73, 1963, p. 310-333.
Salvat 1962 = R. M. Salvat, Tratado de Derecho Civil Argentino: Derechos Rea-
les, 5 ed., Vol. II, Buenos Aires, 1962.
Sampaio 1993 = P. Sampaio, La Reforma Agraria en America Latina. 
RLAC/93/10 - DERU-46, Santiago, 1993.
Silva 1987 = P. Silva, Estado, neoliberalismo y política agraria en Chile 1973-
1981, Dordrecht, 1987.
Simpson 1998 = A. W. B. Simpson, Land Ownership and Economic Freedom, en 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
93
H. N. Scheiber (ed.), The State and Freedom of Contract, Stanford, 1998, p. 
13-43.
Tai 1974 = H.-C. Tai, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis, Ber-
keley, 1974.
Thome 1971 = J. R. Thome, Expropriation in Chile Under the Frei Agrarian Re-
form, en The American Journal of Comparative Law 19, 1971, p. 489-513.
Verkerk 2010 = R. R. Verkerk, Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation: A Comparative 
Perspective,  Antwerp, 2010.
Villiers (de) 2003 = B. de Villiers, Land reform: Issues and challenges. A com-
parative overview of experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and 
Australia, Joahnnesburg, 2003.
Warriner 1969 = D. Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice, Oxford, 
1969.
Wilkie 1974 = J. W. Wilkie, Measuring Land Reform. Supplement to the Statis-
tical Abstract of Latin America with a special map and graph series on land 
reform by Richard W. Wilkie and John Marti, Los Angeles, 1974.
Zoomers & Haar (van der) 2000 = A. Zoomers & G. van der Haar, Introduction: 
regulating land tenure under neo-liberalism, en A. Zoomers & G. van der 
Haar (eds.), Current Land Policy in Latin America: Regulating Land Tenure 
under Neo-liberalism, Amsterdam, 2000, p. 17-26.

LA INFLUENCIA DEL DERECHO ROMANO EN
LA ADQUISICIÓN Y EN EL SISTEMA DE TRANSFERENCIA DE
LOS DERECHOS REALES EN EL SIGLO XIX, ARGENTINA
Pamela Alejandra Cacciavillani
[L]os jurisconsultos romanos han sobresalido en dictar re-




La declaración del Juez Federal, José Daniel Goitía, a finales del siglo XIX, 
es solo uno de los tantos ejemplos de la enorme influencia que el derecho 
romano ejerció en el sistema jurídico argentino. Desde la creación de las uni-
versidades durante el período colonial, el influjo romano se apreció tanto en 
la enseñanza del derecho y en la formación de juristas, como también en las 
sentencias y en las obras jurídicas, fruto de la labor de profesionales formados 
en la tradición romanista. Sin embargo, en la actualidad en Latinoamérica “el 
derecho romano va siendo paulatinamente relegado. En cuanto a planes de 
estudios suplantado (…) en muchos otros reducido a un capítulo más en la 
historia del derecho”.2
No obstante este desplazamiento, de una manera fragmentaria y “ahistóri-
ca” los manuales de diversas disciplinas jurídicas, especialmente las abocadas 
al estudio del Derecho Privado, remiten al Derecho Romano –como también 
al Ius Commune y al Derecho Indiano– mediante una construcción narrativa 
que genera una “instrumentalización respecto del derecho vigente”.3 Coinci-
dente es la opinión de Hespanha, quien advierte diferentes efectos que deri-
van de un cierto uso de la historia, entre ellos se destaca la “sacralización del 
derecho actual por medio de la utilización de la historia”.4
1  Citado por Levaggi 1986, p. 33.
2  Hinestrosa 2007, p.5. Es el caso de la Universidad de Monterrey, en la carrera de 
licenciado en derecho algunas nociones básicas del derecho romano son impartidas en una 
unidad dentro del programa de la asignatura Historia de la Instituciones Jurídicas. 
3  Caroni 2014, p. 16.




En un área específica, como es el estudio de los derechos reales, o tam-
bién denominado derecho de bienes, los vocablos como tradición (traditio), 
acción reivindicatoria (rei vindicatio), posesión ( possessio), la denuncia de 
obra nueva (Operis novi nuntiatio o interdictum demolitorium), entre otros, 
evocan una conexión inexorable con su versión latina, como también con su 
raíz jurídica romanista. En este contexto, no debe sorprendernos el uso que 
los autores y las autoras hacen de estas palabras en latín. En materia de tras-
misión del dominio, para el caso argentino, se sostiene que “Vélez Sarsfield 
adoptó el sistema romano del título y el modo, y a este último elemento (tra-
ditio) como la expresión de la transmisión del dominio”.5 Frente a este tipo 
de aseveraciones vale indagar el significado de la expresión ‘sistema romano 
del título y modo’. En este sentido, debemos preguntarnos cómo fue entendi-
do el derecho romano por parte de los juristas argentinos de finales del siglo 
XIX y del siglo XX. A primera vista, se advierte una lectura de la experiencia 
jurídica romana completamente descontextualizada puesto que en el devenir 
histórico jurídico romano la transferencia de derechos sobre cosas fue el es-
cenario de diversas reformas. Von Ihering advierte que en el derecho romano 
antiguo “la transferencia del derecho de propiedad no era la del derecho de 
propiedad, sino más bien la transmisión de la cosa”, lo que resulta relevante 
aquí no es la idea de derecho sino “el abandono por parte del propietario 
actual de una cosa de la que un nuevo propietario se apoderaba”.6 El autor 
considera que tanto en la mancipatio como en la in jure cesio no se producía 
una transferencia del derecho en cabeza del nuevo adquirente sino que este 
tomaba la cosa, ya que quien la estaba poseyendo dejaba de hacerlo, situación 
que se encuentra en los primeros momentos de la traditio. En el periodo del 
derecho romano clásico, Schulz reconoce la existencia de “cinco actos inter 
vivos mediante los cuales, la propiedad podía ser transmitida: mancipatio, in 
iure cessio, traditio, adiudicatio y adsignatio”.7
Frente a este complejo panorama, inexorablemente emerge el interrogan-
te sobre la finalidad de los juristas de simplificar la experiencia jurídica ro-
mana y de emplearla como un patrón de referencia y de diferenciación. Para 
Alejandro Agüero ha analizado de manera crítica no solo los límites temporales que pre-
dominan en los manuales de enseñanza sino también el rol que cumple esta imagen del 
pasado. Al respecto, ver: Agüero 2017.
5  Scotti 2002, p. 21.
6  Ihering 1998, p. 615.
7  Schulz 1960, p. 330.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
97
comprender este tipo de posiciones creemos que son sumamente valiosas las 
reflexiones de Duve en torno a los procesos de creación de normas, especial-
mente respecto del estudio de las particularidades en “la apropiación de op-
ciones normativas enraizadas en otra normativa”.8 
2. El estudio del derecho romano desde la mirada latinoamericana 
Para comprender la particularidad que representa el ámbito latinoameri-
cano en lo que respecta al estudio del derecho romano, hemos relevado tra-
bajos que analizan la influencia de la disciplina en esta área. Esta búsqueda 
nos permitió no solo divisar diferentes líneas aproximativas sino también evi-
tar “la exclusión apriorística de cualquier procedimiento [que] es ilegítima y 
[que] puede esconder tras de sí un prejuicio ideológico, tanto más peligroso y 
anticientífico cuanto más encubierto y menos consciente”.9
Como resultado de esta aproximación hemos divisado los siguientes tó-
picos: la enseñanza del derecho, la aplicación del derecho y la producción 
del mismo mediante obras doctrinarias. En el primer caso, analizar la ense-
ñanza del derecho romano implica una aproximación a la formación de los 
abogados y los juristas, tanto en el periodo colonial como también durante el 
derecho patrio, y a posteriori durante la experiencia codificadora.10 Respecto 
de la aplicación del derecho, la principal fuente consiste en el estudio de las 
sentencias y se predica el periodo temporal ya mencionado.11 Finalmente otra 
metodología consiste en analizar la recepción de nociones jurídicas romanas 
en obras jurídicas específicas. En este punto, coincidimos con Duve quien 
considera que durante un importante lapso de tiempo la recepción fue con-
siderada como una nota distintiva de los procesos de intercambio normativo 
lo cual dejó “un pequeño ámbito para el análisis del proceso de reproducción 
creativa”12 acaecido en los espacios locales. 
El estudio de obras concretas proporciona importantes referencias, no 
solo en cuanto a la formación y trayectoria de sus autores sino también res-
pecto del proceso por el cual el derecho romano es traducido, interpretado e 
8  Duve 2016, p. 16.
9  Cuena Boy 1993, p. 388.
10  Aspell 2012; Aspell 2010; Ávila Martel 1965; Levaggi 1986; Stringini 2018. 
11  Santos Martínez 1991; Cacciavillani 2018, p.74. 
12  Duve 2016, p. 16.
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introducido, por ejemplo mediante notas,13 en instrumentos jurídicos especí-
ficos como es el caso del código civil.14 Respecto de la incorporación normati-
va en los códigos, Guzmán Brito señaló que al igual que en Europa el derecho 
romano “daba sustancia a los códigos, [pero] en sí mismo quedaba fuera de 
vigor. Pero no por ello fue desplazado de la formación de los juristas sino 
que a partir de allí se divisa “su transformación a disciplina académica en las 
facultades de derecho”.15 En este sentido, se destacan los trabajos realizados, 
tanto por romanistas como históricos del derecho, que analizan la elabora-
ción de los códigos civiles en el ámbito latinoamericano. En esta corriente 
se encauzan los trabajos de Guzmán Brito, Luis Rodriguez Ennes,16 Antonio 
Fernandez de Bujan y Fernandez,17 Rosalia Rodriguez López,18 Carlos Ramos 
Nuñez,19 entre otros.
3. Nuestra propuesta: un puente ecléctico 
Resulta difícil y a la vez poco pertinente, adoptar una posición excluyente 
respecto de la aproximación metodológica en nuestra temática. Al plantear-
nos como horizonte la reflexión en torno a la influencia del derecho romano 
en el código civil argentino, especialmente en materia de trasmisión de domi-
nio, podría inferirse que el último tópico desarrollado ut-supra sería el marco 
de reflexión teórica más apropiado. No obstante la indiscutible relación entre 
esta propuesta metodología y nuestro objeto de estudio, consideramos que 
partiendo de una premisa que aboga por la historicidad per se del derecho la 
forma más conveniente de dirigir esta investigación consiste en “aspirar al es-
tudio del derecho romano en la integridad de su desarrollo histórico y desde 
todos los puntos de vista imaginables que puedan tener significación para el 
derecho”.20 Para ello, y considerando las reflexiones en torno a la traducción 
cultural, proponemos una aproximación “ecléctica” que a partir de una histo-
rización, combine no solo el análisis del texto del código civil y la formación 
13  Turelli 2018. 
14  Esto no quita el estudio del derecho romano en la erección de otros códigos, véase: 
Salinas Araneda 1992.
15  Brito Guzmán, p. 80.
16  Rodríguez Ennes 2012, p. 737-755. 
17  Fernández de Bujan y Fernández 1994.
18  Rodríguez López 1999.
19  Ramos Núñez 1994.
20  Cuena Boy 1993, p. 392.
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de su autor, sino también referencias al régimen jurídico romanista en mate-
ria de transmisión de la propiedad y cuestionamientos sobre las interpreta-
ciones, que juristas contemporáneos y no contemporáneos al codificador, han 
sostenido en esta materia. En esta dirección pretendemos comprender por 
quiénes y cómo fue leído el derecho romano y con qué finalidad. 
¿Quién fue Dalmasio Vélez Sarsfield? 
Dalmasio Vélez Sarsfield (1800-1875), fue un jurista y político cordobés de 
marcada trayectoria que llevó adelante la gran empresa codificadora en ma-
teria civil. Sus primeros contactos con la materia jurídica se remontan inexo-
rablemente a su paso por la universidad. Como sostiene Levaggi, “durante el 
período hispánico (…) la influencia del derecho romano tanto en la enseñanza 
universitaria como en la jurisprudencia y en la práctica forense y notarial es 
notoria”.21 En la Universidad Mayor de San Carlos de Córdoba, casa de estu-
dios en la que se formó Vélez, la cátedra de Institutas comenzó a operar en 
1791, creándose luego de dos años una segunda. Como toda universidad in-
diana, la instrucción jurídica se centró en el derecho romano y canónico con 
las respectivas adecuaciones al derecho real. Si bien el plan de estudios fue 
escenario de importantes reformas durante los primeros años del siglo XIX, 
el derecho romano, al igual que el latín, siguió impartiéndose. 
Sobre la vida universitaria del codificador, Chaneton señala no solo que 
fue sumaria sino que tampoco se advierte un “brillo excepcional”. Cuando 
Vélez accedió al claustro universitario, debido a las reformas, existía la posi-
bilidad de tomar dos de los cuatro ramos que impartía la casa de estudios lo 
que le otorgó “opción al título de bachiller y éste poníale en condiciones de 
abogado, después de la práctica requerida”.22 Lo que caracterizó y contribuyó 
a la formación de Vélez, sostiene Chaneton, fueron dos factores, por un lado 
su acentuado espíritu autodidacta y por otro su paso por la vida política y la 
praxis jurídica. Durante los años 1855-1858, Vélez trabajó como asesor de 
gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires, en sus dictámenes, a diferencia de 
lo que señalan algunos autores para el caso del código civil, es posible advertir 
referencias directas a la experiencia jurídica romana. Mediante un estudio 
exhaustivo de estas fuentes histórica-jurídicas, Somovilla advirtió referencias 
explícitas al Digesto.23 
21  Levaggi 1986, p. 17.
22  Chaneton 1969, p. 350.
23  Ver: Somovilla 2007, p. 1-11.
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Con fecha 20 de octubre de 1864 el entonces presidente de la Repúbli-
ca Argentina emitió un decreto por medio del cual designó a Dalmasio Vé-
lez Sarsfield como redactor del proyecto del Código Civil, días más tarde, el 
25 de octubre, el jurista cordobés aceptó la desafiante tarea.24 La impronta 
del derecho romano en este instrumento jurídico es indiscutible tanto por 
la formación del autor como por el método adoptado y por el fuerte impacto 
que destacados romanistas han tenido en la obra. En este sentido se destacan 
nombres “tales como Vinnio, Heinecio, Cujas y Pothier y los más próximos a 
la época del codificador, continuamente citados en sus notas, Maynz, Mac-
keldey, Ortolan y Molitor”.25 Pero quizás el más destacado de todos ellos fue 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny mediante su obra, en versión francesa, Sistema de 
Derecho Romano Actual la cual fue empleada por el codificador en materia 
de “personas jurídicas, obligaciones en general, dominio y posesión”.26
4. La tradición en la adquisición y transferencia de los derechos reales 
Si bien algunos autores consideran que el derecho romano no fue una 
fuente directa, en el sentido de que “ninguna de las disposiciones del Código 
fue extraída directamente del Corpus Iuris Civilis o de algún pasaje de un 
jurisconsulto romano” es notable que Vélez Sarsfield en materia de derechos 
reales, específicamente en lo que hace a la transmisión del dominio “volvió 
al criterio romano, aun ya abandonado por las legislaciones más recientes”.27 
Entre las notas definitorias del régimen de los derechos reales del código civil 
argentino destacan: el sistema del numerus clausus o enumeración taxativa 
de los derechos reales,28 la adopción del principio de convalidación- como 
excepción al principio nemo plus iuris,29 entre otros. 
Para comprender la idea que plantean diversos autores sobre la remisión al 
24  Ver: Cabral Texo 1920.
25  Llambías 1960, p. 213.
26  Llambías 1960, p. 213.
27  Llambías 1960, p. 123.
28  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, 
Art.2503 “Son derechos reales: el dominio y el condominio, el usufructo, el uso y la 
habitación, las servidumbres activas, el derecho de hipoteca, la prenda y la anticresis”. 
29  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871,
Art. 3270 “Nadie puede transmitir a otro sobre un objeto, un derecho mejor o más 
extenso que el que gozaba; y recíprocamente, nadie puede adquirir sobre un objeto un 
derecho mejor y más extenso que el que tenía aquel de quien lo adquiere”.
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derecho romano debemos prestar atención a lo normado en el artículo 250230 
y en su nota. En esta disposición normativa el codificador adoptó el princi-
pio por el cual los derechos reales solo pueden ser creados por ley, lo que lo 
apartó de cualquier tipo de sistema en el que la voluntad de las partes pudiera 
tener fuerza creadora. Si bien en la nota al artículo la crítica es respecto de la 
realidad que se vivía en España, el quid se encuentra en el cuestionamiento 
de la voluntad como fuerza creadora de los derechos reales. Respecto a la 
experiencia jurídica española, el autor señaló que este sistema se encontraba 
en contraposición con la concepción romanista. En este sentido expresó que 
“el derecho romano no reconoce [cía] al lado de la propiedad, sino un número 
de derechos reales, especialmente determinados, y era por lo tanto privada la 
creación arbitraria de nuevos derechos reales”.31
Si bien esta referencia resulta comprensible si consideramos su horizonte 
de finalidad, desde una perspectiva romanista no puede dejar de mencionarse 
que el concepto de derecho real en sí es completamente ajeno. Schulz remar-
ca que “existe un gran número de importantes concepciones para las cuales 
los romanos no tuvieron términos técnicos, aunque estos mismos, consciente 
o inconscientemente, subyacían en sus discusiones. Una concepción impor-
tante como la de derechos in rem sobre la cual cientos de decisiones fueron 
basadas, no tenía ni siquiera un nombre”.32
Al pretender establecer una suerte de puente con la experiencia romana, 
resulta necesario realizar algunas aclaraciones terminológicas puesto que el 
concepto de derechos reales es de creación posterior. Frente a este panorama 
debemos considerar el ámbito de las llamadas actio in rem en otras palabras 
“el medio típico de defensa o tutela del poder que –directamente- se pretende 
respecto de una cosa corporal in commercium”.33 En el contexto del derecho 
romano clásico, Lozano Corbí considera como el concepto más cercano a lo 
que posteriormente se denomina derechos reales al sostenido por Gayo: “un 
poder que el sujeto de derecho puede ejercer sobre cosas corporales, protegi-
30  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871,
Art. 2502 “Los derechos reales sólo pueden ser creados por ley. Todo contrato o dispo-
sición de última voluntad que constituyese otros derechos reales, o modificase los que por 
este Código se reconocen, valdrá sólo como constitución de derechos personales, si como 
tal pudiese valer”.
31  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Nota al Art. 2502. 
32  Schulz 1956, p. 44. 
33  Lozano Corbí 1999, p. 353.
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das por las denominadas actio in rem”.34
Más allá de las distancias terminológicas, en el ámbito de los derechos 
sobre las cosas, Vélez pretendía dar cuenta de las quejas de los juristas espa-
ñoles quienes se quejaban “de los males que habían producido los derechos 
reales sobre una misma cosa”.35 Esta confluencia de potestades de diferen-
tes titulares significaba, en algunos casos, que “uno era propietario del pasto 
que naciera y otro de las plantaciones que hubiesen hecho”.36 El peligro que 
emergía de este múltiple encuentro de “derechos reales sobre unos mismos 
bienes” fue motivo de la proliferación de un sinnúmero de pleitos y conflictos 
a la par del obstáculo “que representaba esta situación para la explotación y 
circulación de estos bienes”.37 Esto fue explicado por Vélez Sarsfield a partir 
de la desmejora que sufrían las propiedades y el gran número de pleitos que 
emergían. 
5. La tradición desde la perspectiva velezana y su interpretación doctrinaria 
En el Código Civil argentino, la tradición significó tanto el modo constitu-
tivo como el medio de publicidad de la trasmisión de los derechos reales. En 
materia de transferencia de derechos sobre inmuebles el jurista español Gu-
mersindo de Azcárate propuso una clasificación de las legislaciones en cuatro 
grupos. “En el primero incluimos a los que exigen la tradición, entrega o toma 
de posesión, como requisito indispensable para la transmisión de la propie-
dad; en el segundo, las que declaran que ésta se verifica por virtud de las con-
venciones, ya den un valor absoluto al mero consentimiento, ya establezcan 
solemnidades especiales para hacer constar éste, en el tercero las que han 
sustituido la tradición con la inscripción o transcripción en el registro, en el 
cuarto las que combinan estas distintas formas, exigiendo ya la tradición y las 
solemnidades, ya éstas o aquélla y la inscripción, o admitiendo un principio 
para los contratantes y otro respecto del tercero”.38
A partir de la lectura del articulado del código advertimos que este se en-
marcó en el primer grupo propuesto por Azcárate, muestra de ello es lo nor-
mado en el Art. 577: “antes de la tradición de la cosa el acreedor no adquiere 
34  Lozano Corbí 1999, p. 353.
35  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Nota al Art. 2502.
36  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Nota al Art. 2502.
37  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Nota al Art. 2502.
38  Citado por: Fuenzalida1998, p. 118-119.
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sobre ella ningún derecho real”. Respecto de la nota a este artículo, Mariani 
de Vidal señala que además de apreciarse las críticas al sistema francés, el 
cual se basaba en el consentimiento, puede comprenderse el alcance que tie-
ne la tradición en nuestro sistema.39 En el mismo apartado el codificador con-
sideró que la manifestación pública y visible era “la razón filosófica del gran 
principio de la tradición que la sabiduría de los romanos estableció”,40 pero 
al cotejar esta aseveración con estudios sobre el derecho romano surgen al-
gunas incertidumbres. Si bien se reconoce que la transmisión de la propiedad 
era “efectiva cuando el transmitente era el dueño o al menos un autorizado 
para disponer del objeto, como esto era un hecho que no podría ser percibido 
a simple vista, permanecía en la incertidumbre si el cesionario había recibido 
la propiedad o no”.41 En este sentido, se aprecia una suerte de inseguridad ju-
rídica originada en el hecho de que frecuentemente emergían consecuencias 
jurídicas de una serie de hechos “los cuales eran difícil de reconocer”, en este 
sentido “el derecho romano asimiló demasiado esta inseguridad jurídica con 
perfecta calma”.42 Lo que permite sostener que “es una nota característica 
del derecho romano la escaza importancia que fue atribuida a esta clase de 
seguridad”.43
La errónea interpretación de la tradición en términos publicitarios, es ad-
vertida por Azcárate quien interpretó que pareciera que los Códigos “han [hu-
bieran] retrocedido volviendo al sentido del derecho romano”, pero no es así 
en realidad, aclara el autor ya que “la antigua tradición no se originaba de la 
necesidad de dar publicidad al acto de la transmisión y de rodear a ésta de to-
39  En el segundo párrafo de la nota de cita al jurista Freitas quien “sosteniendo el 
principio de la tradición para la adquisición de la propiedad dice: Por la naturaleza de las 
cosas, por una simple operación lógica, por un sentimiento espontáneo de justicia, por el 
interés de la seguridad de las relaciones privadas a que se liga la prosperidad general, se 
comprende desde el primer momento que el derecho real debe manifestarse por otros ca-
racteres, por otros signos que no sean los del derecho personal, y que esos signos deben ser 
tan visibles y tan público cuanto sea posible. No se concibe que una sociedad esté obligada 
a respetar un derecho que no conoce”. Respecto a la interpretación que Vélez hizo de la 
postura de Freitas en materia de tradición, diversos autores, entre ellos Bibiloni, Carballo 
y Mariani de Vidal señalaron la errónea interpretación puesto que Freitas entendía por 
tradición no la entrega de la cosa sino la inscripción. Ver: Cacciavillani 2018. 
40  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Nota al Art. 577.
41  Schulz 1956, p. 248. 
42  Schulz 1956, p. 248.
43  Schulz 1956, p. 243. 
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dos los requisitos convenientes para asegurarse de su autenticidad, sino que 
era una consecuencia derivada de una doctrina completa y estricta”.44
No obstante lo señalado, esta idea de vincular la tradición con la publici-
dad podría tener alguna conexión con el derecho romano. En este sentido, al-
gunos autores sostienen que existía una similitud con la experiencia romana 
en la que se advierten “formas primitivas de publicidad” mediante la presen-
cia de testigos, intervención de autoridades como el libripens, la actuación de 
magistrados y las transcripciones.45 Por su parte, Schulz también reconoció 
que “El principio de la publicidad, importante desde el punto de vista de la 
seguridad de las relaciones jurídicas46 –si bien– fue escasamente usado en 
el Derecho Romano, solo –se advierte– en el caso de la mancipatio e in iure 
cessio”.47
Analizada la tradición en su faceta publicitaria corresponde tratar la cues-
tión de la tradición como requisito en términos de transmisibilidad de dere-
chos. Si bien la primera idea que denota el vocablo es la entrega material de 
la cosa, su capacidad traslativa de dominio se encuentra vinculada a que la 
misma sea realizada “en virtud de título traslativo de propiedad, como venta 
(…) por el dueño que sea capaz de enajenar sus bienes”.48 En este mismo sen-
tido el codificador interpretó la tradición, comprendiendo la entrega material 
junto con un acto jurídico que tenga virtualidad para producir la transmisión 
del derecho (donación, compraventa). La doctrina sostiene que esta interpre-
tación se respalda en la cita que hace Vélez Sarsfield del Digesto, referencia 
que ha sido señalada en correspondencia con el jurisconsulto Paulo: quien 
sostenía “La nuda tradición nunca transfiere el dominio, a no ser que hubiere 
precedido la venta, o alguna causa justa por la cual se siguiera la entrega”.49
Efectivamente, en este punto existe una conexión entre la noción de tradi-
ción que manejó Vélez y la empleada en el derecho romano. La denominada 
causa traditionis se encontraba fuertemente ligada con el propósito, así “se 
44  Fuenzalida 1998, p. 120-121.
45  Zamora Manzano 2004. 
46  En su obra el jurista alemán Schulz advierte que la idea de “seguridad jurídica será 
tratada aquí en un doble sentido del término, en un sentido esto significa la certeza que 
el derecho prevalecerá en su luchar /controversia con lo injusto o incorrecto, en el otro 
certeza respecto de qué es el derecho, su carácter reconocible y la predictibilidad de las 
consecuencias legales generadas a partir de un conjunto de hechos. Schulz 1956, p. 240.
47  Schulz 1956, p. 249.
48  Escriche 1863, p. 4505.
49  Musto 2000, p. 474.
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requirió el convenio de las partes sobre la finalidad legal de la transmisión 
esto es, sobre si la traditio se hacía venditionis causa, donationis causa, dotis 
causa, solutionis causa, mutui causa”.50 La falta de acuerdo entre las partes 
sobre la causa traditionis tenía como consecuencia la no transmisión de la 
propiedad. A la par de este requisito, la transferencia de la posesión era con-
siderada indispensable para el traslado “del poder físico sobre la cosa”, lo 
que generó que “una transmisión de propiedad por simple convenio, fue [ra] 
totalmente desconocida en el Derecho clásico”.51
Durante los primeros años de vigencia de código, los juristas contemporá-
neos comenzaron a marcar las diferencias con el sistema romano. En esta línea, 
Carballo, un jurista de los primeros años del siglo XIX, en su tesis de doctora-
do52 planteó que, para los romanos, “la posesión era fundamental, constituía 
la base, el punto de partida de los derechos reales, de aquí que negaran toda 
eficacia al solo contrato, á la simple convención y de aquí también que reco-
nociendo como únicas fuentes del dominio la ocupación, la aprehensión; no 
concibieran la posibilidad de transmitirlo sin hacer intervenir el acto material 
de la aprehensión”.53 Para el autor, si bien “la tradición respondía al concepto, 
que el pueblo romano tenia del derecho. Legado el principio de la tradición a 
las naciones modernas, lo vemos debilitarse, perder su fuerza poco á poco”,54 
quedando reducido a una exigencia teórica sin objeto ni vida propios.
En materia de transmisión inmobiliaria, las críticas de Carballo al sistema 
adoptado en el Código enfatizaban que la exigencia de la tradición “mirada a 
través del moderno concepto del derecho” se tornó un mero defecto del sim-
bolismo romano que no sólo se presentó como un obstáculo a la “realización 
del derecho” sino que fue un óbice en materia de transacciones y enajenación 
de las tierras. En su anteproyecto al código civil (1932), Bibiloni consideró 
que la tradición de hecho, en el sentido de acto material, era dificultosa ya 
que no deja ningún tipo de rastro permaneciendo “oculta en la soledad de 
los campos”.55 Situación que se tornó más que perjudicial para los terceros 
ya que “¿Quién sabe en las ciudades sí años atrás se hicieron tradiciones y a 
quién?”.56
50  Schulz 1960, p. 336. 
51  Schulz 1960, p. 337.
52  Carballo 1912.
53  Carballo 1912, p. 20. 
54  Carballo 1912, p. 21.
55  Bibiloni 1932, p. 91.
56  Bibiloni 1932, p. 91.
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La razón por la que el codificador se apartó de la idea de tradición sos-
tenida por el jurista Freitas, basada en la inscripción registral, se encuentra 
en una nota final del codificador a todo el título XIV “De la hipoteca”.57 En 
breves palabras, en la nota Vélez consideró que debería esperarse a que “la 
experiencia y el ejemplo de otras naciones, nos enseñen los medios de salvar 
las dificultades del sistema de inscripción de todos los títulos”58 la inscripción 
en el registro no garantiza ni aumenta el valor del título. Si bien los motivos 
que esgrimió el codificador para no acoger la registración de las transferen-
cias de derechos sobre inmuebles59 no tuvieron en miras al derecho romano 
tampoco en este “existió el llamado registro de la propiedad, ni siquiera el de 
la propiedad territorial”.60
A pesar de la postura del autor del primer código civil, a nivel nacional una 
fuerte adhesión a la registración de la propiedad se materializó en las pro-
puestas de diversos proyectos de leyes. Entre ellos se destacan los proyectos 
de los diputados Eleodoro Lobos en 1899, Julián Barraquero en 1902, José 
Galiano en 1904, el del Poder Ejecutivo de 1911, el del diputado Frugoni Za-
bala en 1915 y Carlos F. Melo 1917, un nuevo proyecto del Poder Ejecutivo de 
1923, y los anteproyectos de Juan Antonio Bibiloni 1932 y Llambías de 1954. 
Por su parte, en los espacios provinciales, fueron erigiéndose registros de la 
propiedad con diferentes variantes. En algunos casos, la inscripción consti-
tuía y publicitaba los derechos mientras que en otros tenía solo esta última 
una función.
6. Reflexiones finales 
“Toda investigación romanista debe proponerse la consecución de resul-
tados relevantes para el derecho, pero la pregunta es, ¿para qué Derecho?”.61 
Como respuestas al interrogante emergen diferentes propuesta, por un lado 
los resultados de esta investigación podrían ser considerados romanistas y 
por ende ser relevantes para el estudio de la circulación, interpretación e in-
fluencia del derecho romano en los procesos de producción normativa en La-
57  La autora agradece al Dr. Gabriel B. Ventura por las observaciones y sugerencias 
hechas sobre este punto durante la defensa de su tesis doctoral. 
58  Código Civil de la República Argentina 1871, Título XIV.
59 Un análisis de los argumentos que Vélez esgrimió en este punto se encuentra en: 
Cacciavillani 2018, p. 101-104.
60  Schulz 1960, p. 339.
61  Cuena Boy 1993, p. 391.
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tinoamérica, mientras que por el otro sería un estudio de historia del derecho 
argentino en el que se reflexiona igualmente en torno a la influencia del dere-
cho romano en la construcción del derecho en un espacio.
El objetivo de nuestra propuesta fue ir más allá de una visión dicótoma, 
para ello decidimos realizar un estudio en el que además de considerar la im-
pronta del derecho romano en el texto del código, mediante la labor y forma-
ción de su autor, integre una reflexión que considere el análisis de este desde 
la perspectiva romanista. A partir de este diálogo entre lo que el codificador 
comprendió, interpretó y seleccionó en materia de transmisión de derechos 
reales y lo que el derecho romano estipuló en el contexto de las actio in rem 
y traditio pudimos advertir importantes diferencias que principalmente gi-
raron en torno al rol publicitario y traslativo de la tradición. A la par de este 
cotejo, y con la finalidad de evitar una perspectiva meramente legalista, de-
cidimos incluir algunas referencias de la doctrina para advertir si las inter-
pretaciones del codificador recibieron apoyo o bien fueron objeto de críticas. 
Por medio de la lectura de autores contemporáneos -Carballo- y posterio-
res al código-Bibiloni, Mariani de Vidal, Musto, Llambías, pudimos advertir 
el fuerte rechazo que generó la adopción de un sistema de transmisión de los 
derechos reales en cuyo centro se encontraba la tradición. Las críticas que 
esta decisión desató tienen como sustrato argumentativo las cuestionables 
interpretaciones que Vélez hizo de la experiencia jurídica romana y el empleo 
de algunos conceptos romanistas en un contexto completamente diferente 
que dieron como resultado un sistema de transmisión que dejaba en la com-
pleta incertidumbre las transferencias de derechos sobre inmuebles. 
A partir de un análisis conciliatorio de la experiencia codificadora civil ar-
gentina y especificidades propias del derecho romano pudimos advertir que 
éste no fue meramente receptado sino que fue interpretado, empleado y re-
significado de tal manera que le permitió al codificador apartarse del sistema 
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Some legal scholars1 consider the constituent processes held in Latin 
America between the end of the XX and the first decade of the XXI century 
as an autonomous constitutional cycle (“nuevo constitucionalismo latinoa-
mericano”). The main features selected by Viciano and Martínez to describe 
it are: originality of content; long texts; the complexity of the multiple values 
included, even if the language has been kept simple and easy to understand 
for the general public; a constitutional reform process through a constituent 
assembly. 
As for the first feature, most of the substantial innovations have been in-
troduced in the field of environmental law. It must be taken into account that 
the constitutional debate in these countries has taken advantage of the in-
ternational discourse on sustainable development and the actual need to de-
fend the environment, begun in the Seventies with the Stockholm conference 
on the human habitat and with the 1987 Brundtland report: “Our common 
future”. So, the language of Latin American constitutions, as far as the en-
vironment is concerned, refers to modern concepts, such as sustainability, 
ecosystems, habitats, etc. and explicitly recognizes a healthy environment as 
a fundamental right.
Consider, for instance, the case of Colombia: “Article 79. Every individu-
al has the right to enjoy a healthy environment. The law will guarantee the 
community’s participation in the decisions that may affect it. It is the duty 
of the State to protect the diversity and integrity of the environment, to con-
serve the areas of special ecological importance, and to foster education for 
the achievement of these ends. Article 80. The State will plan the handling 
and use of natural resources in order to guarantee their sustainable develop-
ment, conservation, restoration, or replacement. Additionally, it will have to 
caution and control the factors of environmental deterioration, impose legal 





sanctions, and demand the repair of any damage caused. In the same way, it 
will cooperate with other nations in the protection of the ecosystems located 
in the border areas”.2 
Personally, I propose going further, preferring to speak of a nuevo con-
stitucionalismo andino, whose main features are: interculturalism; popular 
participation both in the constituent process and in ordinary decision-mak-
ing processes, through the enhancement of direct, participatory and deliber-
ative instruments; a new legal paradigm for the environment.3
These characteristics derive from the choice of including, within the legal 
system, references to indigenous worldviews, or the ancient traditions that 
constitute the intercultural background of the values enshrined in these consti-
tutions. The most innovative content of these indigenous traditions, as opposed 
to the Western approach, is the type of relationship between humankind and 
nature that they propose and defend: bio-centric, holistic, interdependent. 
The most representative examples of this new constitutional cycle are Ec-
uador and Bolivia, which constitutionalized, in 2008 and 2009, the Kichwa 
sumak kawsay and the Aymara suma qamaña. Both constituent processes 
adopted an intercultural approach. This means that the indigenous cultural 
paradigm was not simply mentioned as an implementation of the cultural 
and identity rights of a minority group, as has happened in multicultural con-
texts,4 but was included as part of the common cultural heritage of a new 
pluri-national form of State.5 
These first experiences influenced other legal systems in Latin America 
(e.g. references to Pacha Mama can be found in Nicaragua’s constitutional 
revision of 2014; the rights of Nature were introduced in the State Constitu-
tion of Guerrero in 2014, and in the Mexico City Constitution in 2017), but 
2  “Art. 79. Todas las personas tienen derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano. La ley 
garantizará la participación de la comunidad en las decisiones que puedan afectarlo. Es 
deber del Estado proteger la diversidad e integridad del ambiente, conservar las áreas de 
especial importancia ecológica y fomentar la educación para el logro de estos fines.
Art. 80. El Estado planificará el manejo y aprovechamiento de los recursos natura-
les, para garantizar su desarrollo sostenible, su conservación, restauración o sustitución. 
Además, deberá prevenir y controlar los factores de deterioro ambiental, imponer las san-
ciones legales y exigir la reparación de los daños causados”.
3  Bagni 2013, p. 19.
4  Even if the multicultural approach is also included in the Constitutions we are com-
menting on, with chapters dedicated to the rights of indigenous peoples as ethnic groups.
5  Pegoraro 2017, p. 35-36 and p. 66-67; Pavani, Estupiñan Achury 2017, pp. 106-107.
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similar patterns can also be found in other continents (see references to the 
Malagasy fanahy in the Madagascar constitutional revision of 2010; or refer-
ences to Gross National Happiness in the 2008 Bhutan Constitution). 
If not at the constitutional level, some legal systems have incorporated 
aspects of indigenous cultural traditions into specific laws, in particular to 
defend natural ecosystems from exploitation and human devastation. We can 
mention in Australia the Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung mur-
ron) Act of 2017 that legally recognizes the Yarra river as an indivisible living 
entity deserving protection, based on the Aboriginal understanding of the re-
lationship between the river and the original inhabitants of the land; and in 
New Zealand, the Te Urewera Act, 2014, and Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui Riv-
er Claims Settlement) Act, 2017, both recognizing natural elements as legal 
entities, with proper rights, on the basis of the Maori culture.
The legal implications deriving from this process have not been fully per-
ceived, even in the countries where the phenomenon was first generated. In 
fact, countries like Ecuador and Bolivia continue to base their economic sys-
tem on extractivism and the over-exploitation of natural resources. Never-
theless, the encounter between legal science and eco-centric cultures should 
at least produce a profound reconsideration, if not a change of perspective, of 
many legal dogmas, such as the scope of legal personhood, the fundamental 
right of property, and the constitutional right to a healthy environment.6
The aim of this research is, first of all, to illustrate the main features of 
Andean indigenous worldviews, stressing in particular their concept of land 
and nature (§ 2). Secondly, the initial legal consequences produced by the 
“new Andean constitutionalism” on the regulation of property and the rela-
tionship between man and the environment will be analyzed (§ 3). Conclud-
ing remarks will evaluate the impact of the recontextualization of indigenous 
culture on modern law (§ 4).
2. The Andean eco-centric worldviews 
According to a 2014 Publication by the UN Economic Commission for Lat-
in America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),7 by the year 2010 an estimated 45 
6  At the basis of this particular critical rethinking of the Western legal paradigm there 
is a new philosophical approach, called by many scholars “Earth Jurisprudence”, whose 
masterpiece in legal literature is Cullinan 2011.
7  ECLAC 2014.
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million indigenous people lived in Latin America, accounting for 8.3 % of 
the region’s population: 826 indigenous peoples, plus 200 living in isolation. 
Each group lives with its own cultural traditions, even if it is possible to detect 
a common basis for their understanding of the relationship between man and 
Nature.
The Mapuche, who originally settled in the South-East of America, are 
the indigenous people that resisted the longest to the Spanish conquest (they 
were finally defeated only at the very end of the 19th century), and so their own 
cultural traditions have not been influenced by Western culture as much as 
that of other Andean peoples.8 Their cultural roots are strictly related to the 
earth, as their own name shows. In the “Mapudungun”, the language of the 
Mapuche, “Mapu” means “earth” and “Che” means “person”, so the Mapuche 
are literally the “Sons of the Earth”. This genealogy is so strong that their 
language also derives from the sounds of natural elements. It means, in fact, 
the Language of the Earth,9 and was developed by their ancestors precisely to 
decipher the messages coming from all the elements of Nature: the sounds of 
rivers, the whistling of the wind, the howling of the sea, the singing of birds, 
the sounds of leaves, insects and animals.10 
The “Mapu Kimün”, or Mapuche Knowledge, is based on the ideas of circu-
larity and interdependency. In the words of the Ngenpin (wise man) Arman-
do Marileo Lefío: “According to our ancestors’ outlook, the diverse elements 
that constitute our worldview interact and depend on each other in a holis-
tic and systemic manner. Inhabitants, land, nature and powers belonging to 
both the natural and the supernatural dimensions coexist, producing harmo-
ny and equilibrium in the “Nag Mapu””.11 Humanity belongs to the earth, 
as all the other elements, dead or alive, spiritual or material. The Mapuche 
have an integral epistemology of life, time and space,12 generating the deep 
sense of respect that they feel for Nature and the Environment, considered 
“as a communal good, a means of interrelation and a sharing space with all 
creatures sustained by it”.13 But the “Nag Mapu”, the territory where we live, 
is only one part of the whole cosmos for Mapuche. There are other Mapus, 
8  Dillehay 2007, p. 1, 23, 54.
9  Marileo Lefío, Salas Astrain 2011, p. 121.
10  Marileo Lefío; Ñanculef Huaiquinao 2016, p. 21.
11  Marileo Lefío.
12  Ñanculef Huaiquinao 2016, p. 41.
13  Marileo Lefío.
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above (Wenu Mapu, the sky) and below (Miche Mapu, underground), and 
in all cardinal points, all interconnected. It’s a clear holistic vision of space, 
generated from practical observations for thousands of years, and from which 
the Mapuche knew about the earth’s rotation around the Sun long before the 
Western world.
One of the main principles in Mapuche cosmogony is the feminine, be-
cause it represents fertility and its creative power (this assumption is shared 
with the other Andean traditions on Pacha Mama).
The Nag Mapu has both a spatial and temporal dimension: it is populated 
by spirits and energies, good and evil, among which there are also the spirits 
of the ancestors. There is a strong relationship between the living and the 
dead,14 because of the circularity of time, so that the Mapuche say that the 
future is “in our back” (to indicate that it is in the past).
Before the Spanish conquest, the other Andean peoples belonged to the 
Incan Empire.15 The Tawantinsuyu extended from the southern part of Co-
lombia to the Cuzco, Bolivia, and the northern territories of Chile and Argen-
tina. The Incas were a small group of peoples that were able to build a great 
empire and govern the other Andean peoples (the Muisca of Colombia, the 
Valdivia of Ecuador, the Quechuas and the Aymara of Peru and Bolivia, were 
the four most important sedentary Amerindian groups in South America).
In this cultural tradition, too, there is a very strong connection between 
man and nature. The essence of this worldview is to be found in the four ele-
ments that, in a harmonious relationship, generate life in the entire Universe: 
water, air, earth, fire. Everything on earth is permeated by their creative en-
ergy and, as a consequence, each entity is living and interrelated with the oth-
ers. Human beings should be able to communicate with each single element 
of the world, from stones to mountains and forests, because they share the 
same constitutive elements. Pacha Mama is the whole, where time and space 
are fused. Totality and uniqueness coexist. “The Pacha Mama is a framework 
made up of both the human and nonhuman: people do not occupy it – they 
are a constitutive part of it. It is ecological and social at the same time”.16
The dualistic principle in this culture does not produce opposition, but 
integration: we do not live in a universe, but in a pluri-verse, so fighting to 
eliminate differences does not make sense. 
14  Dillehay 2007, p. 5.
15  Dillehay 2007, p. 25; Ribeiro 1975, p. 169 ff.
16  Gudynas 2018, p. 232.
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In one of the many Kichwa legends about the spirits of the universe, from 
the community of Tigua (Cotopaxi, Ecuador), Pachakamak and Pachamama, 
the masculine and feminine spirits that created the universe wanted a mes-
senger to communicate with the living beings on the Earth. So, they gathered 
all the forces of the universe together: the sun, the moon, the rivers, the trees, 
the winds and the stars, Taita Cotopaxi and Mama Tungurahua (two Ecua-
dorian volcanos), the lamas and the men; and from all these energies an egg 
appeared. The condor, being able to fly very high in the sky, is the sacred 
messenger, representing the connection between the earth and the cosmos.17
The way in which humans should live their lives in harmony with the Pa-
cha is expressed in the concept of sumak kawsay (in Kichwa) or suma qa-
maña (in Aymara), translated in Spanish as Buen vivir. It is an open concept, 
not easily defined, and still under construction:
es un espacio de encuentro de diferentes culturas, tanto aquella del sumak kawsay 
como las de feministas o biocéntricos. No es un mero ejercicio multicultural o de yuxta-
posición de culturas, sino que es un encuentro intercultural, entendiendo que existe un 
plano de igualdad entre distintas culturas, pero que a la vez opera un decolonialidad en 
admitir la superioridad de los saberes europeos.18 
The starting point for understanding buen vivir is the transition from an 
anthropocentric conception of the relationship between man and nature, 
which finds its greatest development in the Renaissance culture and in Cath-
olic personalism, to a biocentric one, which refers to the new ecological think-
ing.
Generally speaking, the expression means “Life in harmony with nature 
and other beings”: suma/sumak means “plenty, sublime, excellent, beauti-
ful”; qamaña and kawsay stand for “life, to live, co-living, being”, so, the 
most faithful translation of the expression would be “fullness of life”. The 
Spanish translation can produce false assonances with western philosophi-
cal conceptions, like Aristotle’s eudaimonia, from which liberalism derived 
oikonomia and the welfare state. The modern idea of wellness has nothing in 
common with sumak kawsay: the first is individualistic and subjective; the 
second is communitarian and supportive.
In the indigenous cosmovision harmony between the individual and the 
community is the basis of co-living:
17  Toaquiza 2006.
18  Acosta, Gudynas 2011, p. 81.
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Saber vivir implica estar en armonía con uno mismo. Vivir Bien es vivir en comunidad, 
en hermandad y especialmente en complementariedad. Es una vida comunal, armónica y 
autosuficiente. Vivir Bien significa complementarnos y compartir sin competir, vivir en ar-
monía entre las personas y con la naturaleza. Es la base para la defensa de la naturaleza, 
de la vida misma y de la humanidad toda.19
The main principles of sumak kawsay are represented in the chakana, the 
Andean cross: yachay (ancestral and collective knowledge), ruray (to do), 
ushay (energy, vitality), munay (to love, affectivity, or the ability to share 
ideals and goods).20 The arms of the cross are the principles that regulate the 
relationship between the four elements: “reciprocity (ranti-ranti; the guide-
lines of the social communitarian practices of mutual aid); integrality (pura; 
the guidelines of indigenous holistic thought); complementarity (yananti; 
opposites as complementary elements); and interrelation (tinkuy; the delib-
erative principle to reach a consensual decision)”.21 
Indigenous community representatives participated in the constituent 
processes of Ecuador and Bolivia, so their worldviews influenced the content 
of the new constitutions and some ideas were translated into binding consti-
tutional norms or principles.
3. Normative reception and implications on some Latin American legal 
systems
3.1. The concepts of property, land and territory, and legal personhood
In this paragraph I will analyze how the indigenous worldviews described 
above were introduced into some Latin American legal systems, and the con-
sequences that their reception has produced on the shaping and understand-
ing of some specific concepts in the Western legal tradition, such as property, 
territory and environmental law.
In most European Constitutions, property is recognized as private and 
individual, public or state, or mixed. In some Latin American countries, col-
lective property is another form of property recognized by the Constitution 
and derived from the chthonic tradition. It is important to notice that an es-
sential role in the recognition of the indigenous peoples’ right to collective 
property was played by the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
19  Huanacuni Mamani 2010, p. 7 ff.
20  Macas 2014a, p. 186.
21  Hidalgo-Capitán, Arias, Ávila 2014, p. 37; Kowii 2014, p. 166 ff.; Macas 2014b, p. 172.
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Rights. In cases like Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Vs. Nicara-
gua (Sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2001), Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa 
Vs. Paraguay (Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2006), Comunidad Indígena 
Sawhoyamaxa Vs. Paraguay (Sentencia de 29 de marzo de 2006), Pueblo 
Saramaka Vs. Surinam (Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2007), the Court 
stated that art. 21 of the Convention, when applied to indigenous and tribal 
peoples, must be interpreted as a right to collective property,22 recognizing 
the special cultural and existential value that land has for indigenous commu-
nities.23 However, the Court recognized collective property as a specific form 
of “private property”. The main objective of the Court was not to defend and 
guarantee collective property as an alternative relationship with goods, and a 
different paradigm of possession, but, instead, to implement the cultural and 
identity rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. 
Even if there is no doubt that the most recent Latin American Constitu-
tions have been influenced by this international legal doctrine and, moreover, 
that the direct participation of indigenous peoples in the constituent process-
es played a great part in the recognition of collective property, we have to 
note that the Ecuadorian Constitution considers the collective (community) 
property one of the types of property, at the same level as private and public 
property.24 The same happens in the Bolivian Constitution, that includes in 
22  “148. Through an evolutionary interpretation of the international instruments for 
the protection of human rights, taking into account applicable norms of interpretation and 
pursuant to article 29(b) of the Convention -which precludes a restrictive interpretation of 
rights-, it is the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the Convention protects the right to 
property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the indigenous 
communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized by 
the Constitution of Nicaragua” (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001).
23  “Indigenous peoples live off the land; in other words, the possibility of maintaining 
social unity, of cultural preservation and reproduction, and of surviving physically and 
culturally, depends on the collective, communitarian existence and maintenance of the 
land, as has been the case since ancient times»; «149 […] For indigenous communities, re-
lations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and 
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and 
transmit it to future generations” (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001).
24  “Art. 321. The State recognizes and guarantees the right to property in all of its 
forms, whether public, private, community, State, associative, cooperative or mixed- econ-
omy, and that it must fulfill its social and environmental role”.
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the definition of the right to property: private, individual or collective.25 The 
intercultural dialogue begun with the Andean constitutional cycle has opened 
a different legal perspective on property and economic rights, that was not 
present in the previous one, still characterized by a multicultural approach. 
For instance, in the 1991 Colombian Constitution, collective property is only 
mentioned in connection with the rights of indigenous communities (art. 329 
const.).
The word “territory” in Nation-States usually indicates the area occupied 
by the State population. It is also used in public and administrative law, to 
identify intermediate levels of decentralization of the State, such as regions, 
provinces and municipalities. In Pluri-national States, where indigenous peo-
ples have been struggling for decades to achieve recognition of their collec-
tive rights to land, “Asserting the concept of ‘territory’ has been a hard-won 
battle, especially strong in Latin America. For indigenous people, land is not 
only soil and biodiversity and water — it is also the place from which your 
cultural role and identity as part of a larger Earth Community is defined. The 
law which governs your life and your community, and which has done so for 
generations, is born with you, from the land. Language and cultural identity 
are derived from the land. Your ancestors and the spiritual dimensions of the 
ecosystem and other species all reside in the territory. The land nurtures the 
psyche. All this together is the territory from which you are shaped”.26
Finally, for the Western legal tradition, land and Nature are part of the 
environment and are considered objects of human rights: property rights, es-
thetic rights, like the landscape,27 or environmental rights, like the right to 
live in a healthy environment, free from contamination. In these Latin Amer-
ican countries, for the first time in the history of law, Nature has been recog-
nized as a legal entity and a subject of rights.
25  “Art. 56.I. Everyone has the right to private, individual or collective property, pro-
vided that it serves a social function”.
26  Hosken 2011, p. 47. See also Martinez-Alier, Anguelovski, Bond et al. 2014, p. 19-
60: “The concept of territory is not only used by indigenous populations but also by other 
communities who have a special relation with the spaces where they have historically lived 
in, for example, afro-descendants living in quilombos in Brazil or in palenques in Colom-
bia or by peasant communities ethnically belonging to national majorities”. 
27  See as an example art. 9 of the Italian Constitution: “La Repubblica promuove lo 
sviluppo della cultura e la ricerca scientifica e tecnica. Tutela il paesaggio e il patrimonio 
storico e artistico della Nazione”. 
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3.2. The Chilean silent Constitution
The Mapuche cosmovision has not influenced the Chilean legal system 
yet. The Chilean Constitution is formally still the one approved during Pi-
nochet’s regime. Immediately after the end of the dictatorship, in 1989, a set 
of constitutional reforms was approved. In 2005 a very extensive revision 
of the Constitution occurred, and Pinochet’s signature in the document was 
cancelled and replaced by that of the President of the time. Nevertheless, the 
backbone of the constitution is still that of 1980, where Mapuche people were 
heavily marginalized and discriminated against. The relationship between 
the Chilean government and the Mapuche communities is still very tense, 
even if some steps towards the construction of a more inclusive society have 
been taken in the field of intercultural education. For this reason, there are no 
traces in the Constitution of a new legal ecological paradigm for land rights, 
property and environmental rights. In fact, article 19, no. 8º, mentions the 
human right to live in a healthy environment, from a traditional anthropo-
centric perspective, obliging the State to preserve nature and the health right 
of Chilean citizens.
3.3. The Constitutionalizing of Nature’s rights in Ecuador
The Andean indigenous cosmovision largely permeated the last Ecuador-
ian constitutional process and the new Constitution of 2008. Here, sumak 
kawsay was introduced as a main value for all Ecuadorians, a political goal for 
the State and a system of rights to be implemented. The Ecuadorian Constitu-
tion challenges many Western conceptions concerning land rights, property 
rights and the environment, aiming to “represent a change of civilization”.28 
The most impressive innovation is without any doubt the recognition of 
nature as a legal entity: “Article 71. Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is re-
produced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for 
the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and 
evolutionary processes.
All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon the public au-
thorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and interpret these rights, 
the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as appropriate.
28  Acosta 2018, p. 2: “en el caso de la Constitución de Montecristi se trata de un 
proyecto político de vida en común, con elementosque auguran un cambio civilizatorio”.
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The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to 
communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements 
comprising an ecosystem”. There is no need to explain the reference to the 
indigenous cosmovision, as the expression Pacha Mama is explicitly used in 
the article. The new concept of “earth” as a living entity and an ecosystem to 
whom we belong as humans, is also explained in the preamble: “celebrating 
nature, the Pacha Mama (Mother Earth), of which we are a part, and which is 
vital to our existence”. 
The intercultural perspective adopted in writing the constitution also in-
fluenced the way in which the constituent used the terms “land” (tierra) and 
“territory” (territorio). The former is mainly used to designate the special 
relationship that indigenous communities have with the space they inhabit 
(see in particular chapter IV Communities’, peoples’ and nations’ rights, and 
art. 57 on their collective rights), whereas the second is almost always used to 
indicate State national territory or territorial autonomy. 
The economic dependency of indigenous communities and farmers in 
general on the rural exploitation of their lands also inspired the content of 
art. 282 const., that prohibits large estate farming and land concentration, 
and guarantees that land must be used to fulfill social and environmental 
functions.
Another important acquisition from indigenous culture that has been in-
corporated in the Constitution is collective property. Collective property rep-
resents both a form of territorial organization, like municipalities, provinces, 
and so on, when it corresponds to the land of a whole community;29 and one 
of the possible legal regimes of property.30 
Finally, sumak kawsay influenced the constitutional regulation of natu-
ral resources, which, following art. 408, “are the unalienable property of the 
State”. Special norms protect soil, water, food sovereignty, the biosphere, bio-
diversity, and the Amazon. The Ecuadorian Constitution is, moreover, one of 
the few in the world that has a specific norm regarding the measures the State 
shall take to counteract climate change (art. 414).
29  “Art. 60. Ancestral, indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and coastal back-country (mon-
tubios) peoples can establish territorial districts for the preservation of their culture. The 
law shall regulate their establishment. Communities (comunas) that have collective land 
ownership are recognized as an ancestral form of territorial organization”.
30  “Art. 321. The State recognizes and guarantees the right to property in all of its 
forms, whether public, private, community, State, associative, cooperative or mixed- econ-
omy, and that it must fulfill its social and environmental role”.
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Notwithstanding the broad scope of the constitutional provisions framing 
a new eco-centric legal paradigm, the case-law on this subject-matter since 
the entry into force of the Constitution is very limited. The first case in which 
a court decided a law suit on the basis of the rights of nature is Loja v. Río 
Vilcabamba, 30 March 2011, provincial Court of Loja. The court applied art. 
71 const. for the first time to protect the vital cycle of a river, menaced by exca-
vation works to build a new provincial highway. The legal action was filed by 
two foreign residents, in application of the principle of universal standing for 
constitutional actions. Formally, the court ruling represents a success for all 
the people supporting the idea of widening the concept of legal personhood 
also to natural elements. However, the judgement remains up to now par-
tially still unenforced. The petitioners filed in 2018 a constitutional action of 
compliance with a court judgement. They denounced the fact that the public 
administration had still not approved a plan to restore and regenerate the 
affected area. With judgement n. 012-18-SIS-CC, 28 March 2018, the Consti-
tutional Court dismissed the action, stating that the activities implemented 
by the PA to restore the river bed could be considered as sufficient implemen-
tation of the jurisdictional order. 
We can cite a few other rulings, not particularly meaningful in terms of the 
defense of the ecosystem: Const. Court judgement n. 017-12-SIN-CC, 26 April 
2012, on the limits of establishment at the Galápagos; Juez Temporal Segundo 
de lo Civil y Mercantil de Galápagos, interim injunction n. 269-2012, about 
public works without environmental authorization; noveno Tribunal de Ga-
rantias penales del Guayas, criminal judgement 09171-2015-0004, on the il-
legal fishing of sharks; Corte Nacional de Justicia. Sala Especializada de lo 
Penal, Penal Militar, Penal Policial y Tránsito, case n. 2003-2014 - C.T., 8 
September 2015, about the illegal killing of a jaguar; Const. Court judgement 
n. 218-15-SEP-CC, about measuring the rights of nature and the right to work.
3.4. The concepts of “Land” and “territory” following the Bolivian indig-
enous majoritarian culture
Bolivia is the Latin American country with the highest percentage of in-
digenous peoples.31 The 2008-9 constituent process was the first in Bolivian 
31  According to the 2001 Census they constituted 62% of the population. According 
to the 2012 National Census, 41% of the Bolivian population over the age of 15 are of indig-
enous origin, although the National Institute of Statistics’ (INE) 2017 projections indicate 
that this percentage is likely to have increased to 48% (Jacquelin-Andersen 2018).
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history where indigenous people were widely represented and their requests 
heard and taken into consideration32. Notwithstanding, even if the Consti-
tution incorporates the Aymara equivalent of sumak kawsay, that is suma 
qamaña, it does not explicitly recognize nature’s rights. 
The word “Pacha” can be found only in the preamble, associated with 
Christian references: “We found Bolivia anew, fulfilling the mandate of our 
people, with the strength of our Pachamama and with gratefulness to God”. 
Despite this fault, and even if this new legal concept had been introduced the 
previous year into the Ecuadorian Constitution, in 2009 President Morales 
undertook an international promotional campaign to influence public opin-
ion on the “green” restyling of Bolivian economic policies, proposing to the 
UN General Assembly the institution of the international day of Mother Earth, 
and supporting the creation of the UN Harmony with Nature Programme.
In Bolivia, the rights of nature were introduced by primary Acts (Act n. 
71 of 2010, Ley de derechos de la Madre Tierra; and Act 300 of 2012, Ley 
marco de la Madre Tierra y desarrollo integral para vivir bien). Act no. 
71 recognizes Mother Earth as a collective entity of public interest (art. 5), 
who can exercise all the rights attributed to her by the law (art. 7), through 
the guardianship of all Bolivians. Art. 2 lists the principles that regulate the 
enforcement of the statute. They have an evident origin in the indigenous 
cosmovision of the Aymara vivir bien (e.g. harmony and interculturalism). 
Art. 3 defines Mother Earth as the interrelated, interdependent, complemen-
tary system for all living entities, sharing a common destiny, and affirms that 
Mother Earth is sacred for indigenous nations and peoples’ worldview. Fi-
nally, the Act announces the institution of a public system for the defense of 
Mother Earth’s rights, implemented with Act no. 300. This new Act repeats 
the main concepts of the previous statute, underlining with greater emphasis 
its relationship with the indigenous “bien vivir”, as a cultural and civilizing 
perspective, an alternative to capitalism and modernity, that fosters a life in 
harmony, complementarity, solidarity and balance between Nature and soci-
ety, aiming at eliminating all inequalities and dominations (art. 5.2). The Act 
also institutes the Plurinational Agency of Mother Earth, with functions of 
planification and the coordination of public policies on environmental issues, 
and the management of enforcement programmes and projects concerning 
the integral system of the development of vivir bien.
Unlike in Ecuador, the indigenous influences on the Bolivian Constitution 
32  Prada Alcoreza 2014.
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were much more related to the claims of indigenous peoples and farmers’ 
communities of collective rights over lands. For this reason, in Bolivia the 
“pluri-national” dimension of the indigenous demands prevailed over the cul-
tural and environmental ones.33 There is no difference in the use of the words 
“land” and “territory”, both referred to the recognition of indigenous commu-
nities’ collective rights regarding their lands. Besides, the word “territory” is 
the only one used to refer to the State land. Departments, provinces, munici-
palities and rural native indigenous territories are the territorial units of State 
decentralization (art. 269). But the indigenous cosmovision implies a specific 
discipline for this particular type of territorial self-administration. First of 
all, rural native indigenous autonomy corresponds to the ancestral lands that 
they currently inhabit. Secondly, it is not only an administrative partition, 
but a communality of territory, culture, history, languages, and their own 
juridical, political, social and economic organization or institutions. Finally, 
the self-governance of the rural native indigenous autonomies is exercised 
according to their norms, institutions, authorities and procedures (art. 290). 
So, indigenous cosmovision also affects the interpretation of typical institu-
tions of public and administrative law, such as territorial autonomy. 
Art. 403 describes native indigenous territory from a socio-economic point 
of view: “I. The integrity of rural native indigenous territory is recognized, 
which includes the right to land, to the use and exclusive exploitation of the 
renewable natural resources, under conditions determined by law, to prior 
and informed consultation, to participation in the benefits of the exploitation 
of the non-renewable natural resources that are found in their territory, to 
the authority to apply their own norms, administered by their structures of 
representation, and to define their development pursuant to their own cul-
tural criteria and principles of harmonious coexistence with nature. The rural 
native indigenous territories may be composed of communities.
II. The rural native indigenous territory includes areas of production, ar-
eas of exploitation and the conservation of natural resources, and spaces for 
social, spiritual and cultural reproduction. The law shall establish the proce-
dure for the recognition of these rights”.
Also in Bolivia, property can be individual and collective:34 “Art. 56.I. Ev-
33  Inturias, Rodríguez, Baldelomar, Peña 2016.
34  “Art. 393. The State recognizes, protects and guarantees individual and communi-
tarian or collective property of land, as long as it fulfills a social purpose or social economic 
purposes, as the case may be”.
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eryone has the right to private, individual or collective property, provided 
that it serves a social function”. Unlike in Ecuador, the only limit to proper-
ty, that the constitution mentions, is its socio-economic function, whereas 
environmental defense is not taken into consideration (art. 393). The Con-
stitution establishes a correspondence between communitarian or collective 
property and rural native indigenous territory, native, intercultural commu-
nities and rural communities. Due to the major role that indigenous and ru-
ral communities play in Bolivian society, and the pluri-national character of 
the Bolivian form of State, the Constitution describes in detail the nature of 
collective property: “Collective property is indivisible, may not be subject to 
prescription or attachment, is inalienable and irreversible, and is not sub-
ject to agrarian property taxes. Communities can be owners, recognizing the 
complementary character of collective and individual rights, respecting the 
territorial unity in common” (art. 394.III). 
Land use, management and redistribution was without any doubt the ma-
jor interest of the legislator during the Constituent debates, but this was due 
mainly to the fact that Bolivian society, together with being for its majority 
indigenous, is also most “campesina”. This explains the constitutional norms 
concerning the redistribution of public land, the prohibition of latifundium and 
of selling public land to foreigners, the declaration of work as the fundamental 
means by which agrarian property is acquired and maintained. In this regard, 
the Constitution expressly declares that land use, in conformity with the com-
munities’ tradition, is recognized as the fulfilment of a social purpose (art. 397).
Finally, as for natural resources, in Bolivia as in Ecuador, they are “the 
property and direct domain, indivisible and without limitation, of the Boliv-
ian people, and their administration corresponds to the State on behalf of 
the collective interest” (art. 349). They include renewable as non-renewable 
resources, such as water (art. 373) and hydrocarbons (art. 359).
3.5. Case-law on the rights of Nature in Colombia
Even if only in Ecuador and Bolivia the Constitution or the laws have rec-
ognized Nature as a legal entity, maybe the most significant step forward in 
the recognition of Nature’s rights has been taken in Colombia, by both Con-
stitutional and Supreme Courts. 
“Art. 349.II. The State shall recognize, respect and grant individual and collective own-
ership rights to land, as well as the rights to use and enjoyment of natural resources”.
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The 1991 Colombian constituent process was for many scholars the first 
of the new Latin American constitutional cycle. It was a bottom-up process, 
highly participated by many sectors of society, including the indigenous peo-
ples, who, in the final draft of the Constitution, received recognition of their 
right to apply their own customary law to their territory (art. 246), and of in-
digenous territorial entities as part of the territorial organization of the State 
(art. 286). Despite this, the recognition of the right to preserve their cultural 
identity was not guaranteed as clearly as it could have been. In fact, art. 7 
speaks in very general terms: “The State recognizes and protects the ethnic 
and cultural diversity of the Colombian Nation”.
The formal approach to the Colombian Constitution is, in fact, still multi-
cultural. It has been the job of the Constitutional Court, since then and until 
the present, to interpret the Constitution from an intercultural perspective. 
Over the years, the Constitutional Court has broadened the scope of applica-
tion of the constitutional provisions in favor of Colombian indigenous com-
munities, defending their customary law, introducing the right to consulta-
tion, and finally recognizing, in 2016, the river Atrato as a legal entity, on 
the basis of constitutional biocultural rights. This new doctrine was promptly 
enforced by the Colombian Supreme Court in 2018, extending legal person-
hood to the Amazon.
In the River Atrato case (T-622 of the 10th November 2016, the Constitu-
tional Court, Sala sexta) the constitutional complaint was brought by Cen-
tro de Estudios para la Justicia Social “Tierra Digna”, representing various 
territorial entities, with the aim of “forbidding the intensive use of different 
extractive methods and the illegal forest exploitation” in the Chocó region, 
along the banks of the Atrato river. The plaintiffs stated that these mining 
and forestry activities endangered the traditional ways of life of various ethnic 
communities living in the region. The area is up to 96% constituted by the 
collective territories of 600 afro communities, grouped into 70 community 
councils and 120 indigenous resguardos.
Intensive mining exploitation was destroying the river bed, producing the 
spilling of polluting chemicals, such as mercury and cyanide, and the dis-
persion of mercury vapor from the treatment of residual substances, so that 
“the contamination of the Atrato river is affecting the survival of the human 
population, of fishes, the development of local agriculture, all the necessary 
elements for indigenous people, who have built their life and culture for cen-
turies in these lands”.
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The plaintiffs also denounced forest exploitation, the absence of water pu-
rification mechanisms and waste disposal; the increase of mortal childhood 
illnesses; the loss of navigability in long stretches of the rivers; the drastic 
lowering of life expectancy (58.3 years, as against 70.3 at a national level).
The court reasoning began from the analysis of the concept of the “So-
cial State of rights”, which implies both the recognition of cultural diversity 
and the protection of the environment and natural resources (point 4.7). For 
many years the Court had sustained that it is possible to speak of an “ecolog-
ical constitution” and a “cultural constitution” (point 5.22 ff.).
The Court merged the two concepts, creating the expression biocultural 
rights, meaning the rights of ethnic communities (so, not only indigenous, 
even afro) to administer and protect the forms of life and the ecosystems 
where they live, and with which they develop a special symbiotic relationship, 
applying their own traditional rules.
So, biocultural rights are the trait-d’union between the environment 
and culture from a holistic perspective (point 5.11). The defense “de los 
ríos, los bosques, las fuentes de alimento, el medio ambiente y la biodiver-
sidad” is a standard derived from the principle of the “diversidad étnica y 
cultural de la nación”, so that the State cannot impose a specific worldview 
on anybody. 
The Court concluded, stating that the PA is responsible for omission in 
facing the dramatic violation of community rights to life, health, the environ-
ment, and culture produced by extensive extractivism and forest exploitation. 
Applying the precautionary principle, it prohibited the use of toxic chemicals 
in mines and declared the río Atrato “a legal person”, with the right to resto-
ration (9.25). 
To fulfill the ruling, the court ordered the government to be the guardian 
of the river, together with local communities, by creating a “Rio Atrato Guard-
ianship Commission”, integrated by a team of technicians, among them the 
WWF Colombia and Humboldt Institute. The commission should adopt all 
suitable measures to fulfil the sentence and should monitor the progress of 
each task. 
This ruling pushes Colombian constitutionalism a little bit further than 
the model of sustainable development, towards a new eco-centric dogma-
tism: “9.31. In other words, environmental justice must be applied further 
than the human scenario and must allow nature to be a legal person. Follow-
ing this argumentation, the court considers that a step forward must be made 
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towards the constitutional protection of our main source of biodiversity: the 
river Atrato”.35
On 5th April, 2018, the Colombian Supreme Court, sala de casación civil, 
pronounced ruling STC 4360/2018, rendered by justice Luis Armando Tolosa 
Villabona.
The legal complaint had been proposed against a ruling of the sala civil 
especializada en restitución de tierra of the Bogotá judicial district’s Tribu-
nal Superior.
The petitioners were a group of 25 citizens, aged between 7 and 25, all res-
ident in towns included in the Colombian black list of cities at risk because of 
climate change. They asked to stop deforestation inside the Amazon region.
In this case, there is a peculiarity concerning their standing, because the 
plaintiffs acted as the future generation that will be affected by climate change 
and by current irresponsible behavior.
According to the 2015 Paris agreement and the 2014-2018 national devel-
opment Plan, the Colombian State has an obligation to reduce deforestation. 
However, the plaintiffs proved that every year more and more hectares of 
land have been destroyed, due to land grabbing, illicit crops, illicit mining, 
infrastructure, industrial agriculture, illicit timber exploitation. The State is 
responsible for inactivity in facing this concrete danger. 
In the ratio decidendi, the Supreme Court stated that the legal order had 
been passing through an epochal change from an anthropocentric vision of 
the right to a healthy environment (“homomensura autista antroprocentris-
mo”) towards an “eco-centric- anthropic” one. 
Nevertheless, the main point of the judgment remains the solidarity prin-
ciple, applied between man and nature and inter-generations. Sometimes, 
the reasoning is almost mystical. The judge speaks about “our neighbor” who 
is otherness, and its essence are other beings who live on the planet, including 
other animal and vegetal species, even the unborn. 
The ratio of the ruling is on intra-species solidarity and on the value of 
nature. 
The SC made references to the Río Atrato ruling and used the same formu-
35  The Colombian government enforced the ruling with the Decree of the Environ-
mental and sustainable Development Ministry no. 1148, 5 July 2017, by which the Ministry 
nominated its own representatives for the rights of the Atrato river, and resolution no. 
0907, of 22 May 2018, that created the Comisión de Guardianes del río Atrato, composed 
both by State representatives and local community representatives. 
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la to recognize the Amazon as a legal person and to order other institutions 
and communities to work jointly to write a plan of action to reduce deforesta-
tion and an inter-generational plan to save the life of the Colombian Ama-
zon”, with the aim of reducing to zero both deforestation and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Recently, even the lower courts have begun to apply the “eco-centric-an-
thropic paradigm” in environmental cases. For instance, a group of residents 
in a neighborhood where the sewage system was not working, and, as a con-
sequence, black waters were flowing directly into the nearby river of La Plata, 
presented a case of “tutela constitucional” on 19th March, 2019, to the Juzga-
do único civil municipal de La Plata – Huila. Justice Juan Carlos Clavijo 
Gonzáles decided that the La Plata river is a subject of rights.36 The case was 
not presented by the plaintiffs as a violation of Nature’s rights. The plain-
tiffs denounced the violation of their personal right to good life, health and 
a healthy environment. Nevertheless, the judge eventually decided that “La 
solidaridad que se construye a partir del respeto por la naturaleza, por el 
contrario, implica un cambio en la forma en que la jurisdicción debe abordar 
el examen de este asunto, superando el análisis exclusivamente antropocen-
trista, para ser omnicomprensivo de los derechos de los seres humanos a la 
par con los del ambiente” (p. 15).
The development of this constitutional case-law was, without any doubt, 
nourished by the constitutional innovation that occurred in neighboring Ec-
uador, but was also preceded by many cases in which the Constitutional Court 
had reflected on the Colombian indigenous peoples’ cosmovision.
For instance, regarding the right to redistribution and the use of indige-
nous ancestral lands, in the above-mentioned constitutional judgement the 
Court affirmed:
36  “Es hora de dejar en el pasado la visión antropocéntrica frente al medio ambiente, 
una posición dominante y consumista de los recursos naturales fundada en el deseo irra-
cional de satisfacer sus intereses que han generado como “efecto boomerang” una degrad-
ación de la ecosfera que le impide gozar de su entorno y que encarece la satisfacción de sus 
necesidades. Las prácticas equívocas han llegado al punto que el Panel Intergubernamen-
tal de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático por sus siglas IPCC, el pasado año advirtiera 
que existe un serio riesgo de incumplir el objetivo más ambicioso del Convenio de París, 
quedar por debajo de 1,5° en 2100, pues ello ocurriría en poco más de una década. Por eso 
“[a]hora es el momento de comenzar a tomar medidads para proteger de forma eficaz al 
planeta y a sus recursos antes de que sea demasiado tarde o el daño sea irreversible, no 
solo para las futuras generaciones sino para la especie humana”” (p. 11).
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5.57. Por otra parte, debe señalarse que tanto la jurisprudencia constitucional como 
la del Sistema Interamericano han establecido que el derecho de las comunidades étnicas 
sobre sus territorios ancestrales va más allá de la demarcación e incluye el derecho que 
tienen al uso y respeto de los recursos naturales, como son los bosques, animales, ríos, 
lagos y lagunas. De esta manera, el acceso a sus tierras ancestrales y al uso y disfrute de 
los recursos que en ellas se encuentran está directamente vinculado con la obtención de 
alimento y el acceso a agua limpia. 
In the same case, the Court analyzed the special cultural, ecological and 
religious relationship between indigenous communities and their lands, 
according to which Nature and human beings are equal parts of the same 
ecosystem, and their respective existence is interrelated, so that land can-
not be perceived as individual property but as a collective interest, or maybe, 
in Western words, as common.37 This anthropological study was also based 
on the concepto the Court had requested from the Departamento de Antro-
pología de la Universidad de Los Andes. In that report, the difference be-
tween the use of “tierra” and “territorio”, with respect to Western legal tradi-
tion, is well underlined:
Para las comunidades étnicas el territorio no es lo mismo que la tierra. Esa distinción, 
entre “tierra” y “territorio”, que en Colombia es un principio heredado del movimiento 
indígena, ha sido retomada por el movimiento campesino en los últimos años. Si la tierra 
es una cosa que se posee y se puede comprar y vender, el territorio es inalienable. Pero no 
porque tenga una condición jurídica particular, sino porque se trata menos de una cosa y 
mas de una relación. El territorio es el espacio de la vida cotidiana, y por eso en él se con-
centran el sentido del presente, la memoria del pasado y la intuición del futuro. Es conti-
nuo y discontinuo a la vez, y es siempre colectivo. Además, por tratarse de un decantado de 
relaciones sociales, trasciende a las relaciones con los congéneres, e incluye las relaciones 
37  “6.3. Como complemento de lo anterior debe agregarse que la Corte Constitucio-
nal, en reiterada jurisprudencia, ha reconocido que los pueblos indígenas, tribales y afro-
colombianos tienen un concepto del territorio y de la naturaleza que resulta ajeno a los 
cánones jurídicos de la cultura occidental150. Para estas comunidades, como se ha visto, 
el territorio -y sus recursos- está íntimamente ligado a su existencia y supervivencia desde 
el punto de vista religioso, político, social, económico e incluso hasta lúdico; por lo que 
no constituye un objeto de dominio sino un elemento esencial de los ecosistemas y de la 
biodiversidad con los que interactúan cotidianamente (v.gr. ríos y bosques). Es por ello 
que para las comunidades étnicas el territorio no recae sobre un solo individuo -como se 
entiende bajo la concepción clásica del derecho privado- sino sobre todo el grupo humano 
que lo habita, de modo que adquiere un carácter eminentemente colectivo”. Judgement 
T-622 of the 10th November 2016, the Constitutional Court (Sala sexta).
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con el entorno, con otros seres vivos, con seres del pasado y del futuro, y también con los 
seres espirituales (footnote 322 of the judgement).
4. Concluding remarks
The constitutional cycle of the new Latin American (or Andean) consti-
tutionalism has introduced many innovations to the legal systems of those 
countries, starting with the idea of nature as a legal entity. In a broader per-
spective, we have detected a legal trend, particularly in countries of the so-
called Global South, towards the inclusion of indigenous cosmovisions among 
the philosophical bases of their respective legal systems. The main fields of 
law influenced by this intercultural legal approach are property rights con-
cerning land, limitations to the economic exploitation of natural resources, 
and a new legal framework for the relationship between human beings and 
the environment. Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia seem to foster a shift from 
an anthropocentric to an eco-centric legal paradigm, that implies alternative 
forms of property and economic development. 
However, the gap between formal law and the substantial enforcement 
of these legal innovations remains quite evident in those same countries38. 
The implementation of the rights of nature is very limited and controversial; 
collective properties are recognized only in some indigenous communities, 
many of which are still fighting for their rights on their own land, and too 
often they are expropriated of their right to decide on the use of the natural 
resources of their territories. Finally, the economic system of these countries 
has remained essentially extractivist, based on the extensive exploitation of 
renewable and non-renewable natural resources.39 This contradiction is quite 
evident, even in the law: for instance, Bolivian Act no. 300 of 2012, on the one 
hand defines buen vivir as an alternative vision to capitalism, based on the 
indigenous harmonious and respectful relationship with Mother Earth (chap-
ter 1); on the other hand, it lists, among the State obligations, to industrialize 
natural resources in the framework of vivir bien, an objective that is total-
ly incompatible with that same cosmovision (art. 10.6); again, it allows the 
38  De Castro, Hogenboom, Baud 2016, p. 8; Andrade A. 2016, p. 131 (“The Bolivian 
and Ecuadorian experiences show that although new forms of regulating the exploitation 
and use (income) of natural resources can be created, they have prioritized the preserva-
tion of the states’ access to income and, by implication, of the extractivist activities them-
selves”).
39  Gudynas 2015; Martinez-Alier, Walter 2016, p. 58-85.
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exploitation of non-renewable resources and an extractivist economy under 
the precautionary principle (art. 15.3); and it allows oil and mining activities, 
simply requiring that they must be developed with the least environmental 
and social damage (art. 26).40 
Despite certain major contradictions,41 the constitutionalizing of indige-
nous culture has produced at least two main results.
In Latin America, after centuries of oppression, discrimination and assim-
ilationist policies, indigenous peoples have been able to regain their dignity, 
to become the subjects of rights, and to generate an intercultural discourse 
with State institutions and within the society.
In the Western world, this new legal trend has the merit of revitalizing 
reflections on alternative legal paradigms concerning property law, environ-
mental justice, and the economic system. 
In the field of property law, bridging Western and indigenous knowledge 
could help to develop the legal paradigm of the Commons. Communitarian 
indigenous practices could be compared with local experiments of the com-
mon management of “goods”, such as water, in Western countries. Studying 
the indigenous world view as a legal formant should make it easier for West-
ern legal culture to accept the possibility of other forms of relationship be-
tween men and other living or natural entities. Indigenous cosmovision does 
not recognize property as an absolute right, particularly if applied to land 
and natural resources. For instance, in Australia, the relationship between 
Aborigines and land has been described in the following terms:
The concept of ownership in this legal system is not one of right and entitlement as 
in the Anglo-Australian legal system, but custodial. The relationship between people and 
place is not proprietary in the sense of the land being subordinate or irrelevant to the 
owner, rather the land is regarded as the source of life and law. ‘Country is central to the 
identity of an Aboriginal person, providing physical, cultural and spiritual nourishment’. 
The emphasis in Indigenous land laws on responsibility to ‘look after our home country 
and protect it’ is indicative not only of a different construction of the idea of property and 
ownership to the dominant paradigm of rights-based property, but also indicates a differ-
ent worldview.42 
40  All this corresponds to specific constitutional rules (see Part IV, Title II. Environ-
ment, natural resources, land and territory, art. 342 ff.).
41  Some scholars consider that Earth Jurisprudence can only flourish if property 
rights are constrained and if we reach a new eco-society that is not ruled by capital: Solón 
2017, p. 156.
42  Graham 2011, p. 311. And again “Eualeyai Elder, Paul Behrendt, employed the 
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Following this description, property, at least with respect to some specific 
goods that possess a cultural value or that are essential to the sustainability 
of human life, should not be considered as a set of rights, but as a relation of 
responsibility. This perspective would contribute to the sterilization of many 
environmental conflicts. Environmental justice should be concerned with 
measuring the scope of each party’s responsibility, and not the hierarchy be-
tween competing rights and interests.
On the subject of environmental law, a new interest in Earth Jurispru-
dence and ecological law has flourished in the last decade among legal schol-
ars, and the United Nations have also given attention to this subject-mat-
ter, creating the Harmony with Nature Programme. This different approach 
would encourage lawyers and legal scholars not to consider Nature and the 
Earth in terms of “goods” and “resources”, but, instead, to see all the natural 
elements and beings as a harmonious part of a living ecosystem. Despite the 
adherence to the Gaia theory of James Lovelock, or to the Jurisprudence of 
the Earth of Thomas Berry, only a long walk to freedom from the tyranny of 
the economic and capitalist vocabulary of “resources”, both applied to human 
relationships and to our environment, will allow us to build a peaceful, har-
monious and prosperous society. 
Studying and disseminating these different legal formants is a way to con-
tribute to a global movement that, together with the warning of scientists on 
climate change, and of social and environmental advocacy campaigns sup-
ported by the society at large, is trying to influence policy makers at all levels, 
in order to take concrete actions to solve the global ecological crisis that is 
threatening the survival of our own species.43 
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THE “TRASCRIZIONE” SYSTEM IN ITALY
FROM THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO
THE PROMULGATION OF THE CIVIL CODE (1942)
Alan Sandonà
Given its instrumental nature and the intrinsic high degree of technicality, 
the “trascrizione” system would appear, at first glance, to attract the interest 
of “practical” jurists or, in any case, positive law cultists.
Upon delving slightly deeper, it becomes clear, however, that this is a cru-
cial pillar of the legal system, around which top-priority judicial and econom-
ic issues crystallise.1 
The effects of the system for the public disclosure of transfers and prop-
erty rights2 to which the “trascrizione” belongs, extend beyond inter-private 
relationships (between contracting parties and vis-à-vis third parties). Not 
only is it relevant in relations with the mortgage and land register system, but 
it is also of significant interest to the national economy, especially in terms 
of credit certainty (not only in terms of land credit), and consequent growth.
The certainty of immovable property purchases and the possibility to ef-
fortlessly provide proof of rights and encumbrances pertaining to properties 
are prerequisites for an efficient credit system, guaranteeing the safe use of 
capital on the one hand and rapid debt recovery in the event of default on the 
other hand. The fact that these conditions can be ensured by an efficient pub-
lic disclosure system makes it easy to understand why it is such an essential 
part of any legal system.
The study of the immovable property public disclosure in a legal system 
and the reform proposals arising therefrom reveals much about its founding 
principles, internal tensions, the essence of the society of which the system is 
an expression. 
Unsurprisingly, the topic has since returned to the limelight. The econom-
1  Petrelli 2014, p. 103 ff.
2  Every use, in the context of this paper, of the term “property” (also in variants “real 
property”, “immoveable property”, “ownership”) alludes to the juridical institution of the 
“proprietà” of the civil law tradition (area in which the property is understood as an ab-
stract right over an asset, including the right to dispose of it and enjoy it, directly or in-
directly) and not to the corresponding technical-legal terms of the law of property, that 




ic crisis which has struck Europe (and beyond) since 20083 has determined 
a significant rise in non-fulfilment and insolvency. There has been a conse-
quential rise in the number of immovable property expropriation procedures. 
The Italian legislator has attempted to rectify on a number of fronts, 4 de-
spite never extending its efforts to the realm of public disclosure. An updated 
reflection on the “trascrizione” thus acquires new operative meanings, sub-
jecting the regulatory framework to a veritable stress test, which can reveal its 
strengths and weaknesses.5
Hence the interest in studying it from a historical and judicial perspec-
tive,6 especially by focusing the investigation on the period spanning the late 
19th century and the promulgation of the 1942 Civil Code (currently in force), 
which is crucial for the Italian legal system.
The “trascrizione”, in its materiality, is a mere formality:7 it is the entry in 
chronological order of a deed pertaining to real property rights in a register 
ordered on a personal basis. Depending on the deed requiring registration, 
the nature of the register in which it is entered and the effect which the system 
attributes to the fulfilment of the formality at hand (constitutive,8 declarative9 
3  Particular reference is made to the repercussions on the real economy generated by 
the financial crisis caused by the speculative bubble over subprime loans, which began in 
the United States in 2006 and subsequently infected Europe.
4  Ranging from reforms of (or affecting) the executive process (cf. Act no. 69 of 18 
June 2009, Act no. 3 of 27 January 2012, art. 1, subsection 20, Act no. 228 of 24 December 
2012, Legislative Decree no. 132 of 12 September 2014, converted with amendments into 
Act no. 162 of 10 November 2014; Legislative Decree no. 83 of 27 June 2015, converted 
with amendments into Act no. 132 of 6 August 2015) to the promulgation of the Code of 
Business Crisis and Insolvency (Legislative Decree no. 14 of 12 January 2019).
5  In 2012 these premises led the National Council of Notaries to prepare an interest-
ing project for the reform of the Italian immovable property publicity system. Cf. Consiglio 
Nazionale Notarile 2012.
6  Numerous authors have focused, in historical prospective, on immovable property 
publicity system. These include Besson 1891; Luzzati 1889; Magnin 1896; Coviello 1907, 
p. 47ff; Regnault 1929; Colorni 1954; Pugliatti 1956, Liberati 1995, Petrelli 2007, 2009.
7  The issue of the qualification of “trascrizione” as a mere formality or a veritable 
“law system” is of paramount importance in determining its nature and function. Cf. Va-
dala-Papale 1885, p. 8.
8  “Constitutive” publicity is required for the completion of a deed. Therefore, if it is 
omitted, the deed is null and void and fails to generate effects between parties or vis-à-vis 
third parties. 
9  “Declarative” publicity renders facts or legal deeds enforceable against third parties, 
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or informative disclosure10), the nature and function of this system may man-
ifest, and historically has manifested, heterogeneous characters. 
Usually, the origin of this system is identified in French Republican law, 11 
Brumaire, year VII (1 November 1798) “sur le régime hypothécaire”.11
Pursuant to this law and drawing inspiration from “coutumes de nantisse-
ment” (in force during the pre-revolutionary period in north France and Bel-
gium), which envisaged the transcription of immovable property deeds in a 
public register, the revolutionary legislator forcedly compared the fulfilment 
of this formality to Roman traditio and considered the registration a condi-
tion of essence in transfers to third parties. 
Whether the transcription, under the Brumaire Law, was actually effec-
tive, or held constitutive disclosure value for all, including inter partes, is a 
controversial issue.12 I personally believe there are valid reasons to support 
the affirmative thesis.13 This leads me to post-date the “modern” origin of the 
“trascrizione” system and identify a strong discontinuity between revolution-
ary legislation and legislation established by the 1804 Code Civil.14
The Napoleonic codifier embraced the natural law’s idea, which postulated 
regardless of whether third parties are effectively aware thereof. Its omission prevents the 
deed from generating legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, though it does not render the 
deed null and void.
10  “Informative” publicity (or public notice) refers to a fulfilment limited to the mere 
disclosure of certain deeds or events to anyone with an interest to this effect, the omission 
of which would not prevent said deeds or facts from producing legal effects or rendering 
them null and void. All this without prejudice to any sanctions which may be incurred for 
the omission of the formality. 
11  Cf. Loi sur le régime hypothécaire 1798.
12  Pugliatti 1956, p. 151 is doubtful, especially on p. 151, notes 728, 729; it is altogether 
excluded by the following: Coviello 1907, p. 45 and Petrelli 2009, p. 693 s., id. 2007. p. 591; 
this is acknowledged by Roggero 2013, p. 176 ff., note 2.
13  Cf. Sandonà 2011, p. 368. Also on the basis of what was stated by Merlin 1812, p. 
466 ff., and in light of the broad sense of symbolic traditio attributable to various formal-
ities pertaining to the framework of devoirs des lois, I believe it is can be sustained that 
said formalities determined the transfer of dominion not only with respect to third parties. 
For this interpretation, see also cf. Rapport Leliévre, readable in Nouvelle loi sur le régime 
hypothécaire 1851, p. 105 f.
14  This discontinuity was also supported by the embarrassment of commentators of 
the Code and jurisprudence itself in tackling the problems of inter-temporal law pertain-
ing to sales which were not registered according to Brumaire law. Cf. Duvergier 1835, p. 
19 ff., note 4.
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the elevation of private will to legislative canon.15 Admitting that property in 
general “s’acquiert et se transmet…par l’effet des obligations”,16 the obliga-
tion of delivering the thing should occur “par le seul consentement des par-
ties contractantes” and established the creditor as “propriétaire …encore que 
la tradition n’en ait point été faite”.17 
However, the introduction of the consensual principle18 was incompatible 
with the function ascribed to the formality of “trascrizione” in the Brumaire 
system. This explains the capitis deminutio suffered by “trascrizione” – rel-
egated to mere formal requirement for mortgage redemption purposes only 
– in the Napoleonic system.19 From another point of view, the cult of the indi-
vidual and their “will” required particular emphasis to be placed on the inter-
nal aspect of legal relations, relegating third-party interest to second place as 
well as, in a certain sense, that of the public disclosure of legal transactions. 
In countries subjected to French legal influence, with some exceptions,20 
the Napoleonic system of publicity was largely carried over into the age of 
the Restoration, with the transcription reduced to a mere appendage of the 
mortgage system.21
It wasn’t until the mid-nineteenth century, with the reinterpretation pro-
vided by the Belgian law of 16 December 1851 22 and the French law of 23 
March 1855,23 that the “trascrizione” system took on its modern connotation 
and autonomous dignity.24 
Hence the affirmation of a system whose legal ratio was to provide the 
15  Cf. Cavanna 2005, p. 579ff.; Birocchi 1990, p. 654ff.; Dezza 2000, p. 77.
16  Cf. Art. 711 Code civil 1804.
17  Cf. Art. 1138 ibidem.
18  For a recent, detailed and in-depth analysis of the historic emergence of the con-
sensual principle in the context of general contract theory, cf. De Cores Helguera 2017. 
19  Cf. Sandonà 2011, p. 373ff.
20  For example, in the Grand Duchy of Baden (cf. Kaspers 1972, p. 152) and in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Cf. art. 671, Burgerlijk wetboek 1837), the principle of the 
real effectiveness of transcription was restated: property rights and rights of lien were only 
acquired by fulfilling this formality. 
21  The codes and special legislation of pre-unified Italy, especially those of the Es-
tense states and the Papal States were no strangers to innovations with respect to the 
French model. Roggero 2013, p. 193-219.
22  Cf. Nouvelle loi sur le régime hypothécaire 1851.
23  Loi sur la transcription en matière hypothécaire 1855.
24  Cf. Sandonà 2011, p. 387-385.
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legal system with a mechanism designed to resolve intersubjective conflicts 
generated by claims of contrasting rights on the same property. These con-
flicts were the result by a system of transfer of immovable assets, which was 
based on the provisions of art. 1138 of the Code Napoléon, and was justified 
in economic terms with the purpose of facilitating and stimulating mortgage 
loans, but whose main function was a declarative public disclosure. 
With these characteristics, the “trascrizione” was transposed into the first 
Italian Civil Code in 1865.25
From the standpoint of coeval liberal doctrine of law, tributary of the 
school of exegesis,26 the codified regulations were deemed to be in line with 
the times and well-formulated.27
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the science of law began defining 
the protection of third party rights as a concept laden with social significance, 
in terms of protection of both individuals and public economy linked to se-
cure private trading, and began invoking reforms to the rules governing the 
system.28
Criticisms towards title XXII of the Pisanelli Code,29 excluding the most 
radical ones,30 were quantitative and qualitative in nature. The limitation of 
deeds and requests subject to transcription was deemed arbitrary, illogical and 
prevented the reconstruction of the legal history of an asset, generating un-
certainty as to the claim and challenge to good title perspectives. The protec-
tion of third-party rights in good faith was not absolute, as in the case of the 
resolution of the registrant’s right of the assignor. Registration was a burden 
whose omission was not sanctioned. Overall, the system did not enable the full 
25  Cf. Codice civile 1865, Title XXII (articles 1932-1947).
26  Grossi 2002, p. 12.
27  Cf. Pacifici Mazzoni 1874, p. 122 and 207 ff..; Foschini 1867, p. 631 ss. Cf. also Re-
lazione sul progetto del terzo libro del codice civile in Gianzana 1887, I, p. 331ff. .
28  Cf. Gianturco 1890; Luzzatti 1891, Id. 1886; Frola 1888, p. 55. In the late seventies 
and the early eighties there was a significant shift in cultural convictions and methods. Cf. 
Cazzetta 2011, p. 46; Aquarone 1960, p. 51.
29  For a general overview on criticism of the system cf. Luzzati 1889, Bianchi 1877, 
passim.; Lozzi 1879, p. 217ff.; Vita 1880, IV, p. 14ff.; Vadala-Papale 1885; Gabba 1909, p. 
23; Mirabelli 1889, p. 88; Simoncelli 1892, IV, p. 257ff.; Salvioli 1894, p. 196-236. 
30  Vadalà-Papale even stated that the “trascrizione” system, due to the very fact that 
it constitutes a derogation of the consensual principle, was “amorphous, hybrid, dissatis-
fying” and anyone looking to prolong its existence would have to “bleed themselves dry”. 
Cf. Vadalà-Papale 1885, p. 8.
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reconstruction of the series of immovable property “transfers” and belittle the 
general disclosure function the system had since come to be expected to fulfil.
The practical consequences were significant, in both law system’s consis-
tency and economic and social terms: the uncertainty of the proof of domains 
and therefore, frequent legal disputes, and the lack of mortgage loan guaran-
tees and therefore a reluctance to invest in immovable property, especially 
land investments. “Classical” critical issues related to immovable property 
publicity, whose solution was perceived as urgent.
The very circumstance that the aforementioned defects were particular-
ly felt on occasion of the debate on mortgage loan laws was further proof 
that general exhortations for a reform of the public disclosure system was not 
merely doctrinal complaints but rather real life requirements.31
In the early years of the 20th century, these inconveniences increasingly 
attracted the attention of jurists and statesmen who strove to study and im-
plement suitable remedies.
Many of the most critical jurists were members of the parliament. There-
fore the “trascrizione” reform was included in the legislator’s agenda, and in 
November 190232 a commission was established to study amendments to this 
effect.33
Inspired by the Darlan project (a bill presented to the French Senate on 
27 October 1896),34 indeed Emanuele Gianturco and Vincenzo Simoncelli35 
31  Cf. Ministerial report on the government project by Luzzatti (Treasury Minister) 
Ronchetti (Ministry of Grace, Finance, Ecclesiastical Affairs), Rava (Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Industry and Trade), Majorana (Minister of Finances) to relieve mortgage loans, 
redeem rentals and other duties on properties and facilitate the formation of small prop-
erties (09.02.1905 - 26.06.1906). Cf. ASCD, Archivio della Camera Regia (1848 – 1943); 
Disegni e proposte di legge e incarti delle commissioni (1848-1943), vol. 818. It contains 
the decree of presentation; minutes of the special eleven-member Commission; corre-
spondence and working papers of the Commission; reports and text of the Commission; 
text of proponents presented at the second reading on 8 June 1905, amended by the Com-
mission (no. 116 B); list of deputies registered for plenary discussion; result of plenary 
voting. Approved at the session held on 26 June 1906.
32  Cf. R.D. 30 November 1902.
33  Commissioners worthy of mention are Ippolito Luzzatti and Francesco Filomusi 
Guelfi, who presented autonomous bill drafts on the “trascrizione”, but only the one sub-
mitted by Filomusi was approved by the Commission.
34  Cf. De Loynes 1897, p. 245.
35  Cf. Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Annali del Credito e della Pre-
videnza, 1909, p. 216 ff.
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appear to have contributed to its preparation, the commission elaborated a 
bill for the reform of the “trascrizione” (the so-called Filomusi project). It was 
presented to the Chamber of Deputies on 9 February 1905 within the frame-
work (articles 1-18) of the bill for the approval of “provisions for the relief 
of mortgage loans, the redemption of rent and other duties on properties 
and facilitation of the formation of small properties” (Acts of the Chamber 
of Deputies, session 1904-1905, no. 116), discussed in March and April 1906 
based on the Gianturco report, and finally approved by the assembly,36 but it 
was then nullified due to the closure of the session.37 
The project reflected the French-Belgian system and limited itself to in-
creasing the number of cases subject to transcription. Therefore it failed to 
satisfy the desiderata of legal theory, which also dismissed it as devoid of 
harmony, and was heavily criticised mainly by Giacomo Venezian, Nicola 
Coviello38 and Tommaso Mosca. 39
The rejection of the Filomusi project led Gianturco, who had played a sig-
nificant role in the initiative, to prepare his own project which was presented 
to the Chamber of Deputies on 8 June 1905.40 
The project faithfully replicated articles 1932, 1933 and 1934 of the 
Pisanelli Code, as well as provisions of law on “methods” of registration and 
deeds subject to transcription, but adding to it mortis causa deeds (wills and 
testamentary dispositions), dowry deeds consisting of real rights on immov-
able property and mortgage loans, deeds and interruptive applications for the 
prescription of real rights on immovable.41 Notaries were required to register 
any stipulated deeds, but only if requested by the party and upon advance 
payment of registration fees. This undermined the law’s effectiveness.
36  Cf. Gianturco 1909.
37  Cf. A. Ascoli, Discorso inaugurale pavese e riforma del Codice civile, reproduced 
in Bonini 1996, p. 212.
38  On the life and work of Nicola Coviello, cf. Carnelutti 1913, p. 730; Ascoli 1913, p. 
499; Martone 1984; Grossi 1998, p. 409 ff.
39  Cf. Venezian 1905, p. 111ff.; Coviello 1905, p. 9-10; Mosca 1905.
40  Cf. Gianturco 1896 and for a more extensive analysis of the author’s thoughts, cf. 
Id. 1890. In this work the author examines general principles on the subject and the Ger-
man disclosure system, which at the time was unknown in Italy. 
41  The project listed claims, inheritance claim action, the action of releasing bound 
property, the division, reduction of testamentary provisions and donations, the nullity, 
revocation of ineffectiveness of a testament or testamentary provision, the nullity or reso-
lution of a contract establishing or transferring immovable property rights.
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From a functional point of view, the project did not departed from the con-
cept of registration for mere declarative public disclosure purposes.
It was heavily criticised on the grounds of its inorganic nature,42 but it 
was literally reproduced in the Civil Code for the Eritrean colony promulgated 
with Italian Royal Decree of 28 June 1909.43
The last of the pre-war projects presented and discussed was though out 
by Vittorio Scialoja in 1910.44 Although during works on colonial legislation, 
the Turin-born Romanist had supported Gianturco’s proposals in form and 
substance and when he presented his own bill (perhaps as a tribute to his 
colleague who had died a few years earlier45) he had declared himself a trib-
utary of those, the only element both projects had in common was that they 
were faithful to tradition, in order to prevent “dangerous imitation of foreign 
public disclosure systems”, such as the Australian registration system (Tor-
rens Act) and the Austrian one of grundbuch.46 The implementation of these 
systems was recognised impossible due to technical and financial difficulties 
linked to the need for a radical overhaul of the land registry system. Clearly 
there were difficulties, but Scialoja’s preference for a policy based on Franco-
phile law could have had an influence.47 
As for its contents, the project increased the number of inter-vivos deeds 
and cases subject to “trascrizione”, improved regulations on the effects of 
registration,48 required notaries to ask the contract parties whether they 
wished to register the deed and, in the affirmative case, pay the relevant fees 
42  Cf. Luzzati 1889, p. 160, note 2.
43  Cf. This Code, published and promulgated with R.D. of 28 June 1909 addresses 
transcription in tit. XXVI of book III, articles 1973-2003.
44  Cf., Atti parlamentari 1910. Cf. Venezian 1910, p. 509f..; Ferrara 1910, p. 468; Ga-
lateria 1937, p. 105ff. 
45  Emanuele Gianturco died on 10 November 1907.
46  Cf. Scialoja 1933, p. 58.
47  Mr. Scialoja played a major role in the Italo-French Code of obligations and con-
tracts project. For an overview of doctrinal comments on the project, cf. Istituto di studi 
legislativi 1939. Now also published in Alpa – Chiodi 2007, p. 677ff.. Cf. Vassalli 1960a, p. 
520ff.; Betti 1929, p. 665-668; Betti 1930, p. 184-189.
48  It included, among other things, the transfer of assets to benefiting heir’s creditors 
and legatees (clearly when the inheritance included immovable goods), deeds under which 
the dominus emphyteuseos obtained devolution, or the emphyteuta was released from 
the land granted on perpetual lease, as well as deeds covering the endowment made by a 
woman in favour of herself.
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in advance.49 It also provided for the registration of purchases mortis causa,50 
with the aim of reconstructing the chain of transfers and enabling those who 
in good faith had registered a mortis causa purchase to benefit from ten-year 
usucaption.51 The principle of authenticity was also strengthened, according 
to which the formality could only be fulfilled by means of a public deed, or an 
authenticated or legalized private agreement.52
In functional terms, Scajola underlined how his system aimed not only 
at providing criteria for the prevalence of one among several equally valid 
ownership titles, it also achieving “in un non lontano avvenire, la completa 
pubblicità di tutti i trasferimenti immobiliari”” …ordering “che la pubbli-
cazione di ogni acquisto [fosse] subordinata all’accertamento della pubbli-
cazione del diritto dell’autore”.53 Indeed, a broader disclosure function also 
emerged from the decision to order the publicity of provisions affecting the 
owner’s legal capacity to transfer title to the property (in cases of incapacita-
tion or disqualification and bankruptcy). This made it possible to transcend 
the inconsistent public disclosure system in force at the time regarding inca-
pacitation or disqualification rulings and centred around magistrate’s court 
registers; a system envisaging partial and misleading publicity.
The fact that the project also required the “trascrizione” of deeds inter-
rupting prescription and established the compulsory nature of placing a note 
in the margin of the mortgage entry in the event of transfer of the lien for 
disposal, subrogation, deferment of degree and endowment of secured credit, 
which resulted at the end in a clear vocation of third party protection. 
Despite this project did not aim at establishing a “civil state” of immovable 
property and therefore not striving to reproduce the so-called German system 
(indeed registration wasn’t still an obligation), it functionally departed from 
the “trascrizione” envisaged by the Pisanelli code. With the aim of gathering 
information on the legal condition of each land property, by improving the 
mortgage registration system, the project gave the system a prevailing gener-
al publicity function.
The promoter’s authority and the general appreciation expressed within 
the parliament54 were not sufficient for the approval of this project either.
49  Cf. art. 33 of the project.
50  Cf. art. 8 Scialoja project.
51  Cf. art. 8, last paragraph, Scialoja project.
52  Cf. art. 19 Scialoja project.
53  Cf. Senato del Regno 1913, p. 8.
54  In parliamentary terms, the project was defined as “the most acute, the most bal-
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The war contingencies of the period spanning 1916-18 and the granting of 
full legislative powers to the Government contributed to convert the reform 
proposals55 into law.
With Legislative Decree no. 1525 of 9 November 1916, schedule “H” main-
ly stipulated56 the registration of property division deeds. Notaries or other 
notarising or authenticating public officials were required to register within 
one month of the deed date, and the obligation was applied to court registrars 
in the case of judgements and other measures subject to registration. Lastly, a 
sanctioning system was put in place in the event of omission.57 Legislative De-
cree no. 575 of 21 April 1918, integrating the Consolidation Act on mortgage 
taxes, approved by Legislative Decree no. 135 of 6 January 1918, introduced 
further changes to the rules. More specifically, whereas art. 18 of the Consoli-
dation Act stipulated that notarising or authenticating public officials were re-
quired to register within ninety days of the deed date, art. 19 established that 
the registrars are required to fulfil the obligation to register the deed within 
thirty days of the recording of judgements or the filing of petitions at court 
and registration. Article 4 of Legislative Decree no. 575/1918 summarised the 
list of new cases subject to registration and Royal Law Decree no. 2163 of 24 
November 1919, schedule “E”,58 article 2, established the compulsory nature 
of certificates of reported succession pertaining to legitimate successions, in-
cluding immovable assets or rights, establishing the relevant conditions and 
procedures. This obligation was later extended59 to testamentary successions, 
in replacement of the compulsory registration of testaments set forth in art. 
6 of Royal Decree no. 1802 of 20 August 1923. Subsequent amendments of a 
procedural nature were introduced by Royal Decree no. 2772 of 23 December 
1923.60
The statutory relevance of the registrations ordered by these interven-
anced and best suited”, to the circumstances of the time, cf. Rossi 1923. p. 43; cf. Ministero 
della giustizia e degli affari di culto 1925, Annex no. 1, Sub-committee report on amend-
ments to the Civil Code p. 69.
55  Albeit in the substantive terms of the mere extension of cases subject to registra-
tion.
56  Effective from 1 January 1917.
57  Cf. articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Legislative Decree no. 1525 of 9 November 1916 schedule 
“H”.
58  Effective from 1 January 1920.
59  Effective from 24 August 1923.
60  Valid for successions for which taxes had been paid effective from 1 January 1924. 
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tions, incorporated in tax measures justified by budgetary requirement, was 
questioned.61
However, since 1931 the Supreme Court of Cassation established that dis-
closure achieved through registration undoubtedly held statutory purposes 
and effects.62 
In fact, this extended the scope of application of public disclosure; requir-
ing the compulsory intervention of public officials to guarantee the fulfilment 
of formalities; strengthening the principle of authenticity and reducing the 
hypothesis of nullity, to the benefit of the certainty of the law; creating - via 
the registration of purchases mortis causa and property divisions – the pre-
requisites for the introduction of the principle of continuity of public disclo-
sure formalities, the aforementioned measures, as summarised and coordi-
nated in articles 17 to 23 of the Consolidation Act on mortgage registration 
fees under Royal Decree no. 3272 of 20 November 1923,63 highlighted new 
disclosure purposes of the “trascrizione” system.
The above purposes had since come to transcend the interests of private 
contracting parties as well as the general interest of good functioning of im-
movable property trading and credit. 
At the end of the First World War, Italy had to tackle the issue of judicial 
unification with Trentino and Venezia Giulia provinces that were annexed as 
a result of the conflict and subject to the grundbuch system.64 These circum-
stances were the occasion for further reflection, mostly by Commissions and 
ministerial committees set up to study the issues of demobilisation and legis-
lative unification65, on the opportunity to reform the Italian publicity system 
which, compared to the germanic one, was generally considered to be inferior.
61  Cf. Coviello 1938, cc. 1ff.
62  Cf. Corte di Cassazione 1938, 1931.
63  Cf. Consolidation Act no. 3272 of 30.12.1923 on mortgage registration fees and 
compulsory registrations.
64  On legal problems regarding the annexation of Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Gi-
ulia by the Kingdom of Italy, with particular reference to the immovable property publicity 
system, cf. Fiocchi Malaspina 2013, p. 247-252; Ead, 2014, p. 145-166.
65  The Royal Post-War Commission (established with Lieutenant’s Decree no. 1529, 
16 September 1917) was succeeded by the Commission for the review of war legislation and 
the extension of the laws of the Kingdom to new provinces (established with Royal Decree 
no.1673 of 7 November 1920, which implemented Royal Decree no.1735 of 14 September 
1919), in turn replaced, as stipulated by Royal Decree no. 1038 of 20 July 1922 by a “Tech-
nical committee for legislation regarding the unification of law in new provinces”. 
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During the first two decades of the 20th century, the background on which 
to base a serious reform of the “trascrizione” could be deemed well estab-
lished and the awareness of the need for action had come to maturity.
“Emergency” legislation, together with the Gianturco project, the 1910 
Scialoja bill and various institutions of land register legislation of the “new 
provinces”66 were the starting point of ministerial projects for the reforma-
tion of the “trascrizione” system, within a broader context of Civil Code ren-
ovation work. 
The Scialoja project in particular was completed by the Postwar Commis-
sion, which integrated it in light of observations expressed by Coviello in the 
second edition of his monographic work dedicated to the “trascrizione” sys-
tem.67 
With law dated 30.12.1923, the Government was entrusted with the 
amendment of the provisions of registration laws.68 
For the Chamber of Deputies’ parliamentary sub-committee69 entrusted 
with reporting on the bill for the reform and publication of new codes, the 
superiority of the land register system adopted in Germanic countries over 
the “Latin” system was obvious and the abstractly better choice would have 
been to unify the legislation of the new and the old provinces, extending the 
Austrian system to the latter. The structural deficiency of the cadastral system 
in force in most of Italy would have made this choice inapplicable.
On the basis of these considerations, so as “not to remove the best when-
ever the best may prevail” the Commission proposed to maintain both sys-
66  On the basis of the premise that new provinces would maintain property registers, 
the possibility of extending the system to old provinces was also considered, but the actual 
condition of the Italian Land Registry, even more so than the condition of the legislation 
upholding it, discouraged the initiative. Indeed, as early as in 1893 a commission estab-
lished by Minister Bonacci was entrusted with the task of carrying out a preliminary feasi-
bility study and issued a negative opinion. 
67  Cf. Scialoja 1933, p. 211; Commissione Reale per il dopo guerra 1920. Coviello’s 
work is the 1914 edition, revised and expanded with the assistance of his brother Leonardo 
and published posthumously in the treatise entitled Il diritto civile italiano secondo la 
dottrina e la giurisprudenza…per cura di Pasquale Fiore, Turin, 1914. Cf. also Cf. Minis-
tero della giustizia e degli affari di culto 1925 (Report (to the Senate = by Sub-committee I. 
on amendments to the Civil Code), p. 305
68  Cf. Art. 1, paragraph no. 1 of Law no. 2814 of 30 December 1923 in the Official 
Gazette no. 6 of 8 January 1924.
69  Sub-committee I, consisting of Rossi, Riccio, Ferri, Janfolla, Rosadi, Degni.
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tems,70 but to establish that “registration becomes an element of essence in 
the acquisition of property at all levels, including between contracting par-
ties”.71 
In order to face off probable criticisms of a provision for unification which 
did not unify in the slightest, the commission also stated that “rather than 
two substantially different systems, these are two different ways of guaran-
teeing the law”.72
A hardly convincing argument, albeit underpinned by a major prerequi-
site. The conviction was that registration was, in functional terms, something 
more than a mere criteria for the selection of purchasers from the same as-
signor and represented a device of the objective right rather than the subjec-
tive right, thus acquiring full public disclosure relevance.
The Senatorial Commission,73 appointed to express an opinion on the bill, 
limited itself to underlining the “unthinkability” of introducing the land reg-
istry system in old provinces and the opportunity of reforming the subject 
matter.
Once the delegated law was approved, in 1924 Sub-committee I of the 
Royal Commission for the reform of codes was entrusted with all matters per-
taining to “trascrizione” system.
As a result of the coordination of the Scialoja project, the Pisanelli Code 
70  The speaker Luigi Rossi expressed an extremely interesting suggestion “on a per-
sonal basis” for the introduction of the Austrian grundbuch system in Italian provinces 
where the cadastral system was most perfect. Specifically, he proposed to establish a reg-
ister at each mortgage register office in which to record, for each cadastral map (hence 
on a real basis), transcriptions, inscriptions and annotations of property rights referred 
to in the map. He also proposed to report the formalities presented to the land register 
map section holder and the holders of the relevant property rights, whenever their assent 
was not already provided in a public deed, authenticated or legally recognised deed under 
private seal. He suggested that the entry or transcription of a property right in the register 
should infer the existence of the right and deletion should infer prescription and that there 
should be a legal assumption of exactness of register entries regarding both the owner 
and the property. He also proposed that relevant rights should be deemed as acquired by 
usucaption after 5 years of entry in the register and any registrations and entries could be 
opposed by the court via a summary procedure.
71  Cf. Ministero della giustizia e degli affari di culto 1925 (Report by Sub-committee I. 
on amendments to the Civil Code), p. 70.
 Albeit in the substantive terms of the mere extension of cases subject to transcription.
72  Cf. ibidem.
73  Sub-committee I, consisting of Scialoja, Venzi, Calisse, Del Giudice and Polacco.
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and a few other “reform proposals for the “trascrizione” drawn up by Coviel-
lo in October 1924, which provided for the principle of the real effectiveness74 
of registration, a draft was prepared and, subjected to further amendments, 
it formed the text of the first “progetto di legge della trascrizione”, consisting 
of 38 articles75. Vassalli also worked on this project, which was to become title 
V of book II “Cose e diritti reali”, of 1937.76
Instead of a mere criteria of selection of purchasers from the same as-
signor, the “trascrizione” became a constitutive element of the inter partes 
purchase of a property right.
The proposal was radical and introduced a vulnus of historical signifi-
cance to the consensual principle and reduced contracts for the transfer of 
real property rights to merely compulsory contracts, separating titulus from 
modus adquirendi. Nevertheless, the registration continued to be ordered ac-
cording to the “personal” system.
The 1937 project made further amendments to the Pisanelli Code struc-
ture.
The most significant amendment concerned: an increase in deeds subject 
to registration; the requirement of the registration of deeds of a declarative 
nature (division and transaction), and hence effective retroactively, the indi-
rect obligation of the inalienability of immovable acquired mortis cause up 
to the registration of acceptance; the introduction of so-called “pubblicità 
sanante”, which rendered the registered deed unquestionable after 5 years, 
even if vitiated by and resulting from a non domino disposition.
The project was favourably embraced by jurisprudence, with limited ob-
servations on the form and systematics. 
During the Grandi Ministry,77 from 1939 to 1941, Filippo Vassalli was 
mainly entrusted with matters regarding the “trascrizione” system,78 assisted 
by Francesco Ferrara Jr. and Emilio Albertario.79
74  Every use, in the context of this paper, of phrase “real effectiveness” alludes to the 
suitability of the “trascrizione” to determine the transfer of ownership also with respect 
to third parties, which gives the completion of the formality the value of constitutive pub-
licity.
75  This text later came to be identified as the first Coviello project.
76  Cf. Commissione Reale per la riforma dei codici 1937, p. 152.
77  Dino Grandi was appointed as Minister of Justice on 12 July 1939.
78  Cf. AFV, Lib. tutela/1-A9. Vassalli had participated in codification works from the 
outset. Cf. Vassalli 1960b, p. 605.
79  AFV, Lib. tutela/ 1-A10
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Works on this system80 began in November 193981 with a project entitled 
“Della trascrizione”, which was undated (but probably dating back to Sep-
tember 193982), consisting of 27 articles.83
The project developed by the committee was disclosed to some members 
of the Parliamentary Commission, given that in April 1940, the senator Edu-
ardo Piola Caselli, 84 submitted, on request from the Ministry of Finance, a 
few observations to Vassalli, making himself available for further discussion 
and specifying that the title would soon be examined by the parliamentary 
Commission.
Although Vassalli had supported the real effectiveness of the transcrip-
tion formality and underlined the need to duly acknowledge the orientations 
expressed by the Committee regarding Italo-German relations,85 his project, 
which was completed at the end of September 1939, abandoned the proposal 
and attributed the “trascrizione” a mere public disclosure function, despite it 
was extensive and attentive to public interest. 
It is likely that the civil law specialist, who later complained that he “had 
to make and remake the project several times”,86 was required to rethink the 
registration rules immediately and embrace the orientation emerged from 
the Commission of legislative Assemblies, supported by Eduardo Piola Casel-
li, according to whom the transition to real effectiveness had to be considered 
premature, despite the registration should have been imposed with greater 
rigour, in order to guarantee its public disclosure function due to its acquired 
value of public interest and position as a bridge for desirable transition to a 
system which would encompass it within a probative land register. 
Minister Grandi invited the Commission to consider whether the time had 
come to complete the transition towards a reform which would confer ac-
tual effectiveness upon registration.87 According to the Minister of Justice, 
this Reform, which was already anticipated in the provisions contained in the 
80  Title V of the Royal Commission’s project.
81  Cf. Letter dated 21 November 1939 from Stella Richter (on behalf of the Cabinet of 
the Ministry) to Vassalli (AFV, Corr. cod. civ.).
82  Cf. letter from Vassalli to Grandi on 29 September 1939, Rondinone 2003, p. 193.
83  Cf. Rondinone, p. 239f.
84  Cf. ibidem.
85  Cf. Comitato giuridico Italo germanico 1939. On the events of the Italo-German 
committee cf. Somma 2005, p. 431ff.
86  Cf. Vassalli 1960b, p. 627, note 1.
87  Cf. Grandi 1940, p. 2.
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Eritrean88 and Libyan89 land tenure system, as well as the system in force in 
the new Provinces and the provisions pertaining to the transfer of aircraft,90 
would have returned Italian law to its traditional Roman Law directives from 
which it had moved away, under the influence of the Napoleonic Code. 91
Indeed, in the four ministerial drafts of book VI (Tutela dei diritti) con-
taining the title “della trascrizione” and in the text of the Code then promul-
gated, the regulations on the “effetti della trascrizione” made no reference to 
real effectiveness. 
Failure to adopt a constitutive publicity system was one of the main criti-
cisms made by jurisprudence towards the 1942 code. The decision of condi-
tores to resolve in favour of the usucapient any disputes between the latter 
and the assignee, deriving from the previous owner, irrespective of the reg-
istration of the judgement ascertaining the acquisition of the original title,92 
generated uncertainties in purchases. 
This criticism is probably well grounded, provided it is viewed in the teleo-
logical perspective of raising the public disclosure system to the highest level of 
abstract efficiency. It must be considered that rendering the formal entries of a 
register the only true instrument capable of guaranteeing the security of legal 
88  Cfr. R. D. no. 37 of 31 January 1909. 
89  On the Libyan legal system cf. D’Amelio 1912, p. 16ff.; more in general on Italian 
colonial law, cf. Martone 2007.
90  Cf. Title VI, R.D. no. 356 of 11 January 1925.
91  Cf. Padoa Schioppa 2003, p. 495ff.
92  The ‘37 Commission project provided for the trascrizione of applications and jud-
gements for ascertaining usucaption, specifying that remain “sempre salvi i diritti acqui-
stati dai terzi verso il vero proprietario anteriormente alla pubblicazione della domanda 
od eccezione tendente a far dichiarare verificata la prescrizione acquisitiva”” (cf. Art. 
365, Commissione Reale per la riforma dei codici 1937). After all, given the functional-
isation of transcription for public interest and the certainty of the objective right, it was 
consistent to attribute prevalence to the formal knowability as provided in public registers, 
with respect to the de facto relationship with the res.
In the first ministerial drafts of the book “Della tutela dei diritti”, the transcription of 
direct applications for declaring the verification of usucaption was maintained, but the dies 
ad quem of the enforceability of the registrant of registered deeds or deeds entered prior 
to registration was not centred around the fulfilment of formalities, but rather around the 
“verification of usucaption” (cf. art. 11 no. 5, Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia 1940). In the 
last version of the book “Della tutela dei diritti”, the rule on the transcription of usucaption 
applications disappeared and there remained only applications for interruption (art. 10, 
no. 5) and declarative judgements (art. 46).
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circulation was incompatible with the ratio of the usucaption method, which 
consisted of privileging those who actively used the property at hand, compared 
to those who held formal ownership thereof. In a historical context in which the 
need to attribute a “social function”93 to property strongly prevailed, reconcil-
ing the individualistic aspect with requirements expressed by the community, 
the decision made by the conditores appears far from unjustified.94
Returning to the configuration of the “trascrizione” system, which 
emerged from the preparatory work of the Code, considering the extension 
of the number of cases subject to registration, the extension of the range of 
judicial petitions subject to transcription, the resizing of the real retroactivity 
of invalidity and annulment actions, the introduction of so-called “pubblicità 
sanante”,95 the attribution of important statutory effects upon the registra-
tion of mortis causa purchases and the introduction of the principle of con-
tinuity,96 on the one hand, and the notary obligation of registration, the tran-
scending of the legal theory underpinning the conservator’s passive role97 and 
the reinforcement of the principle of authenticity, on the other hand; all this 
within a regulatory context, which required the control by public officials over 
the contracting parties’ capacity and legitimisation and prevented them from 
receiving or authenticating deeds contrary to the law, public order or good 
practice, the movement impressed to the public disclosure system by the new 
code in terms of completeness of immovable property registers is quite clear, 
including the attribution to the registers of a property “civil state” function, 
aimed at generating legal certainty as to the ownership of assets.
93  Purposes were also stated in the Report to the King which accompanied the defin-
itive text of the third book of the Civil Code which states: « la proprietà è riconosciuta e 
protetta perché è considerata come lo strumento più efficace e più utile per la produzi-
one. […] I beni devono essere diretti alla produzione e il proprietario non può impiegarli 
ai fini puramente egoistici, ma deve usarli in modo che producano la propria utilità e 
concorrano al raggiungimento di quei fini unitari» (n. 23). See also Biggini 1939, p. 68.
94  Regardless of practical difficulties, expressed in the Report to the King (no.1066), 
which would have resulted in the adoption of a system modelled on the land registry sys-
tem.
95  That, even if purely subject to the existence of other circumstances (lapse of time, 
good faith, onerousness of the purchase), it also introduced a principle of public trust in 
immovable property registers.
96  This was fundamental for the use of immovable property registers organised on a 
“personal basis”. 
97  With the extension of cases of legitimate refusal of registration.
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Focusing on safe trade protection, viewed as a public interest objective 
instead of protection of the seller and the original owner in view of an increas-
ingly greater public disclosure of events regarding assets and property rights, 
is tangible proof of the upturning of the principles passed down from tradi-
tion. All this, in line with the new role the law has assigned to the protection of 
entrustment and with the public “interest” (also) in private deed regulations, 
within the framework of the conception of the individual, the society, the 
State and their relations that have emerged since the end of the 19th century, 
which were reviewed during the First World War years and were adopted and 
completed by the Fascist government with the 1942 Code.98 
Bibliography
Archives
AFP = Archivio Filippo Vassalli
ASCD = Archivio storico della Camera dei Deputati.
Primary sources
Atti parlamentari 1910 = Atti Parlamentari, Senato del Regno, XXIII Legislatura, 
prima sessione 1909-1910, Documenti, Disegni di legge e relazioni, n. 174, 
Roma, 1910.
Burgerlijk wetboek 1837 = Burgerlijk wetboek. Officiele uitgave, s Gravenhage, 
1837.
Camera dei deputati 1970 = Camera dei Deputati (a cura della), La Costituzione 
della Repubblica nei lavori dell’Assemblea Costituente, II, Sedute dal 17 apri-
le 1947 al 19 maggio 1947, Roma, 1970.
Code civil 1804 = Code civil des Français, Paris, 1804.
Codice civile 1865 = Codice civile del Regno d’Italia, Torino, 1865.
Commissione Reale per il dopo guerra 1920 = Commissione Reale per il dopo 
guerra - Studi e proposte della Prima sottocommissione: presieduta dal sen. 
Vittorio Scialoja: questioni giuridiche, amministrative e sociali: giugno 
1918-giugno 1919, Roma, 1920.
Comitato giuridico Italo germanico 1939 = Comitato giuridico Italo germanico – 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fűr die deutsch-italienischen RechtBeziehungen, Atti del 
Primo convegno (Roma 21-25 giugno 1938), Roma, 1939. 
Commissione Reale per la riforma dei codici 1937 = Commissione Reale per la ri-
98  Cf. Camera dei deputati 1970, p. 1493 f. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
155
forma dei codici, Sottocommissione per Codice civile - Codice civile - Secondo 
libro - Cose e diritti reali, Progetto e relazione, Roma, 1937. 
Corte di Cassazione 1931 = Sentenza della Cassazione Civile 3 marzo 1931, in Re-
pertorio del Foro Italiano, 1931, col. 1570-A.
Corte di Cassazione 1938 = Sentenza della Cassazione civile 28 giugno 1938 n. 
2178, in Massimario della Giurisprudenza italiana contenente tutte le massi-
me della cassazione civile disposte in repertorio alfabetico, 9 (1938), col. 638.
Ministero di Grazie e Giustizia 1940 = Ministero di Grazie e Giustizia, Codice 
civile. Della Tutela dei diritti. Progetto ministeriale, Roma, 1940. 
Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato 2012 = Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato, La 
sicurezza della circolazione giuridica immobiliare. Modifiche legislative in 
materia di pubblicità immobiliare e di successione necessaria, Roma, 2012.
Documents relatifs au régime hypothécaire 1844 = Documents relatifs au régime 
hypothécaire et aux réformes qui ont été proposées publiés par ordre de M. 
Martin (du Nord), Paris, 1844.
Duvergier 1835 = Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglements, 
et avis du Conseil d’Etat … par J. B. Duvergier, XI, Paris, 1835.
Gianzana 1887 = S. Gianzana, Codice civile preceduto dalle relazioni ministeriali 
e senatoria, dalle discussioni parlamentari e dai verbali della commissione 
di coordinamento, colle referenze sotto ogni articolo agli altri codici: al fran-
cese, alla legge romana, nonché a tutti i precedenti legislativi, coll’aggiunta 
delle leggi complementari che si riferiscono al codice civile, Torino, 1887.
Loi sur le régime hypothécaire 1798 = Loi n. 2137 sur le régime hypothécaire du 
11 Brumaire an VII in Bulletin des lois de la République Française, septième 
partie, I.er semestre de l’an VII, Paris, 1798.
Loi sur le règime hypothécaire 1851 = Nouvelle loi sur le règime hypothécaire, 
accompagnèe de tous les documents officiels relatifs a la loi, Brussels, 1851.
Loi sur la transcription en matiere hypothécaire 1855 = Loi sur la transcription 
en matiere hypothécaire du 23 mars 1855, in R.T. Troplong, Privilèges et hy-
pothèques, commentaire de la loi du 23 mars 1855 sur la transcription en 
matière hypothécaire, par M. Troplong,..Paris, 1856.
Ministero della giustizia e degli affari di culto 1925 = Ministero della giustizia e 
degli affari di culto. Delega al Governo per emendamenti al codice civile e per 
la pubblicazione dei nuovi codici di procedura civile, di commercio e per la 
marina mercantile: lavori preparatori: relazione al disegno di legge, discor-
si di S. E. Aldo Oviglio, Ministro della giustizia, alla Camera dei deputati e al 
Senato del Regno e relazioni delle Commissioni parlamentari sulla delega al 
Governo della facoltà di arrecare opportuni emendamenti al codice civile e 
di pubblicare nuovi codici di procedura civile, di commercio e per la marina 
mercantile, in occasione della unificazione legislativa con le nuove provincie: 
ALAN SANDONÀ
156
Legge 30 dicembre 1923, n. 2814, Regio decreto 4 giugno 1924, Decreto mini-
steriale 7 luglio 1924, Roma , 1925.
Senato del Regno 1913 = Senato del Regno d’Italia, Atti parlamentari del Senato 
del Regno. documenti: Dal n. 136 al n. 255, Roma, 1913.
Secondary Sources
Alpa-Chiodi 2007 = G. Alpa, G. Chiodi, Il progetto italo francese delle obbliga-
zioni (1927). Un modello di armonizzazione nell’epoca della ricodificazione, 
Milano, 2007.
Aquarone 1960= A. Aquarone, La unificazione legislativa e i codici del 1865, Mi-
lano, 1960.
Ascoli 1913 = A. Ascoli, Nicola Coviello, in Rivista di diritto civile, 1913, p. 499-
503. 
Betti 1929 = E. Betti, Il progetto di un Codice italo francese delle obbligazioni 
e dei contratti, in Rivista del diritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle 
obbligazioni, 1929, I, p. 665-668. 
Betti 1930 = E. Betti Sul progetto di un Codice italo francese delle obbligazioni 
e dei contratti, in Rivista del diritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle 
obbligazioni, 1930, I, p. 184-189.
Bianchi 1877 = E. Bianchi, Considerazioni generali sul sistema ipotecario e sulla 
trasduzione secondo il Codice civile italiano, Pisa, 1877.
Besson 1891 = E. Besson, Les Livres fonciers et la réforme hypothécaire, étude 
historique et critique sur la publicité des transmissions immobilières en 
France et à l’étranger, depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours, Paris, 1891.
Biggini 1939 = c. a. Biggini, Riforma dei codici e diritto di proprietà, in La con-
cezione fascista della proprietà privata, a cura della Confederazione Fasci-
sta dei Lavoratori dell’Agricoltura, Roma, 1939.
Birocchi 1990 = I. Birocchi, Notazioni sul contratto (A proposito di un recente 
lavoro di G. Alpa) in Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico 
moderno, 19, 1990, p. 637-659.
Bonini 1996 = R. Bonini, Il diritto privato dal nuovo secolo alla Prima guerra 
mondiale. Linee di storia giuridica italiana ed europea, Bologna, 1996.
Carnelutti 1913 = F. Carnelutti, Nicola Coviello, in Rivista del diritto commercia-
le e del diritto generale delle obbligazioni, 1913, 1, p. 730-732.
Cavanna 2005 = A. Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa. Le fonti e il 
pensiero Giuridico. 2, Milano, 2005. 
Cazzetta 2011 = G. Cazzetta, Codice civile e identità giuridica nazionale. Percorsi 
e appunti per una storia delle codificazioni moderne, Torino, 2011.
Colorni 1954 = V. Colorni, Per la storia della pubblicità immobiliare e mobiliare, 
Milano, 1954.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
157
Coviello 1905 = N. Coviello, Osservazioni sulla riforma della pubblicità immobi-
liare in Temi siciliana, 1905, p. 9-10.
Coviello 1907 = N. Coviello, La trascrizione, I, Torino, 1907.
Coviello 1938 = L. Coviello, La trascrizione ordinata dalla legge sulle tasse ipo-
tecarie, in Relazione al codice civile vigente e al progetto di riforma, in Il 
Foro Italiano, 63 (1938), IV cc. 1/2-15/16.
D’Amelio 1912 = M. D’Amelio, Per l’ordinamento giuridico della Tripolitania e 
della Cirenaica, Milano, 1912. 
De Cores Helguera 2017 = C. De Cores Helguera, La teoria general del contrato 
a la luz de la historia, Montevideo, 2017. 
Dezza 2000 = E. Dezza, Lezioni di storia della codificazione civile. Il code civil 
(1804) e l’Allgemeines Burgherliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB, 1811), Torino, 2000.
Ferrara 1910 = F. Ferrara, Il progetto Scialoja sulla trascrizione, in Rivista del di-
ritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle obbligazioni, 1910, I, p. 468-474.
Fiocchi Malaspina 2013 = E. Fiocchi Malaspina, Le nuove province del Regno 
d‘Italia: il dibattito legislativo e dottrinale per il riconoscimento dci diritti 
storici (1918-1929), in G. Rolla (a cura di), Regimi Giuridici Speciali di Au-
tonomia delle Comunità Territoriali. Profili di diritto comparato, Milano, 
2013, p. 233-252.
Fiocchi Malaspina 2014 = E. Fiocchi Malaspina, Il libro fondiario in Venezia 
Giulia: alcuni profili storico-giuridici, in G. Rolla, M. Cosulich (a cura di), Il 
riconoscimento dei diritti storici negli ordinamenti costituzionali (Quaderni 
della facoltà di giurisprudenza dell’Università degli studi di Trento 3/2014), 
Napoli, 2014, p. 145-166.
Foschini 1867 = G. Foschini, I motivi del codice civile del Regno d’Italia ordinati 
sotto ciascun articolo…Chieti, 1867.
Frola 1888 = S. Frola, Il catasto nei suoi effetti giuridici e conseguenti riforme 
nella legislazione civile, Torino, 1888.
Gabba 1909 = C. F. Gabba, Natura ed effetti della trascrizione in Quistioni di 
Diritto civile, I, Torino, 1909.
Galateria 1937 = L. Galateria, Della pubblicità immobiliare. Le sue origini e i suoi 
progetti di riforma, Napoli, 1937.
Gianturco 1890 = L. Gianturco, Studi e ricerche sulla trascrizione e sul sistema 
ipotecario, Napoli, 1890.
Gianturco 1896 = L. Gianturco, Intorno alla pubblicità del dominio, Napoli, 1896.
Gianturco 1909 = L. Gianturco, Discorsi parlamentari pubblicati per delibera-
zione della Camera dei deputati, Roma, 1909.
Grandi 1940 = D. Grandi, Proprietà e diritti reali. Discorso pronunciato alla 
Commissione delle assemblee legislative per la riforma dei codici il 9 febbra-
io 1940-XVIII, Roma, 1940.
ALAN SANDONÀ
158
Grossi 1998 = P. Grossi, Assolutismo giuridico e diritto privato, Milano, 1998. 
Grossi 2002 = P. Grossi, La cultura del civilista italiano. Un profilo storico, Mi-
lano, 2002.
Istituto di studi legislativi 1939 = Istituto di studi legislativi, Sul progetto italo 
francese di Codice unico delle Obbligazioni dei Contratti. Saggi critici dei 
proff. Adler E., Bartsch R. Graulich L., Gutteridge H.C., Lee W. R., Oertmann 
P., Oser H. Pereterskij I., Perreau E. H., Pollak R., Riezler E., Svatier R., Sca-
duto G., Siegwart A., Vialleton A., Winfield R. H., Roma, 1939. 
Liberati 1995 = G. Liberati, Pubblicità (Diritto Intermedio), in Enc. Dir., XXX-
VII, Milano, 1995.
Lo Savio 1893 = G. Lo Savio, Per la riforma dell’ordinamento immobiliare ita-
liano, Napoli, 1893. 
Loynes 1897 = F. c. De Loynes, Le projet de loi sur la Réforme du Régime 
hypothécaire, in Revue critique del legislation et jurisprudence, 1897, p. 
229-249.
Lozzi 1879 = C. Lozzi, Dell’efficacia della trascrizione di una vendita simulata in 
confronto dei terzi in Giornale delle leggi. Pubblicazione didattica di dottri-
na, giurisprudenza e consulti gratuiti, X (1879), pp. 217-220.
Luzzati 1886 = I. Luzzati, Il progetto per la parequazione fondiaria e la legisla-
zione civile sui beni immobili, Torino, 1886.
Luzzati 1889 = I. Luzzati, Della trascrizione, commento teorico pratico al titolo 
XXII, libro III del codice civile italiano, I, Torino, 1889.
Luzzati 1891 = I. Luzzati, Disegno di legge sugli effetti giuridici del catasto e 
sull’istituzione dei libri fondiari preceduto da uno studio sul catasto italiano, 
Torino, 1891.
Kaspers 1972 = H. Kaspers, Vom Sachsenspiegel zum Code Napoléon, Köln, 1972.
Magnin 1896 = P. Magnin, Étude sur la publicité des transmissions des droits 
immobiliers et les livres fonciers, s.l, 1896.
Martone 1984 = L. Martone, Nicola Coviello, in Dizionario Biografico degli Ita-
liani, 30 (1984).
Martone 2007 = L. Martone, Diritto d’oltremare: legge e ordine per le colonie del 
regno d’Italia, Milano, 2007.
Merlin 1812 = P. A. Merlin, Nantissement, in Répertoire universel et raisonné de 
jurisprudence… Quatrième edition, Paris, 1812-1825.
Mirabelli 1889 = G. Mirabelli, Dei principii fondamentali dell’istituto della tra-
scrizione e delle conseguenze che ne derivano in Raccolta del diritto dei terzi 
secondo il Codice civile italiano, I, Torino, 1889. 
Mosca 1905 = T. Mosca, Come dovrebbe essere emendato il disegno di legge 
sulla trascrizione presentato dal Governo alla Camera il 9 febbraio 1905, 
Roma, 1905.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
159
Pacifici Mazzoni 1874 = e. Pacifici Mazzoni, Istituzioni di diritto civile italiano…, 
Firenze, 1874.
Padoa Schioppa 2003 = a. Padoa Schioppa, Dal code Napoléon al Codice civile 
del 1942, cit., I, p. 531 ss. ora in Id., Italia ed Europa nella storia del diritto, 
Bologna, 2003, p. 495-532.
Petrelli 2007 = G. Petrelli, L’autenticità del titolo della trascrizione nell’’evolu-
zione storica e nel diritto comparato, in Rivista di diritto civile, 5, 2007, p. 
585- 640. 
Petrelli 2009 = G. Petrelli, Pubblicità legale e trascrizione immobiliare tra in-
teressi privati e interessi pubblici, in Rassegna di diritto civile, 3, 2009, p. 
689-754.
Petrelli 2013 = G. Petrelli, Questioni generali e problemi aperti in materia di 
trascrizione immobiliare, in Rivista del notariato, 3, pt. 3, 2013, p. 749-762.
Petrelli 2014 = G. Petrelli, Trascrizione immobiliare e costituzione, in Rivista di 
diritto civile, 1, 2014, p. 103-132.
Pugliatti 1956 = S. Pugliatti, La Trascrizione, XIV- I, in, Trattato di diritto civi-
le e commerciale diretto dai professori Antonio Cicu e Francesco Messineo, 
Milano, 1956.
Regnault 1929 = H. Regnault, L’insinuation des actes emportant transfert de 
propriété à titre onéreux dans l’ancien droit français in Mélanges Paul Four-
nier, Paris, 1929. 
Roggero 2013 = F. Roggero, La trascrizione immobiliare nella giurisprudenza 
del secolo XIX, in L. Moscati (a cura di), Dialettica tra legislatore e interprete. 
Dai codici francesi ai codici dell’Italia unita, Napoli, 2013, p. 169-222.
Rondinone 2003 = N. Rondinone, Storia inedita della codificazione civile, Mila-
no, 2003.
Salvioli 1894 = G. Salvioli, La pubblicità nella vendita storicamente esaminata 
in Rivista italiana per le scienze giuridiche, XVIII, 1894, p. 196-236. 
Sandonà 2011 = A. Sandonà, Note sull’istituto della trascrizione tra la rivoluzio-
ne ed il secondo ‘800, in Rivista di storia del diritto italiano, LXXXIV (2011), 
p. 363-416.
Scialoja 1933 = V. Scialoja, La riforma dei codici di diritto privato in Italia in 
Studi giuridici, IV, diritto privato, Roma, 1933.
Simoncelli 1892 = V. Simoncelli, Gli articoli 1932 n. 7 e 1942 del Codice civile e V 
articolo 687 del Codice di procedura civile in Giurisprudenza italiana, 1892, 
IV, p. 257-272.
Somma 2005 = A. Somma, I giuristi e l’Asse culturale Roma-Berlino. Economia 
e politica nel diritto fascista e nazionalsocialista, Frankfurt am Main, 2005.
Vadalà-Papale 1885 = G. Vadalà-Papale, L’istituto della trascrizione e le sue ri-
forme, in «Circolo giuridico», 16 (1885), p. 3-15.
ALAN SANDONÀ
160
Vassalli 1960a = F. Vassalli, Insegnamento e riforme del diritto civile. Comme-
morazione del Prof. De Ruggiero, in, Studi giuridici, II, 7, Milano 1960, p. 
509-524.
Vassalli 1960b = F. Vassalli, Motivi e caratteri della codificazione civile in Studi 
giuridici, III, 2, Milano, 1960, p. 605-634.
Vita 1880 = L. Vita, Della trascrizione delle alienazioni successive in Giurispru-
denza italiana, 1880, IV, p. 14-29.
Venezian 1905 = G. Venezian, La riforma della trascrizione nel disegno di legge 
per lo sgravio del debito ipotecario (1905), in Opere Giuridiche, 2. Studi sui 
diritti reali e sulle trascrizioni, le successioni, la famiglia, p. 108-119, Roma, 
1920.
Venezian 1910 = Il disegno di legge Scialoja sulla trascrizione, in Rivista di dirit-
to civile, 1910, p. 509-539.
REGISTRO E COLONIALISMO EM ANGOLA
Mariana Dias Paes 
Neste trabalho, analiso um processo judicial que integra o acervo do Ar-
quivo Nacional de Angola. Nessa análise, empreendo um “jogo de escalas”, ou 
seja, procuro mostrar, por meio de um conflito concreto, relações jurídicas, 
econômicas e políticas trabalhadas, pela historiografia, em um nível mais ge-
ral. Por meio dessa análise de nível micro é possível identificar aspectos dos 
conflitos e da construção do colonialismo que podem passar despercebidos 
por análises que adotam uma perspectiva macro. Com isso, discuto como a 
introdução de um novo instituto jurídico – o registro –, em um contexto colo-
nial, alterou a dinâmica de certas relações sociais e a configuração dos confli-
tos fundiários. Ao fazer uso desses novos institutos jurídicos, tanto os colonos 
europeus quanto as pessoas que estavam sendo desapropriadas de suas terras 
acabaram por normalizar o novo sistema colonial de regras.1
A segunda metade do século XIX foi marcada por novas formas de colo-
nialismo na África Centro-Ocidental. A abolição do tráfico transatlântico de 
escravos e a independência do Brasil fizeram com que a atenção de Portugal 
se voltasse, de maneira mais intensa, para suas colônias africanas. Além dis-
so, a expansão do capitalismo esteve na base de novos empreendimentos co-
loniais e no desenvolvimento de projetos de infraestrutura, como, por exem-
plo, a construção de estradas de ferro.2 Na África Centro-Ocidental, uma das 
regiões mais afetadas por essas novas formas de colonialismo foi a bacia do 
Rio Cuanza, na chamada “Província de Angola”.
A abolição do tráfico transatlântico de escravos, um dos pilares da econo-
mia da colônia de Angola até meados do século XIX, coincidiu com o aumento 
dos preços do café no mercado internacional.3 As elites coloniais portuguesas, 
então, defenderam um projeto de produção de café em territórios africanos e 
se falava, até mesmo, na conversão da região em um “novo Brasil”.4 Os produ-
1  Hébrard, Scott 2014, p. 15-19; Premo 2017, p. 1-25; Putnam 2006; Revel 1998, p. 
15-38; Scott 2000.
2  Clarence-Smith 1979; Oliveira Marques 2001, p. 259-291; Vargaftig 2013, p. 135-
161; Vos 2015.
3  Marquese 2015.




tores de café começaram, então, a plantar ao redor de terrenos de café selva-
gem, como, por exemplo, os da região do Cazengo. Nas primeiras décadas de 
implementação do plano colonial de agricultura do café, esse tipo de cultivo 
era feito, principalmente, por populações locais. Contudo, com o desenvol-
vimento econômico da região, produtores europeus também passaram a se 
interessar por esse tipo de empreendimento. Com essa finalidade, requisita-
ram e ganharam concessões de terras do governo português metropolitano e 
dos administradores coloniais. Esses produtores europeus começaram a criar 
firmas agrícolas para a exploração do café e de outros produtos na região do 
Cazengo.5
Além das concessões de terras feitas às firmas agrícolas de administração 
europeia, o governo português também expropriou terra da população local 
com o objetivo de construir estradas de ferro. A região do Cazengo foi um dos 
alvos desses novos projetos de infraestrutura, pois os colonos europeus, há 
muito, demandavam melhorias no sistema de escoamento da produção de 
café. Assim, a construção da estrada de ferro Luanda-Ambaca, conjuntamen-
te ao crescimento das firmas agrícolas, gerou fortes tensões entre a população 
local africana, colonos portugueses e autoridades coloniais, na região do Ca-
zengo.6
O contexto “pré-Conferência de Berlim” influiu fortemente na configura-
ção desse cenário de desapropriação das populações locais africanas. Nessa 
época, as potências imperiais europeias disputavam territórios africanos e 
Portugal tentava garantir que regiões da África Centro-Ocidental fossem re-
conhecidas como seu território colonial. Assim, a expansão agrícola e dos em-
preendimentos de infraestrutura era central para garantir o reconhecimento 
internacional de sua presença e de seu poder colonial na região.7
Diversos mecanismos jurídicos foram funcionais à expansão colonial por-
tuguesa na África Centro-Ocidental, em geral, e na região do Cazengo, em 
particular. Neste artigo, focarei em um deles: o registro. O registro de pro-
priedade fundiária, nesse contexto colonial específico, atendia aos anseios 
portugueses na medida em que garantia a transferência formal da terra para 
colonos e produtores europeus, o que servia, no âmbito internacional, como 
prova de seu bom aproveitamento. Além disso, ao operar a transferência da 
terra para mãos europeias, o registro garantia que as populações locais desa-
5  Freudenthal 2005, p. 125-220.
6  Alexandre, Dias 1998, p. 159, 468-471.
7  Ferreira 2018, p. 199-280.
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propriadas fossem disponibilizadas como mão de obra tanto para as firmas 
agrícolas quanto para os projetos de infraestrutura.
A população desapropriada, porém, resistiu a esse processo e procurou 
se resguardar de diversas maneiras. Uma delas foi a tentativa de utilizar o 
registro a seu favor. Neste trabalho, analiso uma contenda jurídica, na região 
do Cazengo, que girou em torno de questões referentes ao registro da terra. A 
partir dessa análise, é possível identificar como institutos e categorias jurídi-
cas adquirem significados e funções a depender de sua utilização por sujeitos 
históricos específicos.
1. Um conflito fundiário no Cazengo
Foi nesse contexto de novas formas de expansão colonial e desapropriação 
de terras que, em 1883, o presidente do Tribunal da Relação de Luanda rece-
beu, do Chefe do Concelho do Cazengo, um pedido para que Ernesto Freire 
dos Santos fosse proibido de continuar atuando como advogado de provisão8 
e fosse removido de seu cargo de ajudante na conservadoria da comarca. De 
acordo com o Chefe do Concelho, o motivo para a remoção seria o fato de 
Santos “ser conselheiro nas questões irritantes de propriedade, em que incita 
os seus clientes à revolta de mão armada contra os proprietários brancos que 
em tempo compraram as propriedades”.9
Em um relatório que acompanhava o pedido de remoção, o Chefe do Con-
celho apresentou a descrição dos fatos que provariam que Santos estava cau-
sando desordem na colônia. De acordo com o relato, no dia 15 de outubro de 
1883, ele havia sido chamado, por Joaquim Antônio Carmo Ferreira, proprie-
tário da firma agrícola Monte Bello, para comparecer a seu estabelecimento 
a fim de “fazer sustentar o direito de propriedade, o qual havia sido atacado 
por um núcleo de indígenas armados de catanas e cacetes”.10 Carmo Ferrei-
ra alegava que, às sete da manhã daquele dia, ele havia dado ordens a seus 
“serviçais” para que fossem limpar uma vargem com o objetivo de prepará-la 
para o plantio de cana-de-açúcar. A vargem fazia parte da propriedade Mon-
te Bello, “devidamente registrada na conservadoria desta comarca”.11 Porém, 
8 Os advogados de provisão eram aqueles que não tinham educação formal em direito, 
mas que recebiam autorização para atuar como advogados.
9  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 1.
10  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 60.
11  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 63.
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quando os trabalhadores aí chegaram, encontraram aproximadamente 60 
negros armados com catanas e cacetes, que disseram aos trabalhadores da 
firma que eles deveriam se retirar, pois a vargem era sua. Carmo Ferreira, en-
tão, foi até o local verificar o que estava acontecendo e foi ameaçado de morte, 
caso não ordenasse que seus trabalhadores de lá saíssem. Carmo Ferreira e 
os trabalhadores se retiraram, mas o proprietário da firma decidiu escrever 
para o Chefe do Concelho requisitando que ele investigasse o caso e punisse 
os “delinquentes”, se não seria impossível manter a ordem na firma agrícola.12
No mesmo dia, o Chefe do Concelho se dirigiu ao lugar do conflito. Assim 
que chegou, ordenou que os trabalhadores voltassem a preparar a vargem 
para o plantio. O Chefe do Concelho continuou seu relato sobre o caso: “mi-
nutos depois apareceram alguns indígenas, mas com modos submissos e res-
peitadores, e, fazendo eu uma rápida averiguação sobre o fato, alegaram que 
o local onde o referido Carmo Ferreira estava trabalhando, lhes pertencia, 
querendo assim usurpar-lhes o direito”.13 Ele, então, respondeu que aquela 
não era a maneira correta de sustentar direitos de propriedade, ainda mais 
quando eles já haviam sido negados por sentença judicial, como era o caso.14
Naquele momento, Santos, o advogado de provisão, chegou ao local. Ele 
se apresentou ao Chefe do Concelho como o responsável pela questão por 
parte dos que pleiteavam a vargem contra a firma Monte Bello. O Chefe do 
Concelho disse a Santos que aquela não era a maneira correta de aconselhar 
seus clientes, já que eles deveriam reclamar seus direitos em juízo. As partes 
supostamente chegaram a um acordo. Porém, logo após chegar em casa, o 
Chefe do Concelho foi novamente chamado, pois as ameaças e insultos en-
tre as partes haviam recomeçado. Ele, então, decidiu expedir um mandado 
suspendendo o trabalho no local até que a questão estivesse resolvida pelas 
autoridades coloniais.15
Os vários documentos anexados ao processo gerado pelo pedido de cance-
lamento da licença de Santos e de sua remoção do cargo de ajudante na con-
servadoria da comarca nos mostra o impacto do registro e de outros institutos 
jurídicos a ele relacionados em um contexto de expansão colonial.
Nesses documentos, porém, não há muita informação sobre Santos. Sa-
bemos, com certeza, que ele era ajudante na conservadoria da comarca e que 
12  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 63-64.
13  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 60.
14  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 60.
15  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 60-64.
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tinha licença para exercer a atividade de advogado. Não há informação sobre 
suas origens, mas ele dizia publicamente “não professar religião alguma”.16 
No entanto, há uma grande probabilidade de que ele fosse parte de uma nas-
cente elite letrada africana que estava começando a formular discursos crí-
ticos à administração colonial.17 Uma das reclamações de Carmo Ferreira, o 
proprietário da firma agrícola Monte Bello, era de que alguém havia publica-
do, no jornal “Pharol do Povo”, uma nota o difamando. Não há, no processo, 
transcrição da nota. Porém, é possível perceber que ela tratava, também, de 
conflitos fundiários entre o dono da firma agrícola Monte Bello e pessoas que 
se sentiam esbulhadas por ela. Em razão dessa nota, que considerou inju-
riosa, Carmo Ferreira ajuizou um processo criminal contra os africanos que 
estavam demandando a terra, mas todos deram depoimentos afirmando que 
não haviam sido os responsáveis por sua publicação e que nem sequer sabiam 
do ocorrido. Por isso, ele insinuou que Santos era o verdadeiro responsável 
pela nota.18
O jornal que publicou a nota contra Carmo Ferreira e a firma Monte Bello 
foi um dos primeiros jornais nacionalistas angolanos. Contudo, nessa épo-
ca, ele ainda não propagava um discurso explicitamente anticolonial. Mesmo 
assim, funcionava como uma via através da qual as elites intelectuais locais 
podiam expressar seus descontentamentos em relação à administração co-
lonial portuguesa.19 Admitindo que foi Santos, e não seus clientes, quem, de 
fato, publicou a nota, o que é bastante provável, considerando que eles eram 
analfabetos, há uma boa chance de que ele não fosse português, mas parte 
dessa crescente elite intelectual angolana.20
Em seu relatório, o Chefe do Concelho ressaltou que Santos, há muito, 
estava engajado em atividade subversiva. Ele afirmou que, há três anos, em 
1880, Santos havia feito “sublevar uns indígenas no sítio Sá, onde foi necessá-
rio empregar-se a força, sendo devidamente castigados”. Ele também catego-
ricamente afirmou que o único objetivo de Santos era “ganhar dinheiro, em-
pregando para isso qualquer meio, e guerrear a colônia europeia”. Por tudo 
16  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 83.
17  Sobre essa elite africana e seu envolvimento em movimentos contestatórios das 
autoridades coloniais, ver Kambundo 2017.
18  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 49-56, 71-73.
19  Kandijimbo de Kandingi (2015, p. 233) identificou uma publicação assinada por 
Ernesto Freire dos Santos que defendia “direitos dos indígenas” no jornal “O Angolense”, 
em 1917.
20  Sobre o uso da imprensa por intelectuais angolanos, ver Lourenço 2015, p. 29-48.
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isso, ele requisitava que Santos fosse impedido de assumir funções públicas e 
fosse expulso daquele Concelho.21
Não há como saber a extensão do exagero do Chefe do Concelho na carac-
terização de Santos como “inimigo da colônia portuguesa”. Sobre o que se 
pode ter certeza é que, agindo como advogado, Santos ajuizou, no mínimo, 
três processos judiciais a respeito de questões de propriedade perante o juízo 
de Ambaca. Todos eles foram ajuizados contra firmas agrícolas e eram:
– ação por esbulho de propriedade; autor José Ferreira Guimarães, como tu-
tor da menor e sua filha, Maria; réu Antonio Qualimo Carreira, como represen-
tante da firma agrícola Fonseca & Carreira;
– ação de demarcação e vistoria de terrenos; autores João Pascoal Mendes, 
Lourenço Gaspar Domingos de Aragão, Francisco Antônio Amaro Alferes e An-
tônio Francisco Amaro; réu Joaquim Antônio do Carmo Ferreira, como sócio-ge-
rente e representante da firma agrícola Sociedade Monte Bello;
– ação de justificação de mera posse; autores João Pascoal Mendes, Lourenço 
Gaspar Domingos de Aragão, Francisco Antônio Amaro Alferes e Antônio Fran-
cisco Amaro; réus Ministério Público e incertos, tendo comparecido em juízo 
para contestar a ação Joaquim Antônio do Carmo Ferreira, como sócio-gerente 
da Sociedade Agrícola Monte Bello.22
Ao tempo do pedido de remoção, as duas primeiras ações ainda corriam 
em juízo e a terceira, a justificação de mera posse, já tinha sido julgada com 
sentença transitada em julgado. Esta última estava vinculada a uma institui-
ção recém-criada no direito civil português: o registro de mera posse.
2. O registro de mera posse
Pesquisas recentes mostram que a posse era o principal instituto jurídico 
de regulamentação das relações entre pessoas e coisas nas sociedades ibéri-
cas até, aproximadamente, meados do século XIX. Tanto as interpretações 
portuguesas quanto as espanholas das categorias e normas do ius commune 
favoreciam o exercício da posse em decisões judiciais a respeito de confli-
tos fundiários. O registro e a titulação dos bens não eram feitos de maneira 
sistemática nas jurisdições sob controle dos impérios ibéricos durante esse 
período e, na prática, títulos e escrituras não eram suficientes para garantir 
21  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 61-62v.
22  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 23-24v.
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direitos sobre coisas quando confrontados com situações possessórias. Regis-
tros de terras existiam, mas eles não gozavam de força judicial se não fossem 
legitimados pelo uso efetivo da terra. Nesse contexto, a posse frequentemente 
prevalecia sobre os títulos em disputas judiciais.23
Esse cenário sofreu modificações profundas ao longo do século XIX. Teo-
rias jurídicas liberais defendiam que a propriedade era um direito absoluto e 
que sua segurança dependia de títulos que identificassem e individualizassem 
os detentores desses direitos. Em razão de seu caráter absoluto, o direito de 
propriedade deveria estar no topo de uma hierarquia de direitos sobre coisas 
e não poderia ser facilmente prejudicado pelo exercício da posse. Obviamen-
te, demandas possessórias continuaram existindo. Porém, nesse novo siste-
ma de direitos, a posse foi fortemente marginalizada e perdeu a força proba-
tória que tinha em relação aos títulos e escrituras.24 Os registros faziam parte, 
também, de um contexto mais amplo de formação dos Estados Nacionais. 
Durante o século XIX, o registro e a demarcação de terras foram algumas das 
medidas por eles adotadas com o objetivo de identificar e intensificar o con-
trole sobre seus territórios e suas populações.25
Nesse contexto, os juristas portugueses começaram a implementar refor-
mas liberais para regulamentar as relações jurídicas entre pessoas e coisas. 
Uma das medidas adotadas foi a criação do chamado “registro de mera posse”. 
Esse instituto foi regulado nos artigos 524 a 526 do Código Civil Português 
de 1867 e tinha como objetivo dar à posse uma configuração mais adequada 
ao ideário liberal, modificando a forma que ela havia adquirido durante os 
séculos do ius commune. Vejamos como foi construída essa nova arquitetura 
jurídica.
O Código Civil Português estabeleceu que, para ser hábil a ensejar prescri-
ção (ou seja, aquisição do domínio, agora identificado com o direito de pro-
priedade), a posse deveria ser titulada, de boa-fé, pacífica, contínua e pública. 
À primeira vista, nada muito diferente da configuração anterior. Porém, uma 
leitura atenta dos dispositivos do Código deixa entrever a roupagem liberal 
que a posse estava adquirindo. O artigo 319 definia que o título (entendido 
como origem do direito), nos casos de posse, não se presumia. Ou seja, o 
título deveria ser provado por quem invocava a posse. Ora, no ius commune, 
o exercício continuado da posse sanava eventuais vícios no título e era o seu 
23  Para uma análise detalhada dessa questão, ver Dias Paes 2018.
24  Para uma análise detalhada dessa questão, ver Dias Paes 2018.
25  Por exemplo, Blaufarb 2016; Garavaglia, Gautreau 2011.
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próprio exercício que constituía ou legitimava o título necessário à aquisição 
ou proteção judicial de direitos sobre coisas.26
Outra modificação importante dizia respeito à publicidade da posse. Nas 
sociedades ibéricas regidas pelas normas do ius commune, a publicidade da 
posse era comprovada por meio do reconhecimento comunitário. Ou seja, 
considerava-se como pública a posse que era reconhecida como tal pelos 
membros da comunidade do possuidor. Em casos de conflito judicial, essa 
publicidade era atestada por meio de depoimentos testemunhais.27 Já o Có-
digo, em seu artigo 323, definiu a posse pública como aquela “que foi devida-
mente registada, ou tem sido exercida de modo que pode ser conhecida pelos 
interessados”.28 A própria ideia de que, para adquirir direitos sobre uma coi-
sa por prescrição, o possuidor deveria registrar sua posse já demonstra uma 
diferença marcante entre o novo contexto liberal e aquele do ius commune. 
Essa ideia respondia ao ideário liberal de que a propriedade deveria ser regis-
trada e que os proprietários deveriam ser identificados para que seus direitos 
fossem assegurados e protegidos. Assim, o Código igualou a publicidade ao 
registro. O Código tentava fazer valer uma ideia de que a publicidade estava 
atrelada ao registro, ou seja, ao controle estatal mais do que ao reconheci-
mento comunitário compartilhado.
Para serem registradas, as posses teriam que ser provadas por sentença 
judicial passada em julgado, prolatada em um processo específico (justifica-
ção de mera posse) no qual fossem ouvidos o Ministério Público e os “interes-
sados incertos”. Estes últimos seriam citados por éditos. Outro requisito era 
provar que a posse vinha sendo exercida de forma pacífica, pública e conti-
nuada por, no mínimo, cinco anos. Ao iniciar o processo, o justificante pode-
ria requerer um registro provisório da mera posse. Esse registro se tornaria 
definitivo após a averbação da sentença, o que teria efeitos retroativos à data 
do registro provisório.29
Alguns anos depois, em 1876, o Código de Processo Civil Português regulou 
outros aspectos das justificações de mera posse. Ele estabeleceu que o pedido 
deveria ser deduzido por meio de artigos e a oposição deveria ser apresentada 
como contestação. No mais, o feito seguiria os termos do processo ordinário.30
26  Codigo civil portuguez 1868, p. 97. Ver também Dias Paes 2018.
27  Dias Paes 2018, p. 29-38.
28  Codigo civil portuguez 1868, p. 98.
29  Codigo civil portuguez 1868, p. 98.
30  Codigo de processo civil 1877, p. 161.
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O instituto jurídico do registro de mera posse e todo o processo judicial que 
o fundamentava talvez não tenham sido pensados com o fim último de propi-
ciar a expansão colonial portuguesa. Porém, ao analisarmos esses institutos 
e procedimentos jurídicos levando em consideração os contextos históricos 
de sua aplicação, fica evidente sua funcionalidade a essa expansão colonial. A 
citação por édito, por exemplo, fazia com que parte da população – que fosse 
analfabeta ou que não falasse português – tivesse mais dificuldades de tomar 
conhecimento do ajuizamento das justificações de mera posse e, portanto, 
não contestasse uma ação judicial que lhe prejudicasse. Efeito parecido tinha 
a citação de interessados incertos. Em processos análogos, como, por exem-
plo, as demarcações, ou em outras ações possessórias, os confrontantes do 
terreno deveriam ser citados. Aí, a citação era direta e eventuais interessados, 
de fato, tomavam conhecimento do caso e tinham mais mecanismos para res-
guardar seus direitos. Nas justificações de mera posse, os confrontantes não 
eram citados. Os réus eram definidos em abstrato, por meio da categoria dos 
“interessados incertos”. Esse procedimento também pode ter facilitado que 
pessoas com mais condições de ajuizar esses processos produzissem direitos 
fundiários reconhecidos pelo governo colonial português.
3. Registro e produção de direitos
Como mencionei, Santos ajuizou uma justificação de mera posse em favor 
de João Pascoal Mendes, Francisco Antônio Amaro Alferes, Lourenço Gaspar 
Domingos de Aragão e Antônio Francisco Amaro. Na petição inicial, ele ale-
gou que seus clientes eram possuidores de terrenos, situados no Concelho do 
Cazengo, com plantações de café e outras árvores frutíferas. Os limites dos 
terrenos eram: a leste, com terrenos do falecido Mateus Mendes Machado e 
de José Veiga; a oeste, com a fazenda Monte Bello; a norte, com os riachos Ca-
tacala e Kassembele; e a sul, com os terrenos de Custódio Rebelo dos Santos.31
Citados o Ministério Público e os interessados incertos por edital, Carmo 
Ferreira compareceu para contestar a ação. Ele alegou que parte dos terrenos 
cuja posse os autores pretendiam justificar pertencia à firma agrícola Monte 
Bello. Como prova, juntou ao processo, a certidão de registro do terreno e o 
Boletim Oficial no qual havia sido publicada a portaria do Governo da Provín-
cia de Angola que concedeu, a ele, quinhentos hectares de terra.32
31  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 25.
32  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 26.
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Seguindo os termos do processo, o juiz ouviu as testemunhas. De acordo 
com ele, elas foram capazes de provar que os justificantes estavam de posse do 
terreno em questão por mais de cinco anos, de maneira pacífica, pública e con-
tínua. Ademais, elas atestaram que eles efetuaram atos possessórios no terre-
no, configurando, portanto, uma situação de “mera posse”. No entanto, ao con-
trário do que ocorria no ius commune, o juiz não considerou tais depoimentos 
como suficientes para garantir o direito dos justificantes. Para ele, como a firma 
agrícola Monte Bello havia registrado parte do terreno contestado na conserva-
doria da comarca, era ela a proprietária legítima, o que impedia os justificantes 
de registrarem a sua “mera posse” apesar de configurada a situação jurídica.33
Considerando que os efeitos do registro subsistem enquanto não for cancelado, artigo 
novecentos sessenta e cinco do Código Civil; considerando que uma justificação de mera 
posse apenas serve para legalizar bens que não estejam titulados, artigo quinhentos vinte 
e quatro do citado Código […] Por todos estes fundamentos, julgo, para os efeitos do artigo 
quinhentos vinte e quatro do Código Civil, procedente, e por provada a presente justifi-
cação, somente na parte relativa aos terrenos que não contestados e que estão fora das 
demarcações da propriedade “Monte Bello”, pertencente à propriedade do mesmo nome.34
O juiz considerou que o registro da firma agrícola tinha maior força do que 
o exercício da posse, ou seja, do que o efetivo trabalho dos justificantes no 
terreno. Trabalho este que havia sido executado por mais de cinco anos. As-
sim, eles conseguiram uma sentença que reconhecia seu direito a registrar a 
mera posse apenas sobre a parte do terreno que não havia sido registrada pela 
firma Monte Bello. De qualquer modo, um registro parcial era melhor que 
nenhuma garantia de que seus direitos seriam respeitados, em um contex-
to de expansão colonial e intensa desapropriação das populações locais. Por 
isso, logo após o trânsito em julgado da sentença, em junho de 1883, Santos a 
levou até a conservadoria para ser registrada pelo escrivão. Foram efetuados 
um “registro de propriedade” e uma “inscrição predial” do terreno.
É interessante notar que, no registro de propriedade, a descrição do terre-
no ainda segue formatos bastante recorrentes à época do ius commune. Isto 
é, os limites do terreno não são descritos utilizando-se referências e sistemas 
numéricos, mas a partir de acidentes geográficos como riachos, paus, cumes, 
pedras, embondeiros e montanhas.35
33 ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 26.
34  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 26-27.
35  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 28-30. Sobre o uso de sistemas numéricos em ações de 
demarcação, no Brasil do século XIX, ver Dias Paes 2018, p. 89-96.
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Já a inscrição predial foi feita pelo próprio Santos, exercendo sua função 
de ajudante na conservadoria. Nela, ele anotou que a inscrição havia sido fei-
ta a requerimento de Francisco Antônio Amaro Alferes, solteiro, proprietário, 
maior de idade, agricultor e morador no Concelho do Cazengo. Santos tam-
bém inscreveu, no documento, que a sentença judicial reconhecia, definitiva-
mente, “o domínio sobre os terrenos agrícolas” a favor dos justificantes. Ele 
acrescentou, ainda, que os terrenos haviam sido adquiridos por herança de 
seus pais.36
Todos esses procedimentos, no entanto, não foram suficientes para apla-
car a tensão. Alguns meses depois, no começo de outubro daquele ano, as 
partes se enfrentaram no episódio que gerou o processo de remoção e cas-
sação de Santos. Também alguns dias depois desse episódio, Santos ajuizou, 
em favor de seus clientes, uma ação de demarcação e vistoria de propriedade 
contra a firma agrícola Monte Bello. Ele começou a petição inicial afirmando 
que seus clientes eram “donos e possuidores de uma extensa área de terra 
com plantações de cafeeiros, neste Concelho”.37 Porém, a sentença da justi-
ficação de mera posse não havia definido quais os limites dos terrenos dos 
suplicantes e os da firma agrícola Monte Bello. Tal situação estava gerando 
“disputa entre os suplicantes e o suplicado Carmo Ferreira sobre a várzea 
do Catacala, que está incluída na posse dos suplicantes, a qual confina com 
a propriedade Monte Bello, achando-se assim confundidos os limites com a 
propriedade pertencente à dita firma agrícola Monte Bello”.38 Ao fim, ele pe-
dia fossem nomeados peritos para procederem à demarcação e vistoria dos 
terrenos e que fosse citado Carmo Ferreira para “apresentar os títulos da sua 
propriedade”.39
Foi ainda nesse contexto que se publicou a nota no “Pharol do Povo” con-
tra a qual Carmo Ferreira ajuizou um “auto de investigação de injúrias”. Na 
petição inicial desse processo, ele afirmou que “durante todo o tempo que 
o suplicante Joaquim Antônio do Carmo Ferreira tem estado à testa de sua 
propriedade Monte Bello”, nenhum dos outrora justificantes havia deixado 
de “colher todo o café de suas lavras por proibição do suplicante”. De acordo 
com essa versão, os terrenos dos outrora justificantes estavam incrustados 
36  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 31-32.
37  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 34.
38  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 35.
39  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 35.
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nas terras de Carmo Ferreira.40 Ao serem inquiridos, Francisco Alferes Amaro 
e Lourenço Gaspar Domingos de Aragão confirmaram que Carmo Ferreira 
não os impedia de colherem o café nos terrenos que estavam incrustados em 
sua propriedade. Apesar de não saberem que uma nota contra Carmo Fer-
reira seria publicada no jornal, haviam autorizado Santos a elaborar, em seu 
nome, um requerimento ao Governador da Província relatando as contendas 
existentes, há dois anos, entre as partes.41
Os depoentes eram africanos mas tinham nomes portugueses, o que atesta 
que tinham algum nível de integração na sociedade colonial. Porém, isso não 
impediu que, no interrogatório criminal, fossem classificados como “lavrado-
res” e, ao longo dos documentos produzidos pelo Chefe do Concelho, fossem 
referidos como “indígenas”. Carmo Ferreira, ao contrário, é constantemente 
referido, na documentação, como “proprietário” e “agricultor”. Essa classifi-
cação empreendida pelas autoridades coloniais na produção de documentos 
também cumpria um papel importante na produção de direitos. As últimas 
décadas do século XIX foram marcadas pela ascensão de discursos jurídicos 
de marginalização dos chamados “indígenas”.42 Assim, classificar uma das 
partes de um litígio dessa maneira, poderia contribuir para a deslegitimação 
de sua pretensão jurídica, limitando o reconhecimento ou a proteção de direi-
tos dessas pessoas sobre coisas.
4. Conclusão: registro e colonialismo
Diante do requerimento do Chefe do Concelho, Santos procurou se de-
fender alegando que era Carmo Ferreira quem intimidava, com armas, seus 
clientes. Além disso:
Pois se os advogados são os conselheiros e auxiliadores das partes litigantes em juízo, 
e os meus clientes longe de defenderem suas propriedades repelindo a força pela força, 
recorreram à autoridade competente, propondo suas ações em juízo, com que argumento 
prova meu detrator a revolta que tristemente fantasiou, e me atribui? Se a justiça é uma 
constante e perpétua virtude de dar a cada um o que é seu, como a definem os juriscon-
sultos, e na sua balança pesam por igual o nobre e o plebeu, o pobre e o rico, o branco e o 
preto, é crime procurarem os meus clientes defender a sua propriedade dentro dos limites 
legais, recorrendo ao lato campo da justiça? E eu serei criminoso por aceitar o mandato, se 
40  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 47, 50.
41  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 53-55.
42  Silva 2009.
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é minha profissão, como advogado, defender os justos interesses de meus constituintes? É 
por isso teria de fazer seleção de cores ou de raças?43
O processo arquivado no Arquivo Nacional de Angola termina sem uma 
resolução sobre a situação de Santos. Porém, mesmo que as solicitações do 
Chefe do Concelho não tenham sido atendidas, é bastante provável que San-
tos tenha continuado a ser perseguido pelas autoridades coloniais, tementes 
de uma revolta iminente e que colocasse em xeque o projeto colonial portu-
guês naquela região da África Centro-Ocidental.44 Afinal, além do Chefe do 
Concelho, outras autoridades estavam bastante descontentes com a atuação 
de Santos. O juiz de direito de Ambaca, por exemplo, acusou-o de fazer:
registros dolosos a favor dos seus constituintes, na falta de outros legais, abusando 
por esta forma também do cargo que ocupa de ajudante privativo da Conservadoria desta 
Comarca, e por último, ainda como advogado, incitando os indígenas a invadir as pro-
priedades, procurando assim ver se consegue pela força o que não tem conseguido pelos 
termos ordinários do processo.45
Mesmo sem maiores informações sobre o desenrolar do caso do Cazengo, 
os documentos que sobreviveram atestam que a introdução do registro e sua 
constituição como modo, por excelência, para a aquisição de direitos sobre as 
coisas foi determinante na configuração dos conflitos agrários no território 
colonial português da África Centro-Ocidental. A força com a qual a ideologia 
liberal dotou o instituto jurídico do registro alterou os modos de produção de 
direitos de propriedade. No caso de Carmo Ferreira, por exemplo, as autori-
dades coloniais produziram, por meio da emissão de uma concessão e poste-
rior registro da mesma, direitos sobre um terreno que estava sendo utilizado, 
há mais de cinco anos, pela população local. Esse uso efetivo, no entanto, não 
foi capaz de garantir o direito dos possuidores sobre o bem, sendo suplantado 
pela abstração do registro.
Por outro lado, Santos registrou a sentença prolatada na justificação de 
mera posse como “registro de propriedade” e, na inscrição predial, escreveu 
que essa sentença reconhecia o direito de domínio de seus clientes. De acordo 
com as normas do Código Civil Português, essa sentença não geraria um re-
gistro de propriedade, considerado mais forte do que o de mera posse. Porém, 
43  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 7-8.
44  Veja-se, por exemplo, as inúmeras perseguições relatadas em Assis Júnior 1980.
45  ANA, caixa 163, maço 17, p. 3.
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Santos ignorou essa disposição e, com a produção de documentos, procurou 
produzir, também, direitos mais fortes para seus clientes. Diante da conti-
nuação dos conflitos, ele ajuizou, ainda, um processo de demarcação, outra 
instância produtora de direitos sobre coisas nesse período.46
O registro, portanto, desempenhou algumas funções no contexto colonial 
da África Centro-Ocidental. É bastante evidente a sua funcionalidade à ex-
pansão colonial portuguesa. Na medida em que Portugal precisava afirmar 
seu poder sobre a região, uma das maneiras de consegui-lo era transferir di-
reitos sobre a terra para europeus e para firmas controladas por europeus. Ao 
mesmo tempo, populações que estavam sendo ameaçadas de expropriação de 
suas terras recorriam aos próprios institutos do direito colonial para tentar 
conter esse processo. Daí que o registro e processos judiciais eram também 
mobilizados por essas pessoas em uma tentativa de resguardar pelo menos 
parte de seus direitos. O capcioso desse processo era que, ao recorrerem às 
instituições coloniais, elas acabavam por reforçá-las.47
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TRACING SOCIAL SPACES:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF LAND REGISTRATION
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina 
1. Entangled narrations: international law, national law and colonial law
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the history of in-
ternational law by scholars seeking to overcome Eurocentrism and to evolve 
towards a truly global perspective. The field focuses on transfers, networks, 
connections and transformations that have occurred in time and within a 
global space, as well as on methodology, scrutinising the different possibili-
ties for writing the history of international law.1 At the same time, interest in 
questions of colonialism, imperialism and law, in the complex relationship 
between international law and empire and in their historical narrative(s) has 
grown rapidly.2 
The aim of the article is to present some preliminary considerations con-
cerning an ongoing project, which investigates the mechanisms of land law 
and land register systems in African colonial territories between the 19th and 
20th centuries, focusing on the relationships between international and do-
mestic laws in the imperial expansion and colonial periods.
It proposes to examine the legal mechanisms of colonial expansion and 
to outline the discourses between the colonial powers and their implications 
on the legal concepts of land ownership in both a colonial and a European 
context. Case studies will provide detailed accounts on different land register 
systems as examples of how larger frameworks of these juridical practices 
evolved. The article will show that the discourses between colonial powers 
and the adaptation of European legal concepts regarding property and land 
registration in the colonies facilitated the expansion and consolidation of co-
lonial empires. 
1  See Fassbender-Peters 2012, p. 1-24; Obregón Tarazona 2015, p. 95-112; Kosken-
niemi 2017, p. 381-397. On methology see: Koskenniemi 2013, p. 215-240; Koskenniemi 
2014, p. 119-139; Koskenniemi 2016a, p. 104-112. See also: Orford 2013a, 97-117; Orford 
2013b, p. 166-197; Orford 2015, p. 369-385; Hunter 2016, 1-32.
2  Rech 2017, 57-80; Koskenniemi 2016b, p. 248-277. See also: Pitts 2018; Starski-Käm-




Scholars from different disciplines have pointed out that the African col-
onies were used as a laboratory,3 as a living laboratory4 and as a space of 
transfer and comparison with the European context.5 The duality of space 
constructed around the colonies and the European states raises important 
questions concerning land ownership and land register systems. In this per-
spective, the aim is to investigate the complex relationships between the colo-
nies and the European states and how these impacted the establishment of 
register systems; particularly, which register systems managed to prevail and 
what were the relevant factors in their survival, i.e. which modalities were 
employed where the customary law of the local population met European 
concepts of land law and land tenure.
The key concept for trying to explain not only the political and social 
frameworks but also the legal dynamics that pertained between European 
and colonial areas is that of “internationalisation”. As it expanded during the 
long 19th century, internationalisation was certainly favoured by the emer-
gence of national legal language, which were the founding elements of an in-
ternational legal language and at the same time complementary to it. In the 
19th century, in fact, the idea of ‘nation’ became strong and reached its acme 
as the liberal spirit continued to blow like a wind through Europe and across 
the Atlantic, transmuting and forming itself into many different political, le-
gal, social, economic and scientific realities. The rise of national identities was 
marked by revolutionary movements, spreading rapidly, as a new geopolitical 
map of the world appeared with emerging territorial states as central actors.6
Thus, the delimitation of borders and territorial independence coincided 
in the 19th century with the affirmation of the so-called principle of nationality 
and the principle of non-intervention, developed and perfected by diplomats, 
politicians, lawyers and jurists. These professionals, however, were simulta-
neously engaged in the legal construction of the colonial discourse and in the 
legitimisation of European expansion, which was becoming almost a constit-
uent element of most European nations.
Throughout a period of intense rivalries both in Europe and in the colonial 
environment, we perceive a sort of cooperation and consultation in the sec-
ond part of the 19th century. 
3  De L’Estoile 2004.
4  Tilley 2011.
5  Nuzzo 2006, p. 52-58; Nuzzo 2005, p. 463-508.
6  Fiocchi 2019.
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This moment was crucial for the internationalisation of (legal) discourse. 
Models and practices were discussed in conferences, associations, congress-
es, institutions and expositions.7 The networks of meetings were recently de-
scribed as “knots in what together constituted a worldwide web”.8 
This cooperation included international law regarding land registration 
and discussions concerning the application of European legislation not only 
in the European states but also in the African territories. The idea of a com-
mon international dialogue favoured entanglements between the national 
and international spheres.9 
These national and international spheres concerning land registration and 
land ownership will be examined through three different “narratives”: 1) in-
ternationalising international law 2) nationalising the land register systems 
and 3) internationalising the land register systems. The choice of the term 
“narrative” encourages broad methodological debates that entail the perspec-
tive of a global legal history, as well as different possibilities of narration con-
sidering a variety of spatial and temporal entanglements. Eminent scholars 
have critically re-read the “master narrative”10 in the history of international 
law – the European one – giving space to other non-European narratives 
from South America and Asia, as well as from Africa.11
Martti Koskenniemi, in this sense, captured the complex nature of the term 
“narrative” most aptly, when he referred to the “history of international law 
histories”.12 In this context each narrative is devoted to a cultural, social and 
political sphere as a product of a specific temporal and geographical context. 
The fil rouge of all narratives is the impact of the internationalisation of law, 
which comprises: the professionalisation of international law, developing as 
an autonomous discipline in the 19th century; the crystallisation of land regis-
ter systems influenced by European civil law codifications; and the implemen-
7  Lindner 2015, p. 57-58.
8  Geppert 2010, p. 3, in which the author showed through a transnational approach 
how expositions favoured the “international” exchanges between nations at the end of the 
19th century. See also concerning the role of comparison of law and also international law: 
Koskenniemi-Kari 2018, p. 974-999. Also Singaravélou 2012, p. 135-157.
9  Bourdieu 1990, p. 1-10.
10  Peter-Fassbender 2012, p. 8, according to the authors the reference is here for 
Immanuel Wallerstein.
11  See for example concerning the role of the peripheries and semi-peripheries: Beck-
er Lorca 2015; Becker Lorca 2012, pp. 1034-1057; Becker Lorca 2010, pp. 475-552.
12  Koskenniemi 2012, p. 943. 
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tation of new land register systems, such as the Torrens system, adopted by 
the British Colony of South Australia. Lastly, it will be shown that the interna-
tionalisation of law was the result of the above-mentioned narratives applied 
in colonial contexts, as for example in Italian Eritrea, as well as in the French 
Protectorate of Tunisia, the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo. 
2. First narrative: internationalising international law
The first narrative refers to the increasing internationalisation of law dur-
ing the 19th century. A central role in this development was played by jurists 
in advancing the scientifisation of international law.13 Francis Lieber, pro-
fessor of public international law at Columbia University and author of the 
renowned Lieber Code (a first attempt to formulate the “laws of war”), took 
a crucial role when he proposed to the Belgian international lawyer Gustave 
Rolin-Jacquemyns the establishment of an association with the purpose of 
drafting the general principles of international law, a so-called “espèce de 
concile juridico-oecuménique sans pape et sans infaillibilité”.14 
Upon this proposal Gustave Rolin-Jacquemyns invited ten of the most dis-
tinguished experts of international law to convene in Ghent. Among them 
were Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Gustave Moynier and Pasquale Stanislao 
Mancini who subsequently founded the Institut de Droit International in 
September 1873 with the purpose 
En travaillant à formuler les principes généraux de la science de manière à répondre à 
la conscience juridique du monde civilisé; […] En donnant son concours à toute tentative 
sérieuse de codification graduelle et progressive du droit international […].15 
The Institut de Droit International addressed a variety of legal issues of 
international interest including colonial law. The debates concerning colonial 
law became relevant in particular regarding the African and Asian colonies and 
entailed questions such as the general legitimacy of colonisation, as well as so-
mewhat technical questions, such as regulating river transport on the Congo.16
In 1894 the Institut Colonial International was founded in Brussels as an 
institution of predominantly Western and American states for the purpose of 
13  Nuzzo-Vec, 2012, p. XII.
14  Rivier 1877, 12. See also Rolin 1923, p. 10. 
15  Rolin 1923, p. 18. Nuzzo 2012, p. 133. See also: Nuzzo 2011, p. 319-337. 
16  Rolin 1923, p. 10. See also Koskenniemi 2001, p. 92 ff.
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exchanging expertise with regard to their colonies. Among the member states 
were France, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, as well as Russia, the United States, Brazil and Chile.17 
The aim of the Institut Colonial International was to engage and promote 
transnational exchanges between scholars, politicians, colonial administra-
tors and experts. From the beginning it affirmed its nature as a scientific as-
sociation whose purpose was: 
faciliter et [répandre] l’étude comparée de l’administration et du droit des colonies; en 
particulier: des différents systèmes de gouvernement des colonies […]; de la législation co-
lonial, en tant qu’elle peut intéresser, soit plusieurs colonies déterminées par des mesures 
arrêtes en commun, soit toutes les colonies par l’importance des problèmes résolus; de 
ressources des diverses colonies, de leur régime économique et commercial.18 
The objective of creating an international colonial platform was well ex-
pressed in the second paragraph of the same article: 
créer des relations internationales entre les personnes qui s’occupent d’une façon 
suivie de l’étude du droit et de l’administration des colonies – hommes politiques, ad-
ministrateurs, savants – faciliter l’échange des idées et des connaissances spéciales entre 
hommes compétents.19 
The Institut focused on specific topics relevant to the colonial context: 
regulation of labour, tropical hygiene, acclimatisation of Europeans to colo-
nial environments, and colonial monetary matters, as well as land law and 
land registration systems. Ulrike Lindner has shown that at the end of the 
19th century there was frequent and common cooperation in different fields 
of international and colonial law. The work and the network created by the 
Institut Colonial International “seem to have reached a surprising level of 
institutionalised exchange”.20 Legal regulations were central to the Institut’s 
research, something also confirmed by the background of the members, most 
of whom were lawyers or pursuing a legal profession.21 
Also of significant importance was the founding of the Bibliothèque Co-
17  Lindner 2015, p. 57-58. See also See: Henning Böttger 2006, p. 165-172; of the 
same author see also: Henning Böttger 2005, p. 109-115.
18  Institut Colonial International 1937, p. 5.
19  Institut Colonial International 1937, p. 5.
20  Lindner 2015, p. 57.
21  Institut Colonial International 1937, p. 5.
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lonial Internationale (1895-1930). In its annual or biannual meetings, the 
Institut Colonial International produced and edited a considerable number 
of research papers, studies and proceedings (the so-called comptes-rendus), 
which represented a fruitful source for various colonial topics.22 
It is interesting to notice that, despite the publication of numerous studies 
on, for example, “l’influence du climat sur la colonisation” (1894), the debate 
“sur l’enseignement colonial” (1900) or “sur le régime forestier aux colonies” 
(1912), between 1898 and 1906 the Institut Colonial International focused its 
attention on the study of land law and land registration.23 In 1911, the Insti-
tut Colonial International published the Recueil international de législation 
colonial: a collection of laws intended to promote discussion and analyses of 
legal problems in the colonies. 
The Institut de Droit International and the Institut Colonial Internation-
al are key to understanding how the concept of internationalisation was used 
as a strategy for the development of the colonial discourse.
In this context, it is notable that the Institut Colonial International used 
a comparative approach in analysing the different topics relevant to colonial 
consolidation and expansion. Joannès Tramond, for example, in his essay 
entitled Des conclusions sur la colonisation comparée, showed the benefit 
of comparing colonial experiences in building a collaborative and fruitful dia-
logue between nations.24 For legal historians, studying the approaches of the 
22  Concerning some topics discussed by the Institute, for example, agriculture see: 
Daviron 2010, p. 479-501.
23  This was the topic of the 3er Serie of the publication edited by the Institut Colonial 
International [after the 1. Serie on labour law and the 2. on colonial administrators]: Le 
Régime foncier aux Colonies, which comprehends, for example: Tome I.– Indie britan-
nique. Colonies allemandes (Mertens 1898); Tome II. – Etat indépendant du Congo. – 
Colonies françaises, Bruxelles, 1899; Tome III. – Tunisie. Erythrée. Philippines. (Mertens 
1899); Tome IV.– Indes orientales néerlandaises, Bruxelles, 1899; Tome V.– Lagos.- Sier-
ra Leone.– Gambia.- Bornéo septentrional britannique.– Cap de Bonne-Espérance.– 
Rhodésie.– Basutoland.– Iles Salomon.– Iles Fidji.– Côte-d’Or, Bruxelles, 1902.
24  Tramond 1932, p. 527-528 : “Cette unification de la planète ne s’est encore faite, 
nous ne pouvons la concevoir que sous la forme de ces grands empires s’étendant sur 
plusieurs climats et sur plusieurs continents, qui sont essentiellement les empires colo-
niaux. […] À l’ancienne notion de rivalité, qui causa tant de maux à l’humanité, ne cesse 
de se substituer celle de solidarité et de sympathie, et l’on peut dire que cette passion colo-
niale, qui jadis causa tant de guerres et de catastrophes, se mue aujourd’hui en un principe 
d’union et presque de collaboration. […] à beaucoup d’égards, les questions coloniales sont 
entrées dans une phase où leur intérêt dépasse celui des affaires purement nationales”.
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Institut Colonial International offers a different perspective on the idea of 
“internationalisation”. The Institut collected and compared governmental re-
ports and statistics and produced questionnaires addressed to European em-
pires and to their colonial administrators. The answers were collected, pub-
lished and discussed during the regular meetings.25 As the Institut’s founders 
had hoped, their publications promoted legal debates, discussions and the 
prospects of specific legislation, decrees or norms to be adapted and used 
in completely different colonial systems. Examples of this “borrowing” and 
cross-pollination were the application in African territories of the Torrens 
system, and of “typically European” land register systems, such as the Grund-
buch or transcription.
3. Second narrative: nationalising the land registration systems 
The development of the aforementioned land register systems during the 
long 19th century forms part of the second narrative. The problem of land 
laws, land register systems and of the consequent choice of the best system 
to adopt were questions that dominated the discussion both in the European 
states and in their respective colonial possessions during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, inevitably involving domestic, colonial and international law. 
In the 19th century private law codifications and the crystallisation of pri-
25  Stoler 2010, p. 158-160. For example, the questionnaire of the 1899 session includ-
ed a number of land law and land registration topics. The Institut Colonial International 
collected acts, regulations and orders in these specific areas: the land tenancy under which 
occupation was sanctioned—fee simple, emphytheusis, ordinary leases, clearance leases; 
the exclusion or admission of foreigners as grantees; the maxima and minima of the ex-
tent of waste lands obtainable by each planter; the prices at which waste lands were sold 
or leased, whether these prices were determined by regulation or by competition, and the 
conditions to which the resale of these lands were subject; the taxes to which planters 
were subject whether they were exempted from certain taxes and if so for how many years; 
whether compulsory labour still existed for village or other purposes, how far the people 
on the lands were exempted from such services and what the planters had to pay in con-
sideration for the exemption; […] the rights of natives (chiefs, communities or private in-
dividuals) on the land, occupied or turned to any account by them before the conquest; the 
limits on the rights of the natives to sell, let, or sub-let their own lands and the conditions 
under which such rights could be exercised; the regulations that applied to deeds of sale 
and mortgages on lands belonging to Europeans and natives (public or authentic records, 




vate property rights were crucial to the discussion and adoption of specific 
land register systems. Concurrent to the nation-building process was the na-
tionwide unification of law and with it the establishment of land register sys-
tems. The idea of “good government”, well articulated in the Enlightenment, 
became central during the 19th century, with its principal objects of procur-
ing the true happiness and security of nations.26 Land register systems and 
property were part of the legal discourse around achieving a certain level of 
security in the transfer of immoveable goods. It was felt, without doubt, that 
protection of property lay at the core of good government, also affecting other 
fields of law, from administrative law to tax law. By protecting real property, 
states ensured a certain level of legal certainty between private individuals 
and thus encouraged private and economic exchange. The level of legal cer-
tainty regarding property transfer was guaranteed by the land register system 
and its different typologies.27 
In this perspective, one of the fundamental principles of land register 
systems was the publicity principle, which had repercussions on certainty of 
ownership, security of tenure and reduction of land disputes. Victor Ehren-
berg  described the importance of the effects of publicity for the concepts of 
“Rechtssicherheit” and “Verkehrssicherheit” also known as “statische Sicher-
heit” and “dynamische Sicherheit”.28 Influenced by different cultural, politi-
cal and economic developments, a number of land register systems emerged. 
By choosing a comparative perspective, this study focuses on the influence 
of modern civil law codifications, more specifically, the influence of certain 
concepts of property on the development of land register systems in the 19th 
century. 
The land register system established in France and Austria in the 19th cen-
tury, and the Torrens system – a register system ex novo established in the 
colony of South Australia in 1858 – serve as case studies for this analysis. 
In the course of drafting the French Civil Code, discussions evolved be-
26  In 1758 Emer de Vattel in his Le droit des gens wrote that: “The society is estab-
lished with the view of procuring, to those who are its members, the necessaries, conve-
niences, and even pleasures of life, and, in general, everything necessary to their hap-
piness, –of enabling each individual peaceably to enjoy his own property, and to obtain 
justice with safety and certainty,– and, finally, of defending themselves in a body against 
all external violence”: Vattel 2008, B. I, chap. VI, §72, p. 126.
27  Schmoeckel 2018; see also the recent volume edited by Goymour-Watterson-Dix-
on 2018.
28  Ehrenberg 1903, p. 273, see  Petrelli 2007, p. 594.
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tween the members of the commission around the transcription system, a 
land register system that originated from legislation passed during the French 
Revolution and the coutumes de nantissement.29 For some of the drafters, 
transcription had to be considered and included in the Code with regard to all 
transactions of immovable goods, while for other members this was contrary 
to the idea of an absolute property right, crystallised in art. 544: “La propriété 
est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pour-
vu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements”.30 
The drafters of the code ultimately supported the consensualist doctrine of 
transfer and thus considered all transfers as exchanges, without any impact 
on “third parties” and any specific provisions concerning, for example, mort-
gages. 
Pursuant to the Code, only certain legal transactions and certificates need-
ed to be transcribed: it was mandatory to transcribe donations, for example, 
according to art. 939 ff., entailed estates substitutions according to art. 1069, 
and petitions of restitution, according to art. 958 ff.31 As Gaetano Petrelli has 
pointed out, the lack of a homogenous discipline with regard to transcription 
determined criticism of the codification itself, accompanied by severe reper-
cussions on financing sectors as well as credit financing.32 
To overcome this problematic situation and uncertainty of legal transfers, 
detailed provisions regulating the transcription system were issued, only sev-
eral years later, in 1855 with the Loi du 23 mars 1855 sur la transcription en 
matière hypothécaire, introducing the transcription system “in public regis-
ters of property as a whole”.33 This law disciplined the “transcription of mort-
29  For an overview see: Petrelli 2007, p. 594; Sandonà 2011, p. 363-416; Besson 1891. 
See also the contribution of Alan Sandonà in this volume.
30  Code Civil Francais 1804, art. 544, p. 134.
31  Petrelli 2007, p. 594; Wieacker 1980, p. 525. See Nerson 1938, p. 6. 
32  Petrelli 2007, p. 594.
33  Vinding Kruse 1953, p. 84. Interesting is the comment of Victor Fons on the impor-
tance of this law: “D’après ce titre clair et précis, il semblerait que son objet unique a été 
l’établissement de la transcription pour les actes translatifs ou modificatifs de la propriété 
immobilière. Néanmoins, la loi contient des dispositions de la plus grande importance 
relatives à divers points du régime hypothécaire. L’objet de toutes ses dispositions a été 
de donner une publicité complète tout à la fois aux transmissions totales ou partielles des 
immeubles, aux démembrements qu’ils subissent et aux charges dont ils sont grevés, et de 
procurer ainsi de la sécurité à ceux qui achètent des immeubles ou qui les acceptent pour 
gage des prêts qu’ils consentent à faire“: Fons 1857, p. 6
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gage, providing also for the recordation of all transfers of land and vesting all 
property rights and interest on land”.34
The law of 1855 extended transcription to transfers of ownership, but the 
registry of real property was not deemed a legal prerequisite for the transfer 
of ownership. The transfer of ownership was by mere agreement. Therefore, 
the transcription system had no probative force. Nonetheless, the registry’s 
purpose was to inform about the legal status of immovable property. The reg-
istration was personal. Consequently, the entries in the registry were listed 
by the name of the owner and not by the immovable property itself, (as, for 
example, in the Grundbuch).35 
Some years later in a completely different geographical, political context 
another “model” of codification was enacted, legislating a different system 
of land registration. The ABGB (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) uni-
fied the Austrian substantive property laws and entered into force in 1812. 
It established throughout all territories of the Empire an Austrian land reg-
ister system, the so-called Grundbuch system, under which registration of 
title constitutes the property as a right in rem. Therefore, the registration is 
a necessary condition for the transfer of ownership, as stated in § 321 of the 
Austrian civil code: “Wo so genannte Landtafeln, Stadt- oder Grundbücher, 
oder andere dergleichen öffentliche Register eingeführt sind, wird der rech-
tmäßige Besitz eines dinglichen Rechtes auf unbewegliche Sachen nur durch 
die ordentliche Eintragung in diese öffentlichen Bücher erlangt“.36 Detailed 
legislation regulating the harmonisation of the discipline of the Grundbuch 
in all the territories of the Empire was issued only in 1871.37
With regard to transfer of ownership, the Grundbuch system and the 
French transcription system are significantly distinct from each other. The 
French transcription follows the system of solo consensus, in which the mere 
conclusion of property sale transfers the property. The subsequent registra-
tion serves only to protect the original vendor from third party purchasers 
in good faith, whereas in Austria the transfer of ownership is not valid until 
the transaction is registered in the Grundbuch. The contract of sale and the 
34  Bouckaert 2010, p. 192. See: Pfister 2018, p. 157-192.
35  Petrelli 2007, p. 594.
36  Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1811, § 321, p. 64.
37  See for the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Laws n. 95 and 96 of 25 July 1871, concern-
ing the establishment of (land register). For a comment on them and their application in 
the Habsburg territories: Gabrielli 1974, p. 2; Gabrielli 2012, p. 179; Gabrielli – Tommaseo 
1999; Sicchiero 1993.
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transfer of ownership are conceptually distinct in the Grundbuch system. The 
registration thus has a constitutive effect. A real property system, listing ac-
cording to plots of land and citing their boundaries, was already in existence 
in the Austrian territories from the 15th century.38
Transcription and Grundbuch are two parallel systems functioning within 
property registration but resulting from two different legal concepts. Grund-
buch differs from transcription in some crucial aspects: the implementation 
of the registration system, which is property-based instead of subject-based; 
the constitutional value attributed to registration; the registration principle, 
which states that an inter vivos transaction alone could not be considered a 
transfer or lead to the establishment of property rights. Other features of the 
Grundbuch are a judicial review of the formal and substantive requirements 
of the titles and strict compliance with the principle of continuity, since the 
registration of an item could only be attributed to the person referred to as 
the owner in the land register.39
As a paradigmatic example for a register system ex novo in a colonial con-
text we have the Torrens System, established in the British colony of South 
Australia in 1858 and developed by Australian politician Sir Robert Torrens. 
Inspired by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, he largely reinterpreted and 
adapted its principles on registration of ships and charges to the context of 
colonial land tenure. He also drew from the land register systems of the Ger-
man cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen. His Real Property Act 1858 
introduced mandatory registration for all immovable property. As in the Aus-
trian land register system, all changes of rights to land had to be registered 
and consequently a real property system was established, assigning to every 
particular plot a parcel identification number.40 
Furthermore, entry into the registry was a constitutive element for the 
conveyance of property. The owner held a certificate of title. The property 
could be conveyed by transfer of the title deeds.41 The title deeds had proba-
tive value. The validity of the title deeds was supported by the government 
records of all land titles. As a result the purchaser’s title upon registration 
was basically indefeasible and free from any defects affecting the title of the 
38  Kohl 2018, p. 113-132.
39  Gabrielli 1974, p. 3-4; Solidoro Maruotti 2010, p. 146. See also Padovini 2001, p. 
713-727; Padovini, 2002, 499-506.
40  Janczyk 1977, p. 213-233.
41  Panforti 2000, p. 715. Rogers 2006, p. 125-132.
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vendor.42 For the rare cases of fraud in which the owner suffered financial loss 
due to an error in the system, an assurance fund was set up to compensate the 
owner for his loss. Such guaranteed and marketable titles facilitated the con-
veyance of real property, enabling property to be traded like commodities.43 
Recent studies have shown the role played by the establishment of a new 
land register system in the colonies, focusing on the history of land register 
systems from a temporal and spatial perspective.44 For example, the Torrens 
system was based on the assumption that land has no history. As Sarah Ken-
nan argues, it works like H.G. Wells’ time machine: they both share a “basis in 
fiction, a reliance on radical temporal dislocation, and the facilitation of hu-
manity’s arrival in dystopic and racist landscapes. Title registries operate on 
the basis of fictional accounts of land which portray it as a market commodity 
with a short and entirely contained history”.45 
The concept of establishing a land register system ex novo in a colonial en-
vironment, through which the colonisers could exploit lands and enable fast 
circulation of property rights by title certificates, was extremely well received 
in many other colonies. The European colonial states decided to introduce the 
Torrens system in many of their African colonies between the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century, as well as in many colonies of 
the East.46 In the French colony of New Caledonia the Torrens system was de-
scribed as an experiment that was able to answer the needs of the colonisers.47 
42  Low 2009, p. 205-234.
43  Panforti 2000, p. 715. See also Gillissen 1974, p. 142-144.
44  Mawani 2014, p. 65-96; Keenan 2015.
45  Keenan 2019, p. 283-303; See also: Keenan 2017, p. 87-108.
46  See Guyot Cameron 1915, p. 13 ff. It is interesting to report the entry concerning 
the Torrens system written by Heyse 1947, p. 920: “L’Acte Torrens a fait du chemin et est 
appliqué en Indochine et dans la plupart des colonies de l’Afrique centrale. Cependant, 
il ne s’agit pas d’une application intégrale, car dans la législation du Congo belge et dans 
celle des autres colonies ou protectorats, on relève de nombreuses discordances et modifi-
cations apportées aux conceptions radicales de Sir Robert Richard Torrens, qui a créé une 
adaptation très ingénieuse du droit immobilier allemand”.
47  Recueil Général de Jurisprudence de Doctrine et de Législation Colonial et Ma-
ritimes 1910, p. 24: “La colonie se trouvait dans les meilleures conditions pour servir à 
l’expérimentation d’un régime foncier procédant de l’Act Torrens. Lorsqu’arrivèrent dans 
la colonie les dernières instructions ministérielles prescrivant une étude dans ce sens, elle 
était administrée par le Gouverneur Pardon, qui parvint à mettre sur pied le projet qui 
porte encore son nom. Ce projet, qui date du 29 août 1891, n’est pas, comme la loi tuni-
sienne de 1883, une imitation dégénérée de l’acte australien, juxtaposant sans logique des 
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In other African colonies, however, some European states also experimented 
with the application of modified versions of the Grundbuch system and the 
French transcription system, as will be shown in the next paragraph.48 
4. Third narrative: internationalising the land register systems
The third narrative will focus on how the internationalisation of law influ-
enced the development of different land register systems in colonial contexts.
Colonial administrators commonly used their control of land ownership as 
a tool to control and exploit colonial possessions. Land ownership and prop-
erty registration played a significant role in African colonialism, where public 
and private interests mingled with colonial ambitions and economic exploita-
tion. By studying the legal system of land registration, one can examine how 
European states used their colonies to adapt and experiment with the legal 
frameworks of land ownership.
The introduction of modified land register systems served to a certain 
extent for the expropriation of land by colonial powers. But not only eco-
nomic advantages were of interest. The colonies also served as an experimen-
tal space, in which European colonial powers were able to gain knowledge 
on several land register systems in different circumstances. In Continental 
Europe various legal systems developed different concepts of property and 
property rights. Legislative developments were also heavily influenced by 
tradition and by a relationship between the population and the land regard-
ing property that had developed over time. These European concepts of land 
ownership were applied and adapted to the colonial context, where they were, 
vice versa, influenced by native customs. At the end of the 19th century, the 
spread of the Grundbuch, transcription and Torrens systems in the African 
colonies resulted in a contamination49 and transfer of legal norms, as the fol-
lowing case studies will show. In the French colonies in Tunisia (1885-1892) 
dispositions à peine conciliables, empruntées tantôt au système germanique, tantôt au 
système français. Il adopte d’abord, avec toutes ses conséquences, le principe de l’Act Tor-
rens, “la publicité”, d’après lequel la propriété et les autres droits réels ne s’acquièrent que 
par l’inscription aux registres publics, à l’exclusion du simple consentement; il organise 
ensuite, à l’instar de son modèle, le “contrôle légal” de toutes les inscriptions faites aux 
registres (principe de la légalité) […]”.
48  See: Colin-Le Meur-Léonard 2010; Barrière-Rochegude 2010; Nobirabo Musafiri 
2007.
49  Guella 2014, p. 167-193.
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the decree of 1 July 1885 introduced a land register system based on the Tor-
rens system, but it was also influenced by the French transcription and the 
German Grundbuch system.50 This law of 1885 had some unique features: 
the “publicité” was “réelle”, which meant that the land, not the owner, was 
registered (art. 18). The “immatriculation”, or registration of land was “fac-
ultative” (Art. 22). Concerning any “oppositions à l’immatriculation” a mixed 
land tribunal (Tribunal Mixte Immobilier) was entitled to establish the own-
ership of contested land (Art. 33 ff.) and at the same time an assurance fund 
was established: “fonds d’assurance destine à indemniser celui qui se trouvait 
lésé par l’immatriculation d’un immeuble ou par l’inscription d’un droit réel” 
(Art. 39).51
For the Congo Free State (1885-1908), of relevance in this context is the 
Ordonnance of 1 July 1885 through which the Belgian government estab-
lished the concept of state land, starting a consequent process of occupation 
based on legal title. As Johan Pottier pointed out “European concepts of legal 
tenure, assumed to be universal, became central to the land laws of every 
colony. In particular, the colonial authorities assumed that the European 
concept of proprietary ownership covered the full range of customary land 
rights in Africa”.52 
Article 1 of the Ordonnance of 1885 stated: “A partir de la présente 
proclamation, aucun contrat ni convention passé avec des indigènes pour 
l’occupation, à un titre quelconque, de parties du sol, ne sera reconnu par le 
gouvernement et ne sera protégé par lui, à moins que le contrat ou la conven-
tion ne soit fait à l’intervention de l’officier public commis par l’administrateur 
général et d’après les règles que ce dernier tracera dans chaque cas particu-
lier“. Furthermore, Article 2 proclaimed: “Nul n’a le droit d’occuper sans titre 
des terres vacantes, ni de déposséder les indigènes des terres qu’ils occupent; 
les terres vacantes doivent être considérées comme appartenant à l’Etat”.53 
These Articles represent the legal basis for the proclamation of the Congo 
50  See for a bibliography concerning the topic: Hénia 1998; Giudice, 2009, p. 229-
239.
51  “Art. 1 Les dispositions du code civil français qui ne sont pas contraires à la pré-
sente loi s’appliquent, en Tunisie, aux immeubles immatriculés el aux droits réels sur ces 
immeubles”: law published in Régence de Tunis, Loi Foncier and règlements annexes, 
recueil officiel 1893, p. 18; Dain 1885; Tirman 1885.
52  Pottier 2005, p. 59; See also Brausch 1961.
53  See Bulletin de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 1885, p. 30. See also Kinet 2005, p. 
70 ff.
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Free State and for subsequent legislation concerning land tenure and the in-
troduction of the Torrens system in the Belgian Congo in 1920.54 While in 
Belgium the French transcription system was implemented in 1851, it is inter-
esting to note that in their colony of Congo, the Belgian government opted for 
the Torrens system and implemented it by a decree dated 6 February 1920. 
The decision to establish the Torrens system was an attempt at finding a com-
promise between guaranteeing the boundaries of “tribal” land and protecting 
the interests of colonial landowners.55 The same Decree entered into force 
in 1927 in Ruanda-Urundi. The legislation established that a “land-title of 
registered proprietor was paramount and indefeasible, unless fraud had been 
committed. Furthermore, a person dealing with a registered proprietor need 
not be concerned about the validity of such title - he could rely on the Certifi-
cate Title as conclusive”.56
In Italian Eritrea the Italian government introduced the Grundbuch under 
the Royal Decree of 1909. Article 164 included the establishment of a proba-
tive land register system. Article 206 specified that “registration in the special 
land registers is the only legal statement of rights over property and their 
transfer”. Registration had to “be based on a legal document valid for the pur-
chase and transfer of rights over properties according to the law applicable in 
the colony” (article 207). Registration of the transfer of a right could not be 
done if the transferor was not the holder of that right, according to the land 
register (article 208).57 According to article 209, any concession deed had to 
be noted in the land register within sixty days from the date of its stipulation, 
under penalty of cancellation of the same. All transfer deeds or declarations 
concerning ownership of property, as well as of any other right over property, 
had to be registered as well.58 Subsequently the Decree no. 1247 of 21 Novem-
ber 1918 established a title registration office in Asmara.59
This case is especially interesting, since the Italian government was trying 
to introduce a system in Eritrea that it had failed to implement at home. Eri-
trea was regarded as an experiment for Parliament, Government and policy 
makers of the Kingdom of Italy with the purpose of assessing the feasibility 
54  See: Yernault 2013, p. 50 ff.
55  Dufrénoy 1939; Heyse 1934.
56  Dirk Beke 1994, p. 65.
57  Ministero degli affari esteri 1909, p. 71-72.
58  ibid 72-73.
59  Favali and Pateman 2007, p. 261.
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of a change in the Italian system.60 The Italian law on property, crystallised in 
the Code of 1865, generally adopted the French registration system, and was 
largely influenced by the Napoleonic Code, the French law of 23 March 1855 
and the Belgian law of 16 December 1851.61 In 1886, Law no. 3682, also known 
as the Messedaglia Law, set up the unified Italian land register. It introduced 
a new type of surface measurement based on land parcels and established a 
register for land and urban buildings, expanding on the previous Urban Land 
Register dating back to 1877.62 In spite of these important reforms, one of the 
most debated issues in Parliament was the lack of probative elements within 
the transcription system. Since the enactment of the Civil Code of 1865, the 
necessity of establishing a land register with probative value similar to the 
Austrian Grundbuch system was widely felt.63 
There was a strong need for radical change in the functioning of the ca-
dastral and register system in the Kingdom of Italy. Various parliamentary 
committees were established and many projects were submitted proposing 
land registers with probative value to enhance the possibility of proving land 
rights. Worthy of attention is a report by the Minister for Justice, Vittorio 
Scialoja, resulting from a meeting of 3 March 1910 (exactly one year after the 
enactment of the Royal Decree 1909 for the Eritrean colony) when a draft law 
was proposed to the Senate. The report included amendments in Book III of 
the Civil Code, with special regard to chapter XXII, relating to the transcrip-
tion of property transactions. Scialoja spoke of: 
Unanimous acknowledgement of the need to reform the land register system to make 
property titles easier and clearer; disagreement upon the ways in which such an objective 
could be reached. And while eminent legal experts would certainly accept the map system, 
other equally influential experts hesitate to approve a radical reform which may affect the 
structure of society [...].64
60  Fiocchi Malaspina 2018, p. 233-251. 
61  See: Colorni 1954, p. 189; Solimano 2003, p. 101, 106; Manuel-Gismondi 1933, 
348; Di Simone 2006; Ferrante 2008, p. 105; Sandonà 2011, p. 363; Roggero 2013, p. 175-
228. See also: Petrelli 2007, p. 602-603.
62  Messedaglia 1936, p. 274.
63  Messedaglia 1936, p. 274. See also the contribution of Alan Sandonà in this volume.
64  “Unanimità di consenso nel riconoscere l’assoluta necessità di riformare il siste-
ma del catasto per rendere più semplice e certo il titolo di proprietà; dissenso invece sui 
modi cui raggiungere tale scopo. E mentre autorevoli giuristi non esiterebbero ad accettare 
senz’altro il sistema tavolare, altri giuristi non meno autorevoli si dimostrano titubanti ad 
una radicale riforma la quale intaccherebbe l’organismo civile [...]” (author’s translation). 
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The debate regarding transcription was resumed upon annexation of the 
“New Provinces” of Italy, i.e. former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy at the end of World War I. These 
were the provinces of Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia and in these 
territories the Grundbuch continued to be applied. Therefore, two different 
property register systems coexisted at the same time in Italy, both aiming to 
meet specific requirements.
The years following the annexation, in fact, were particularly difficult in 
terms of introducing new legislation. The long period of Habsburg rule had 
created a very deep-rooted administrative and political system that was diffi-
cult for Italian legislators to overturn.65 Although Italian legislative procedure 
was very complex, the legislature decided to extend, without any adaptation 
or limitation, the applicable national laws to the new provinces. However, one 
of the main exceptions, which greatly impacted private law in particular, was 
the Grundbuch. It was decided not to extend the Italian transcription system 
(based on French and Belgian law) and at the same time to retain, albeit tem-
porarily, the Grundbuch system that dated back to ancient times.66
There were various reasons why the Grundbuch was maintained in those 
territories. Among them was the acknowledgement that the Grundbuch was 
deeply rooted in the legal historical tradition and in the economic system. 
Also, the Grundbuch was proving to be efficient, as it was being introduced 
into Italian Libya by Royal Decree no. 12073 of 3 July 1921, as well as in the 
Italian Dodecanese Islands by government Decree no. 46 of 22 August 1925.67 
The desire to adopt it in various territories became evident, in particular with 
regard to other colonies.68 
5. Conclusion: universal principles on land law and land registration sys-
tem?
These three narratives reveal the complexity of normativity in relation to 
the “international” in the second part of the 19th century. The history of inter-
This project has been described by Ferrara as the most advanced and accomplished leg-
islative attempt to regulate the Italian property registration system possibly meeting the 
land market requirements: Ferrara 1910, p. 468; Galateria, 1937, p. 105.
65  Capuzzo 1992, p. 133. See also: Rossi 2012, p. 502-510.
66  Capuzzo 1992, p. 133.
67  Fiocchi Malaspina 2018, p. 233-251; Bassi 2013, p. 17-18.
68  Cuccaro 2010, p. 4. 
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national law and the history of international relations and cooperation were 
developed through the “continuous work of interconnection” carried out by 
transnational and international institutions created from the second half of 
the 19th century, with the aim of contributing to a “unique” set of rules in the 
various colonies.69
Our analysis of different systems of land registration shows how European 
states used their colonies to adapt and experiment with the legal frameworks 
of land ownership. What happened in the colonies might have been impos-
sible to carry out in the European context. The knowledge acquired by imple-
menting different legal frameworks of land ownership and land registration 
in the colonies conversely influenced the legal systems applied in Continental 
Europe.
The Institut Colonial International encouraged the exchange of ideas 
about the various colonial experiences that states had collected in their own 
particular situations, in order to create common and universal principles. In-
ternational law and domestic law, or national law concerning land register 
systems and land law were part of the colonial discourse as it endeavoured 
to create and adopt universal principles of law, trying to establish a platform 
of common dialogue, with common premises, concerning different colonies, 
different colonial experiences and ultimately different cultural, social and po-
litical contexts.
The Russian jurist Friedrich Fromhold von Martens, member of the Insti-
tut Colonial International as well as of the Institut de Droit International, 
compared laws and decrees concerning land law and land register systems in 
the colonies and emphasised the need to formulate « universal » principles to 
be adopted in the different colonial experiences:
Notre désir et notre but est que l’échange des idées sur les différentes expériences 
faites dans les diverses colonies des différents pays nous aide à obtenir des principes qui 
puissent être adoptés par les différents pays. […] Je crois […] qu’il est absolument néces-
saire d’obtenir et établir des principes qui forcent l’unité dans la législation coloniale et le 
système foncier à appliquer aux colonies.70
The international exchange of principles of colonial law presupposed the 
definition of the general legal principles that Europe sought and established 
between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Space, 
69  Singaravélou 2012, p. 135. 
70  Martens 1904, p. 363.
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understood as private and public space, was defined by the choice of register 
systems introduced in Europe and in the colonies.
A global perspective on this space resulted from the proliferation of es-
tablished land register systems in numerous colonies. Ordering space in 
the colonies led to increasing interest among the European states as colo-
nial rulers in discussing questions of regional planning and register systems. 
The search for general principles, as well as the development of individual 
land register systems, shows the dialectic between universality and particu-
larity on the one hand, and between expansion and the creation of normativ-
ity on the other.
The colonial context formed and traced the international space in which 
a plurality of actors operated within a plurality of norms. This international 
space was characterised not only by its dynamics, but also by its intrinsic 
multiplicity of forms and models, with the common aim of guaranteeing the 
transfer of property rights. In this international space, economic, legal and 
political interests intertwined and formed an inextricable whole.
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THE POLITICS OF REAL PROPERTY IN
THE KINGDOM OF SARDINIA, 1720–1848
Charles Bartlett
This chapter is interested in the politics attached to real property regimes 
in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, and it takes as its focus the Kingdom of Sar-
dinia from the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance to the Statuto Alber-
tino. During this period, the Kingdom of Sardinia underwent drastic territo-
rial and administrative change, much of it inseparable from a broader context 
of political and social development across Europe. The consequences of such 
change for the institutions of real property offer a fascinating glimpse into 
how such institutions relate to structures of political power and collective en-
terprise, how that relation can lead to their politicization, and how amenable 
these institutions are to alteration. Although this chapter, like others in this 
volume, is therefore not solely interested in using political timelines to define 
the characteristics and developments of land law, it is interested in the effects 
of each upon the other, and chooses dates of political significance to bound 
the investigation because these come more easily to hand. That being said, 
the processes of interest to us are complex, and reference will be made to 
phenomena that fall outside these years.
The French Revolution and the First French Empire dominate events at 
the middle of our timeline and had profound effects on the Kingdom of Sar-
dinia, both in terms of political ideology and administration. It will come as 
no surprise that much of what we will discuss is framed through the issues 
that actors at the time and scholars subsequently have identified as central, 
above all the concentration of land-owning and bureaucratic centralization. 
Although developments in the Kingdom of Sardinia were tied to broader phe-
nomena across the continent, there were nevertheless particularities in the 
Kingdom of Sardinia that we will discuss in detail. These particularities were 
due in no small part to variations in land law within the Kingdom of Sardinia 
at the end of the 18th century, which were owing to the perpetuation of region-
al differences within the recently expanded polity, and, relatedly, growing 
pressure for Italian unification. 
In characterizing the relationship between political regimes and land law, 




common parlance, the word “corporation” is used to denote a small subset 
of the organizations and activities to which the word could be applied, and 
indeed historical consideration only reveals more pluralism. Further, it will 
come as no surprise that the dominant impression of what a corporation is, 
among the array of collective ventures that could be so labeled in any one 
moment, has itself changed over time. In using the lens of the corporation 
to examine the politics of real property regimes in the Kingdom of Sardinia 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, this chapter is also interested in a likely shift 
away from one of the previously instrumental conceptions of the corporation. 
As we would expect, given the expansive nature of many political and social 
events of these years, this shift was informed by happenings elsewhere in Eu-
rope, and indeed must also be seen within an extra-European context, as will 
be discussed. Nevertheless, developments in the Kingdom of Sardinia offer 
a unique example of the shift away from one form of corporate organization 
through the politics that came to be attached to it.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. It first recalls in broad strokes the 
political history of the Kingdom of Sardinia during these years. In providing a 
grounding upon which to examine the changes that interest us, this historical 
recapitulation will prime us to consider the varied experiences of different 
regions within the Kingdom of Sardinia in terms of political and real prop-
erty administration, as well as the affinities between some of those regions 
and other polities. Next, it will present the salient points of the history of the 
corporation over the longue durée. This sketch will not only demonstrate the 
varied nature of corporate undertaking over time, but will speak to the dom-
inant conception of the form of the corporation in several periods, as well as 
how that dominant conception has changed. 
We will then delve into the politics of the administration of real property 
in the Kingdom of Sardinia in our period, especially in the decades on either 
side of the turn of the 19th century. Having considered the history of the King-
dom of Sardinia and neighboring polities over these years as well as the histo-
ry of the corporation, we will be in good stead to appreciate how a particular 
sort of corporation was central to the politicization of real property, and how 
the movement away from this type of corporation influenced the dominant 
conception of corporate activity. This is the corporation of peasant laborers 
that owned and administered collective property under the feudal system of 
land tenure. More details will follow in due course, but it is a principle aim of 
this chapter to float the idea that this sort of organization is best understood 
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as a form of corporation, and that we here glimpse the conception of the “cor-
poration” at a moment of transition toward its more familiar, commercial 
sense. Finally, we will close by considering how the actions of the restored 
monarchy in the realm of real property inform upon the regionalism seen in 
the decades following our period. This chapter will not discuss in detail the 
Risorgimento or the institutions that followed in its wake, but will offer some 
suggestions as to how the actions of the government in Turin in the years 
after 1815, especially in the context of the corporation and the administration 
of real property, set the stage for regional variations within the Kingdom of 
Italy and promoted continuing affinity and exchange with areas to the north 
and west.
Over these four parts, this chapter drives toward three conclusions. It ar-
gues first that using the lens of the corporation allows for a more complete pic-
ture of the politicization of real property regimes in the Kingdom of Sardinia 
in our period, and that the events related to this politicization mark a decisive 
shift in the conception of the predominant form of the corporation toward 
commerce and away from communal governance. Second, it examines the 
relationship between the actions undertaken by the restored monarchy in re-
gard to the administration of real property after 1815 and the pronounced re-
gionalism of the Kingdom of Italy. It argues that these policies fundamentally 
changed the stance of the monarchy vis-à-vis the entities that had previously 
administered real property in the Kingdom of Sardinia, thereby encouraging 
the standardization of such administration, and created a somewhat more 
coherent polity that increasingly looked abroad for influence and exchange; 
this interaction prompted further developments intelligible in regional terms. 
Third and finally, this chapter seeks to provide an instance of a much larger 
historical point, namely that political systems and offices can more easily be 
changed than can underlying mechanisms of real property transfer and ad-
ministration. The Kingdom of Sardinia in these years demonstrates the stay-
ing power of these mechanisms, and that they often stubbornly resist efforts 
at reform.
We must also define the terms that form the basis of our discussion. We 
will use the common understanding of “real property” as land and the build-
ings constructed on it, although the land itself was the foremost consider-
ation during many of the events described. For our terms, “politicization” 
means the understanding and characterization of an institution as belonging 
to or serving the interests of a certain political regime, and therefore able 
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to changed. And finally, a “corporation” is an entity distinct from its mem-
bers formed for a collective undertaking, which need not but may own and/or 
control property, and whose actions and claims in regard to property, and to 
other rights and privileges, receive legal recognition. 
1. The Kingdom of Sardinia, 1720–1848
It will be useful first to contextualize our subject within the history of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia and the relevant polities during the period of interest to 
us. Here we will touch upon the territorial expansion of the Kingdom of Sar-
dinia in the first decades of the 18th century; the fissures exposed by invasion, 
occupation, and administration by France from 1792, as well as the territorial 
gains that followed the Congress of Vienna in 1815; and finally, the events of 
the mid 19th century that have been seen as instrumental in the unification 
of Italy shortly thereafter. This short sketch will hopefully both suggest the 
extent of the complexities – political, economic, and social – inherent in a 
polity so situated, and prime us to consider the larger political valences and 
corporatist dimensions of different administrative initiatives.1
The Peace of Utrecht marked the end of the War of Spanish Succession 
(1701-1714), and the treaties signed in 1713 required Spain to give over Sicily 
and portions of the Duchy of Milan to Savoy; this rendered the Duke of Sa-
voy, Vittorio Amedeo II at the time, King of Sicily. Spain was also forced to 
cede Sardinia and the majority of the Duchy of Milan, along with the Spanish 
Netherlands and the Kingdom of Naples, to Charles VI, Holy Roman Emper-
or and Archduke of Austria. Several years later, Spain tried unsuccessfully to 
recapture these lost territories. The resulting War of the Quadruple Alliance 
(1718-1720) reversed all of the intervening Spanish gains, and at its conclu-
sion, the Treaty of the Hague cemented the territorial arrangements prior to 
1717 as far as the Spanish were concerned, but forced Savoy to exchange Sicily 
for Sardinia, the former now to be ruled by Austria. Thus, the areas of Savoy, 
Piedmont, the Aosta Valley, the Ligurian Coast from Nice to Oneglia (now 
Imperia), and Sardinia were constituted as the Kingdom of Sardinia.
As soon as these territorial bounds were established, land reform began in 
Savoy and later moved to Piedmont. This reform stemmed from the attempts 
of Vittorio Amedeo II to rectify the financial problems that had developed by 
1  For a treatment of the earlier history of the region, cf. Schena 2012 and Barbero 
2012.
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1720. As in much of Europe, large estates had been created in Savoy over the 
preceding centuries through lords’ accumulation of their dependents’ lands 
through mainmorte. In order to raise funds, Vittorio Amedeo confiscated the 
land of lords who could not produce title to their expansive properties, and 
curtailed other longstanding noble privileges.2 Upon succeeding his father, 
Carlo Emanuele III at first moved away from this initiative, but later in his 
reign pursued it with force. In 1762 he decreed an end to mainmorte on royal 
land, and in 1771 he abolished mainmorte entirely, rendering all peasants in 
the duchy his direct subjects once they secured their emancipation.3 While 
Carlo Emanuele fancied himself a child of the Enlightenment, the fiscal ef-
fects of the departure of many peasants from the Duchy were likely a strong 
motivation for such action, and with this move the Duchy increased its reve-
nues from taxation.4 When Vittorio Amedeo III became Duke, he dithered as 
to whether or not to enforce the decree that had been issued just before his 
succession, and ultimately put into effect an amended decree in 1778. Slowly 
but steadily redemption payments chipped away at serfdom, until in 1790 
the peasants, emboldened by the events in France, called for immediate and 
complete emancipation, storming chateaux and torching archives.5
As it did the whole of Europe, the French Revolution greatly affected the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, both through war and territorial change from the 1790s 
and, by means of the political ideas that it brought to the fore, in the decades 
that followed 1815. There is of course an immense literature on the French 
Revolution, and rather than rehash the details of these complex years, we 
need only recall the broad strokes of some of its most consequential ideas in 
order to see effects upon the Kingdom of Sardinia in the areas of interest to 
us here.6 
2  For a description of this process, cf. Clark 1995, p. 145.
3  This decree allowed for voluntary emancipation, and provided that if the lord and 
the peasants could not agree upon terms within a specified length of time, then govern-
ment officials would set the parameters of the arrangement. A fixed and low indemnifica-
tion fee was set, and if the fee could not be met, the peasant community could sell off some 
of the communal land to raise the necessary funds. We will return to this form of corporate 
ownership below.
4  Blum 1978, p. 217.
5  See Blum 1978, p. 218 for a portrait of Vittorio Amedeo III and a lucid description 
of the end of this series of decrees.
6  Of the many such studies, three sound treatments of the effects of the French Rev-
olution and Napoleon upon the Italian peninsula are Grew 1999, Broers 2017 (some of 
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The Kingdom of Sardinia was drawn into conflict with the First French Re-
public when Savoy was annexed in 1792 as the 84th Département; in this year, 
the French government decreed the immediate end of serfdom and cancelled 
any remaining redemption payments. Several years later, the disadvanta-
geous Treaty of Paris of 1796 was foisted upon Sardinia after several defeats 
on the battlefield, and through it, Sardinia recognized the new French state 
and withdrew from the First Coalition arrayed against it. The treaty forced 
Sardinia to cede a number of fortresses, and to allow free passage of French 
troops through Piedmont into the rest of Italy. Sardinia was also compelled to 
cede the already-annexed Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice to France. 
In the wake of the treaty, the French general Barthélemy Catherine Joubert 
occupied Turin at the end of 1798, forcing Carlo Emanuele IV to flee to Sar-
dinia, and the provisional government set up in Turin voted to unite with 
France. The Code Napoléon was put into force in Italy from 1806 until the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars.
Within this context of disruption and perceived weakness on the part of 
the Kingdom of Sardinia, there was a great deal of unrest in Italy during the 
period of French occupation. In addition to the events in Savoy already men-
tioned, the Kingdom of Sardinia also saw longstanding tensions stemming 
from the nature of Savoyard administration of the island of Sardinia boil over 
into the Sardinian Vespers of 1794-1796. The peasants of Sardinia had chafed 
under the feudal system that had long existed on the island. After 1720 they 
were joined in their discontent by the local notables, who resented that they 
were now governed from Turin and that administrative positions increasingly 
came to be filled by well-connected people from the mainland. This adminis-
tration had grown to be more invasive than the Spanish system that had ex-
isted previously, and once powerful Sardinians took issue especially with the 
fact that all the most lucrative episcopates were staffed by Savoyard officials.7 
A viceroy was dispatched to the island, in the manner of a colonial posses-
sion, and served as a bureaucrat without independent initiative or political 
role, but solely to carry out inflexible instructions from Turin.8 The revolt was 
finally touched off when the Sardinians, after repelling a French invasion at-
tempt in 1793 and thereby, so they thought, demonstrating their loyalty to 
which looks especially at the north), and Davis 2006 (which traces developments in south-
ern Italy). Among them these three also provide extensive bibliography. 
7  Raspi 1971, p. 793.
8  Sotgiu 1984, p. 25.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY AND LAND LAW
209
Savoy, issued the “Five Requests” to Vittorio Emanuele III. These were an 
attempt to regain their traditional political and administrative privileges, and 
to render administration of the island more in line with practices elsewhere 
in the Kingdom. Although the Five Requests could hardly be called revolu-
tionary, Vittorio Emanuele rejected all of them. In the wake of this rejection, 
over 500 Savoyard administrative officers were rounded up in Cagliari, put 
on a boat, and ferried back to the mainland. The revolt spread to elsewhere 
on the island, and Giovanni Maria Angioy emerged as one of its leaders. It 
was curtailed in 1796 after loyalist forces gained additional support following 
the Treaty of Paris, and Angioy was forced to flee to France, where he contin-
ued to agitate for French annexation of the island. Sardinia remained under 
Savoyard control, and although there were several more feudal uprisings un-
til 1821, an altered aristocratic governance was restored and links with the 
mainland strengthened, culminating in the Perfect Fusion of 1847.
The Kingdom of Sardinia benefitted from the Treaties of Paris of 1814 and 
1815, the latter of which finally brought an end to the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars. In 1814, the Republic of Genoa was added to the King-
dom of Sardinia and two-thirds of the Duchy of Savoy was returned, and a 
year later the remainder of Savoy was restored. Once the monarchy regained 
its position after its exile in Cagliari, its policies were reactionary.9 Vittorio 
Emanuele I withdrew the Code Napoléon, returned lands to the nobility and 
to the Church, and entrusted the Jesuits with many institutions of education 
and afforded them censorship privileges.10 Liberals and others in Piedmont 
resented these policies and instead were increasingly attracted to some of the 
positions of the Carbonari, especially in regard to the necessity of a constitu-
tion.11 The heir apparent, Carlo Alberto, seemed to support this position, and 
in March 1821 the revolt that had begun in Naples arrived in Turin. Vittorio 
9  Lo Faso di Serradifalco 2016.
10  For a fuller description of Vittorio Emanuele I’s efforts to stamp out any change 
from the ancien regime, cf. Laven, 2000, p. 55 and the relevant bibliography.
11  A complex movement that gained ground throughout the peninsula in the wake 
of the Congress of Vienna, the Carbonari were drawn from many levels of society and un-
surprisingly differed to some degree in their views. Some wanted a radical redistribution 
of land through an agrarian law, while others from the landowning classes favored, if not 
a full-fledged republic, a constitution that would bind any particular monarch; many of 
these landowners had obtained their property from land sales during the period of French 




Emanuele I abdicated in favor of his brother, Carlo Felice, and made Carlo 
Alberto regent until his brother returned from Modena. Carlo Alberto pro-
claimed that the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which would have abolished 
feudalism and provided for universal male suffrage, would go into effect upon 
the approval of the absent king, but Carlo Felice refused the action.12 Carlo 
Alberto eventually submitted to Carlo Felice, and the latter returned to Turin 
secure in his position. 
Carlo Felice recognized that attempting to reestablish the ancien regime in 
its entirety would have been catastrophic, and there were moderate reforms 
throughout the 1820s.13 There were disturbances throughout the peninsula 
in the 1830s, owing to the effects of economic hardship and, to perhaps a 
lesser extent, nationalistic movements elsewhere in Europe, but more drastic 
change came in the 1840s.14 The Perfect Fusion of 1847 abolished differenc-
es in governmental administration between the island of Sardinia and the 
mainland, thereby sweeping away many of the institutions and practices that 
had characterized life on the island since Spanish rule. This came as certain 
well-positioned Sardinians started to see the Spanish institutions as a major 
hindrance in light of the administrative reform that had been taking place 
on the mainland. When the last viceroy departed the island in early 1848, 
Sardinia was split into three administrative provinces, each ruled by a prefect 
on the model in place on the mainland since 1815. Although this move was 
called for by certain Sardinian elites, the result was in large part the further 
marginalization of the island within the Kingdom of Sardinia, which led many 
proponents of the initiative later to regret their role in it.15
In the immediate aftermath of the Perfect Fusion came the Statuto Al-
bertino of 4 March 1848. This provided the constitutional and legal basis 
on which the Kingdom of Sardinia was to be administered, and remained in 
force, with modifications, until 1948. The Statuto was not promulgated at a 
time of political calm in Italy by any means, and nor did it quell the unrest, 
drawing the ire of the Church especially.16 It is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to detail the happenings of 1848-1849 across Italy, but in closing this his-
torical sketch we must note that this display of constitutional intent by the 
12  On the Spanish Constitution of 1812, cf. Schmidt-Nowara (ed.) 2012.
13  Laven 2000, p. 56.
14  Laven 2000, p. 59-61.
15  Siotto Pintor 1877, p. 476-477.
16  Cardoza 2000, p. 118-119.
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monarchy in Piedmont changed the political situation by sufficiently aligning 
monarchic and liberal programs.17 The economic reforms of the subsequent 
decade made Piedmont the most commercially powerful state in Italy. These 
factors led many to migrate to Turin, and this in turn fueled the nationalist 
and liberal movements in the state, which would come to the fore at the end 
of the decade.
2. The Corporation by the late 18th century
Now that we have recalled the political events in the Kingdom of Sardin-
ia and neighboring polities during the period of our study, we turn to the 
history of the corporation. The object of this section is to convey the many 
forms and ends of corporations across time, and especially to demonstrate 
that commerce was far from the sole or even primary motivation to incor-
porate throughout much of western history, in contrast to what quotidian 
usage today may suggest. That being said, one or several forms within this 
multitude predominated during any particular period, as we will discuss, and 
so the colloquial reduction in the term’s scope today is not unprecedented. 
In tracing the emergence of a predominant usage at any one point in time, 
we will take account of the larger intellectual and political economy develop-
ments which these usages reflect. Fortunately, we have a fair bit of evidence 
for these developments during the period of primary interest to us, as we will 
examine below.
When many of us hear the familiar word “corporation,” the idea of a 
for-profit enterprise designed to maximize share holder value comes to mind. 
We certainly recognize a number of variations from this idea, but in many 
circumstances, this is the default conception of a corporation. Of the two ele-
ments of this conception, the drive toward commercial profit and share hold-
er primacy, the former only became a characteristic of some of the most well-
known corporations more than a millennium after the first such entities, and 
the latter is a product almost entirely of the last century.18 The origins of the 
17  Davis 2000, p. 13.
18  Sneirson has documented the history of shareholder primacy extensively. His most 
recent treatment admirably excavates not only the relationships between shareholder 
primacy and sympathetic doctrines, but also the assertion, which he correctly points out 
is false, that corporate law, at least in the United States, all but requires a dedication to 
shareholder primacy (Sneirson 2019; cf. also Stout 2013). In the United States, this norm 
was given a strong boost by the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford 
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corporation are to be found at Rome. Although it is very likely that groups of 
citizens came together already in the first years of the Republic, whose found-
ing is traditionally dated to 509 bce, to contract with organs of the “state,” 
the first detailed evidence we have of such an arrangement dates to 215 bce.19 
Our evidence for Roman history from the late third century bce to the first 
century ce makes clear that although their dealings with the state would occa-
sionally revert to hostility, the societates publicanorum (sing. societas pub-
licanorum) or “companies of publicans,” were integral to the workings of the 
Roman empire, performing crucial administrative tasks. They famously make 
appearances in several of the Gospels as tax collectors, portrayed in less than 
the most favorable terms.20 
There are other documents that give a more complete picture of their 
tax-collecting operations. One example is the Customs law of Asia, an in-
scription dating to 62 ce that was lost sometime later and discovered in 1976 
in Ephesus, Turkey.21 This document consists of provisions passed by Roman 
magistrates, including the emperor, which spell out how taxes were collected 
in the Roman province of Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey). It attests to the 
power of the societates in the Roman world, and indicates their symbiotic 
relationship with the Roman state and, relatedly, their corporate structure.22 
Although some studies have seen far more similarities to later corporations 
than the ancient evidence will bear, a Roman juristic source specifies that by 
the time of the high Empire (2nd century ce), the societas had property, a trea-
in 1919, but the doctrine had questionable reach before this landmark decision (Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)). The growth of this doctrine was closely con-
nected to developments in the United Kingdom, where too the evidence of a financializing 
conception of the corporation was unmistakable (cf. Moore 2018).
19  For a discussion of these very first arrangements, cf. Badian 1972, p. 16. The coher-
ence and capacity of political and other civil institutions in the early Roman Republic is an 
issue of perennial debate among ancient historians.
20  Cf., inter alia, Luke 3:12-14; 5:27-28; and 18:9-14. These were the most conse-
quential of the Roman corporations.
21  The most complete publication of the text and a translation, along with an explan-
atory introduction and several analytical essays, is Cottier et al. 2008.
22  Cf., respectively, lines 40 to 42 and 67 to 68, lines 56 to 58, and lines 74 to 78 of 
the text of the inscription for specification that the societates were allowed to use state re-
sources in performing their duties, that they were the only organizations licensed to collect 
taxes, and that they were except from the terms of the very law.
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sury, and an agent distinct from those of its members.23 Crucially, this source 
likens these aspects of the societas to the state, which at this time in Roman 
history was an autocracy. We see similar tendencies in the Customs law of 
Asia to structure the societas as a singular entity, especially in its dealings 
with the state. This relation of the corporation to a state is powerful evidence 
of the development in Roman political thought, if not in legal doctrine, of the 
notion of corporate personhood.24
In the medieval period there emerged a corporation that would exercise 
great influence over the development of the corporate form and over debates 
regarding its nature. That institution was the medieval Church. The Church 
came to be discussed as something different from those corporations that had 
preceded it or existed alongside it. No picture of the medieval world is com-
plete without mention of the constantly negotiated arrangements between 
the papacy, the holy orders, kings, nobles, imperial outposts, and indepen-
dent polities, not to mention the various autonomous or semi-autonomous 
interstices. The power dynamics of this reality bear directly upon how the 
Church came to be conceived of in corporate terms, as there arose the ques-
tion of whether the power of the Church derived from the Church itself, or 
from the various self-sufficient bishoprics, abbeys, and monasteries. To put 
this another way: to what extent did the Church exist, as far as the faithful of 
any one place were concerned, beyond the affairs of the local bishop?25 If the 
ultimate authority was to be found in Rome, and here we must stress the dis-
tance from the center of some Christian communities, then certainly a greater 
feat of mental concentration and understanding of structure was required, 
and with it a more nuanced theory of delegation. From here it is not a stretch 
to see how an interest in the potentially numinous nature of the corporation 
grew.
23  Digest 3.4.1.1. Cf. esp. Malmendier 2009 for several of the most pervasive anach-
ronistic claims regarding the complexity of the societates, including that shares in these 
companies were traded on an exchange, which the ancient evidence cannot support.
24  Cf. lines 133 to 135 and 140 to 143. Appreciation of the stature of the societates 
in the Customs law also allows us to see that these corporations were powerful well into 
the first century ce, which is to say solidly within the classical period of Roman law. We 
should understand them as influencing Roman ideas of contract. Maitland (1913, p. xviii) 
remained unconvinced that the Romans developed a legal notion of corporate person-
hood, and indeed it does not seem that there were instruments to ensure the survival of 
the corporation beyond the death of its members.
25  For a discussion of these and related questions, cf. Tierney 1998.
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Such an interest is certainly of accord with Pope Innocent IV’s suggestion 
of the existence of a legal persona, and indeed jurists became invested in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in questions of a potentially operable cor-
porate personhood that transcended the individual members.26 As mentioned 
above, Roman jurists had already recognized certain aspects of the corpora-
tion that distinguished it from its various members, but there had not been 
consideration of the implications of endowing a collection of individuals with 
its own quasi-permanent legal status beyond certain transactions or the lives 
of certain members. Nor had the question of exactly what sort of status this 
was been taken up: did the corporation exist as a separate entity apart from 
the individuals who composed it, or was it an amalgamation of those indi-
viduals that nevertheless could express its own preferences, at least in some 
general sense? At stake in the debate over how to conceive of corporations, 
and especially over whether to conceive of them as fictive persons, were the 
sorts of rights and responsibilities that should be conferred upon them, and 
the manner in which this should be done. It follows from the fact that a corpo-
ration cannot die in the way of human beings that certain other expectations 
relating to social interaction may have to be changed.27
The municipal corporation is also of great importance to this history, and 
was in fact the most commonly formed corporation throughout the medieval 
and early modern periods.28 This corporation offered its members various 
privileges, especially through the legal norms that governed its space, with 
the result being that this corporation constituted a societal form as well as a 
body politic or a commonwealth.29 The municipal corporation often claimed 
political and legal standing based not on charter but on custom. In this con-
text, the writing of local histories was a decidedly political act, and municipal 
officials often archived those documents that gave the corporation recogni-
tion in law.30 The types of legal action undertaken by municipal corporations 
differed to some degree from that of other types of corporations, and its terri-
torial confinements were crucial to its character. The political aspects of this 
character ensured that it too was fertile ground for figurative thought.31
26  Bus 1988.
27  On this and related questions, cf. Seipp 2012.
28  Stern 2017, p. 23-24.
29  Withington 2010; Stern 2017, p. 24.
30  Patterson 1999, p. 70. For a discussion of these ideas in Renaissance Italy, cf. Va-
ranini 2012.
31  Turner 2016.
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The guild was also an extremely consequential corporate form in the me-
dieval period. Over the course of these centuries, as ideas of commercial 
partnership that had come into form around the Mediterranean moved into 
northern Europe and were interpreted in the terms applied to the corpora-
tions already present there, municipalities and religious bodies defended 
their legal privileges by insisting that they were different from such commer-
cial ventures. This discussion, by relating other types of collective undertak-
ing to those already present but still maintaining differentiation, broadened 
notions of the corporation to include guilds.32 In much of Italy, these entities 
were not by any means only commercial, but indeed have been seen as indis-
pensable to an increase in participation in local government and the forma-
tion of the popolo.33 Scholars usually distinguish between merchant guilds 
and craft guilds, and hasten to assert that guild characteristics and practices 
varied greatly across time and space.34 
Merchant guilds enforced contracts between members and non-members. 
Through the coordination of the affairs of their members, they were able to 
organize boycotts of certain ports where rapacious political authorities seized 
the goods or money of merchants; this deprived rulers of critical tariff reve-
nue, and was a powerful bargaining strategy. The corporate structure of guilds 
did not protect the property of individual merchants in all cases, however. In 
certain instances when one member did not pay a debt in a foreign port, all of 
the members of the merchant guild could be held liable and their goods seized 
to cover the shortfall. Recompense would be sought from the offending mer-
chant upon return to the home market, but we clearly see here the give-and-
take of collective negotiation.35 Craft guilds were organized around particular 
trades. Manufacturers made durable goods such as textiles and metal wares, 
and exported them when profitable. Some guilds, such as those of clerks or 
actors, sold skills and services. Still others, known as victualers, bought and 
sold agricultural products. There has been much debate as to the control ex-
ercised by specific guilds in various times and places, but for centuries they 
32  Laski 1917, p. 578; Tierney 1998.
33  Mineo 2012, p. 327-333.
34  There is an immense literature on the history of the guilds. For an up-to-date bib-
liography of the major titles, cf. Ogilvie 2019; p. 1-34 are helpful in spelling out some of 
these variations. For a summation of the debate over whether guilds spurred or hindered 
technological development in European history, cf. Prak and van Zanden 2013.
35  Cf. Thrupp 1989 for a sustained discussion of the relations between these commer-
cial elements and other prominent groups in medieval English society.
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remained powerful economic actors when they were able to control entry into 
certain professions, coordinate the activities of their members, and bargain 
with political officials.36
The guilds certainly retained their importance well beyond the end of the 
medieval period. Indeed, the guilds were not abolished in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia until 1844, and lasted at least until the end of the 18th century else-
where in Italy.37 The commercial practices of guilds, including their monop-
olistic control over certain industries and their collective ownership of prop-
erty, among others, have led some scholars of the early modern period to see 
them as the precursors of the joint stock corporation.38 By the 16th century, 
the corporation was used increasingly, though by no means exclusively, to 
organize commercial activity, and the joint stock company was a way to coor-
dinate increasingly ambitious commercial and political aims. An innovation 
of this corporate form was to fund such endeavors with capital from people 
beyond just those associated with the business of the company.39
The relationship between the joint stock company and the state was a fluid 
one, but one commentator at least has stressed as fundamental the insistence 
on the part of several joint stock companies that they not be subsumed with-
in the state apparatus.40 The joint stock company elided elements of a col-
lectivity, the societas, as well as those of a unitary persona, the universitas. 
The joint stock company also had many executive and administrative roles, 
including, depending on the parlance of the particular firm, directors, gover-
nors, shareholders, subcontractors, and, if the company undertook coloniza-
tion and governance, settlers and subjects. Among the many differences be-
tween the early modern joint stock company and 21st-century ventures is the 
36  Cf. Richardson 2001 and Hatcher and Miller 1995 for two discussion of the power 
of guilds to influence local economic conditions, and Ogilvie 2019, p. 36-82 for an over-
view of the interactions between guilds and local governments.
37  Caligaris 1998 shows the interactions between guilds and other social organiza-
tions in the Kingdom of Sardinia, and how those interactions evolved in the context of 
18th-century commercial change.
38  Scott 1912, p. 1.2-8; Cooke 1950. Of the several other types that could be added 
to this survey of corporations, the university was frequently discussed in early modern 
treatises on the topic; cf. Stern 2017, p. 24, who notes their importance to Blackstone, and 
to Coke before him.
39  Cf. Stern 2017, p. 25 for an indication of the broad social basis of such funding.
40  Maitland (1913, p. xxi-xxii) points especially to the Bank of England and the East 
India Company.
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process of chartering such a company. This process was political rather than 
administrative, with the result that incorporation remained a sovereign pre-
rogative rather than an individual right. The significance of this distinction is 
that, during the early modern period, those who wanted to form a corporation 
were often obliged to argue how such a charter would benefit the state. This 
was not always required, but at times a prospective corporate venture had to 
highlight the advantages it would confer on the populace at large.41 The de 
facto power of many corporations meant that keeping a charter came to func-
tion as a right, and some argued that legally this was true as well.42
So what then is the picture of the corporation by the late 18th century that 
emerges from consideration of its long history? An impression is best gained 
by looking at the characteristics, the capabilities, and the purposes of differ-
ent examples. In terms of the characteristics of the corporation, it collected 
the interests of many people into one entity in order to advance the goals 
or protect the position of those people who judged this the most efficacious 
mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism was due to the legal recog-
nition it received, as well as the fact that it existed beyond the lives of any par-
ticular members. It had wide-ranging capabilities, including the right to own 
and administer property, the capacity to control and govern territory, and 
certainly the ability to bargain effectively with the state to maintain its privi-
leges and advance its interests. The purposes for which various corporations 
were formed were also many. Alongside the profit motive that is most familiar 
to us, groups of people chose to incorporate to advance educational, religious, 
charitable, and administrative interests. The importance of commerce within 
this list undoubtedly grew over the centuries, but the interrelation of these 
large societal phenomena counsels against seeing any particular corporation, 
especially one dealing in a meaningful way with real property, as solely con-
cerning itself with one of the items on this list.
3. Real property, politics, and corporations
Now that we have considered the history of the Kingdom of Sardinia and 
that of the corporation, we are in good stead to see how these two histories 
41  A general incorporation law would eventually do away with this in many countries. 
For a treatment of the main intentions of such laws in many contexts, cf. Atack 2014, esp. 
p. 557-558.
42  Cf. Stern 2017, p. 26
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interact, and to form judgments about three elements of these interrelated 
developments. First, we will juxtapose the characteristics of certain types of 
corporations to demonstrate that in fact the peasant collective should be con-
sidered as a kind of corporation. Second, we will show that this consideration 
affords us a better understanding of the politicization of real property in the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, especially in the years surrounding the French Revolu-
tion. And third, we will see that developments in the years after 1815 suggest 
a change in the dominant conception of the corporation.
In considering the history of the corporation, the deep similarities between 
types of corporations that we classify as different emerge. The corporate form 
evolves from gradual adjustment and discussion, and so it is unsurprising that 
some elements between different forms would be familiar or that later forms 
would divide out or build upon the characteristics of earlier forms, and we 
should not think of these forms as by any means hermetically sealed from one 
another.43 The dominant notion of the corporation can change, but nonethe-
less there may remain some similarities across different corporate types that 
we should be open to observing. The peasant corporation combines elements 
of a municipal corporation and a guild, while retaining some unique charac-
teristics. We will have to triangulate this argument by describing the aspects 
of the municipal corporation and of the guild that the peasant corporation 
preserves, and then specifying its unique elements. I cannot offer absolute 
proof of this, but it is my hope that this suggestion will prove interesting and 
useful in thinking about the corporate form and real property across history.
In terms of the similarities of the peasant corporation with a municipal 
corporation, we stress first that both had administrative power over the lives 
of the people in an area, and that participation in the corporation was not 
discretionary if one wished to live in that area. This phenomenon contributed 
to the great jurisdictional plurality in many early modern states, although, 
crucially, the peasant corporations were formed in the wake of the establish-
ment of a fief and did not have the same level of control as municipal corpo-
rations over the space in which they functioned.44 Both also created political 
community, by fostering personal interaction and organizing the actions of 
43  Recall that the new commercial corporations that moved to northern Europe were 
rendered different from but intelligible in terms of municipal and religious corporations. 
The joint stock company is especially multivalent.
44  For a description of the powers of different actors over the affairs of a fief, cf. Cen-
garle 2012, p. 295-300.
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their inhabitants in dealings with political authorities. In addition to their 
functioning, we can look to their origins to see some similarities between a 
municipal corporation and our peasant corporation. Corporations of each 
type may or may not have had clear moments of inception, but custom was 
fundamental in both cases. 
As we have seen, the writing of local histories was meant to bolster the rec-
ognition that municipal corporations customarily received, and was certainly 
a political act. I contend that we observe a similar practice in the context of 
the peasant corporation, namely the creation of a feudal archive, kept espe-
cially to record debts. The two forms of documentation have their differences, 
but from the standpoint of the establishment and operation of the entity in 
question, they share many similarities, such that the archive should be con-
sidered a form of historical documentation. Historical documentation need 
not produce a bound volume, nor must it be in the service and interest of the 
members of the corporation it is meant to enshrine. These peasant corpora-
tions were by-products of the creation of noble positions, and such positions 
required these archives. This reality means that the peasant corporation pro-
tected to some degree the rights of peasants within the political economy of 
the ancien regime, but the peasants likely would have favored the dissolution 
of the corporation in the context of a different political economy altogether.45 
Would that we knew what was contained in them in more detail, but the peas-
ants burned the archives in many parts of Sardinia in 1790, no doubt in an 
attempt to cripple the debt relationships that sustained this system.
The peasant corporation shares some similarities with the guild as well. 
The peasant corporation controlled agricultural production within its do-
main, much as craft guilds monopolized the production and merchant guilds 
the distribution of certain wares. Again, the creation of these privileges and 
the means of perpetuating them will have been different between the two 
forms, but their place in the structure of a local economy may have been quite 
similar. Crucially, guild members also pooled resources in their dealings with 
governments as we have seen. We do not have much information on how 
members of the peasant corporation determined the use of communal land, 
but there must have been internal reconciliation when collective resources 
went toward payment of indemnification for individuals, perhaps in a man-
ner not dissimilar from how other members of the guild paid outstanding 
45  For a treatment of the emergence of estates and nobility in the centuries preceding 
our period, cf. Marino 2007 and Cengarle 2012.
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debts in foreign markets amassed by certain individual merchants. It would 
be fascinating to know how decisions regarding the use of this communal 
land were reached, and procedures must have varied widely.
The proximity of the peasant corporation to these and other corporate 
forms will have changed over time, especially as the nature of the state, with 
which they all interacted, underwent such change in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies. Some of these corporate forms adapted and changed, and others died 
out. But what is different about the peasant corporation at this time? In terms 
of membership in the corporation, there is only so much land within a given 
community, and this cannot be divided up past a certain point, nor a later 
offering made. Additionally, the fact that this property is immovable would 
make difficult the affairs of anyone living in the area and not wishing to par-
ticipate in the corporation, and so there was less commercial discretion. This 
must account for the reality that membership was confined to one stratum 
of society, but must have affected many in that stratum in some locations.46
Focusing on the membership of the peasant corporation allows us to judge 
its role in the politicization of real property. This corporation like others was 
a marker of the ancien regime, an example of a privilege recognized or creat-
ed by the state to control a trade or the administration of an area. Of course, 
the peasant corporation depended upon a feudal setting as we have said, but 
interpreting feudalism in this light is instructive; the lens of the corporation 
affords us a far better understand standing of the dynamics of mainmorte 
on feudal estates. As the ancien regime came under pressure, so too did 
many domestic expressions of the corporate form, especially those that kept 
in place such a system of land ownership.47 The politics of real property is 
not only who owns or has the right to own land, but how it is administered 
and the rules governing its use. Therefore, the political project in the years 
surrounding the French Revolution was about changing the internal rules of 
corporations regarding how land was administered, through redistribution 
and administrative standardization, away from the particularism of any one 
corporation. However, initiatives that affected the whole polity in the realm 
of the administration of real property could cut both ways. Apart from the 
46  For a discussion of this question in the German context, cf. Sagarra 1977, p. 140-
154. In terms of the framing of questions related to corporate participation, cf. Kaplan 
1986.
47  For an interesting case from Lille where guilds were not suppressed as elsewhere, 
cf. Bossenga 1988.
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immediate context of its destruction during the French Revolution and brief 
resuscitation after 1815, the ancien regime was not entirely static in regard to 
private property.48 In the decades leading up to 1789, a great deal of commu-
nal property was privatized, with the result that many peasants lost access 
to village commons and other lands. This continued on the island of Sardin-
ia with the Enclosures Act of 1820. The removal of such lands was a funda-
mental change in the system underpinning the peasant corporation, and this, 
combined with the effects of the abolition of mainmorte, led to its end. 
With recognition that we are dealing with a complex and ever-shifting phe-
nomenon and that much more work is required to firm up such an assertion, 
this chapter seeks also to propose the idea that developments in the wake of 
1815 were fundamental not only in bringing about the end of the peasant cor-
poration, but also in prompting a change in the predominant understanding 
of a corporation away from one almost necessarily including some element of 
governance and toward a primarily commercial conception. As the state as-
serted itself more forcefully after these years, corporations acted less and less 
as bodies politic, guilds were eventually abolished, and those corporations 
that were constituted increasingly asserted commercial ends. This gained an 
impetus from general incorporation laws in many countries, and is related as 
well to distinctions made between domestic administration on the one hand, 
and the governance of Europe’s overseas empires on the other.
4. Conclusion: regionalism after 1815 and after 1848
In this concluding section, we will briefly consider the actions of the re-
stored monarchy after 1815 in terms of what they can tell us about region-
alism in the Kingdom of Sardinia through 1848 and in the Italian state after 
1861, and about the relationship between political change on the one hand, 
and development in the institutions of real property on the other.
Our main point here is that the actions undertaken in Turin after 1815 
ironed out many of the administrative differences across regions within the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, and that the more unified polity thereby created would 
in some regards manifest itself as a region once Italy was united, albeit with 
certain differences after 1861. To a great extent this uniformity excepted the 
48  There has been a great deal written about this legislation and the related intellectu-
al movements, especially physiocracy, among which see the articles in Kaplan and Reinert 
2019 for up-to-date bibliographies, and Reinert 2019 for a treatment of these issues in Italy.
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island of Sardinia, but the fact that real property administration on the island 
was still changed after 1815, culminating in the Perfect Fusion in 1847, was 
crucial to doing away with the peasant corporation through the abolition of 
communal land. The restored monarchy was of course hostile to many of the 
goals of the revolutionary and Napoleonic years, and could draw on a base of 
resentment toward France.49 Nevertheless, the lens of the corporation allows 
us to see similarities in the initiatives both of revolutionaries and of monar-
chists toward centralization and standardization after 1789. That being said, 
the restored monarchies did try to reconstitute some of the corporate priv-
ileges that had existed before the end of the 18th century, but this was done 
in a manner entirely different from that in which the system of corporations 
emerged before 1789. In fact, the granting of these privileges all at once had 
a valence, in terms of the power dynamics between the state and these corpo-
rations, counter to the negotiated and variegated foundation of such corpo-
rations initially, where the state acknowledged that it needed these corporate 
entities to govern. The position, therefore, of these corporations vis-à-vis the 
state had changed at its core. Of course, the state did still need these entities 
in many ways, but the unilateral reinstatement of privileges was different not 
only aesthetically from the initial negotiation of them centuries before. In-
deed, it gestures toward the notion that the state is rather more necessary for 
commerce the closer to capitalism we come.
In carrying out this administrative standardization, the House of Savoy 
took cues from other polities, and the decision of what model to use rested on 
historical affinities and traditional connections over the border in France. We 
can see the connections between Turin and France in the use of the French 
provincial model to administer the island of Sardinia, and indeed that Savoy 
had been an integrated as a Département after 1792. The promulgation of 
the Code Napoléon after 1806 will only have deepened these long-standing 
commonalities. Although certain areas within the Kingdom of Sardinia had 
historically looked more toward and more like southern France than others, 
Turin’s actions after 1815 brought some measure of standardization to the 
Kingdom of Sardinia. This standardization did not extinguish the gaze of the 
House of Savoy, however. Napoleon spurred nationalist feeling throughout 
the Italian peninsula of course, and increasingly in the decades following 1815 
attentions in Turin were pulled south. After the Risorgimento, redrawn na-
tional boundaries did not dissolve regional particularities, but did alter at-
49  Broers 2001.
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tempts to define identities by reference to other polities. In these years, only 
parts of what was the Kingdom of Sardinia looked across national lines to the 
north and west again, in a manner suggesting that some aspects of the region-
alism of that by now by-gone polity had only been papered over.50 Other areas 
looked to Florence and then to Rome. 
Lastly, we should consider that the monarchy’s restoration of ancien re-
gime privileges after 1815 may to some degree have been an economic neces-
sity, pointing to the idea that political forms can more easily be changed than 
can the underlying mechanisms of real property transfer and administration. 
It was political more than real property institutions that experienced whip-
lash and chaotic upheaval over these years. The momentum that eventually 
changed these real property institutions required a great deal of time to swell, 
such that even after 1815 many trappings of the ancien regime system carried 
on. What makes this particular period of politicization so interesting is that 
one type of corporation deeply related to these institutions seems finally to 
have been abolished, even if it generated far less excitement than the political 
turmoil of the moment.
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Toward the end of the 19th century, an independent Chile experienced a fast-ter-
ritorial expansion and established several colonies in the southern territories of 
Santiago, included Araucanía, where lived the Mapuche, a group of indigenous 
inhabitants of south-central Chile and southwestern Argentine. For this, the gov-
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ernment in Santiago promoted a new colonial project. First, the Mapuche were 
persuaded to remise their land and to live in the cities; second, the Chilean gov-
ernment aimed to convince the European to settle in Chile by describing all ben-
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pecially the laws of 1866 and 1874.
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